area handbook series 

Cote d 'I voire 

a country study 



Cote d'l voire 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Robert E. Handloff 
Research Completed 
November 1988 



On the cover: Detail of hand-painted Senoufo tapestry from 
northern Cote d'lvoire 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Cote d'lvoire : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Robert E. Handloff. 

p. cm. — (Area Handbook Series) (DA pam ; 550-69) 

"Replaces the second edition of the original Area handbook for 
the Ivory Coast, which was reprinted in 1973 with an added 
summary of events covering the period January 1963 to December 
1972"— Pref. 

"Research completed November 1988." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 223-241) and index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-69/990 

1. Ivory Coast. I. Handloff, Robert Earl, 1942- . 

II. Roberts, Thomas Duval, Area handbook for Ivory Coast. 

III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. Series. 
V. Series: DA pam ; 550-69. 

DT545.22.C66 1990 90-5878 
966.6805— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-69 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of T.D. 
Roberts, Donald M. Bouton, Irving Kaplan, Barbara Lent, Charles 
Townsend, and Neda A. Walpole, who coauthored the first edi- 
tion of Ivory Coast: A Country Study, the predecessor of the current 
volume. The authors also wish to thank Roxanne Donahey, William 
Kallon, Vincent Kern, Gilda Nimer, and Benjamin Nimer, who 
updated the original volume with a new section entided "Sum- 
mary of Events: January 1963-December 1972." Their collective 
work provided the organizational outline for the present volume 
as well as substantial portions of the text. The authors are grateful 
to those individuals in various public and private agencies who con- 
tributed photographs, research materials, and invaluable time and 
expertise to the production of this book. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the text. Thomas Collelo, Richard F. Nyrop, 
and Sandra W. Meditz reviewed all drafts and provided guidance; 
Martha E. Hopkins and Marilyn Majeska managed editing and 
production; Mimi Cantwell, Sharon Costello, Vincent Ercolano, 
Ruth Nieland, and Sharon Schultz edited the chapters; Beverly 
Wolpert performed the final prepublication review; and Shirley Kes- 
sel prepared the index. Also involved in preparing the text were 
editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson. Malinda 
B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared the 
camera-ready copy, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto reviewed draft maps from which he, Kimberly 
A. Lord, and Harriett R. Blood prepared the final maps. Addi- 
tional thanks are due also to Kimberly A. Lord for designing the 
artwork for the cover and the illustrations on the title page of each 
chapter and, with David P. Cabitto and Sandra K. Ferrell, prepar- 
ing charts and graphs. Arvies J. Staton provided information on 
military ranks, uniforms, and insignia. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction , xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Rachel Warner 

PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD 5 

ARRIVAL OF THE EUROPEANS 7 

FRENCH EXPANSION IN COTE DT VOIRE 9 

Local Resistance and Establishment of 

Protectorates 9 

Repression and Conquest 11 

FRENCH RULE UNTIL WORLD WAR II 12 

Evolution of Colonial Policy 12 

Colonial Administration 12 

Economic Development and Social Change 14 

IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II 16 

Brazzaville Conference 16 

French Union 18 

Regional Political Cooperation 20 

TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC 

PARTY OF COTE DTVOIRE 21 

REFORM AND THE FRENCH COMMUNITY 22 

INDEPENDENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION 

OF THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM 23 

INTERNAL DISSENT AND FURTHER 

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 25 

Changes in Government and Party Structures 25 

Sources of Popular Discontent 26 

Consolidation of Power in the 1960s and 1970s 27 

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF THE 

LATE 1970s AND 1980s 30 

Growing Economic Problems 30 

Succession Question 31 

Party Decentralization 32 



vii 



Discontent on Campus 32 

Other Sources of Discontent 33 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 37 

Rita M. Byrnes 

PHYSICAL SETTING 41 

Location and Size 41 

Physical Features 41 

Rivers 44 

Climate 45 

POPULATION 46 

Distribution 47 

Composition 48 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 48 

Ethnic Diversity 48 

Language Diversity 50 

Lineage Patterns 51 

East Atlantic Cultures 53 

West Atlantic Cultures 56 

Mande Cultures 59 

Voltaic Cultures 60 

Foreigners 61 

THE ROLE OF RELIGION 64 

Local Religions 66 

World Religions 69 

Syncretic Religions 73 

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 73 

Urban Society 74 

Elites 76 

The Role of Women 78 

Social Attitudes 79 

EDUCATION 80 

The Education System 81 

Problems in Education 85 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 86 

Social Programs 88 

Social Problems 88 

Chapter 3. The Economy 91 

Robert E. Handloff and Judith Timyan 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 94 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 98 

Public Investment 99 

Budget 100 



Vlll 



Banking and Finance 102 

LABOR 105 

Wages and Income Distribution 107 

Labor Unions 109 

AGRICULTURE 109 

Land Use 110 

Cocoa 112 

Coffee 112 

Timber 113 

Diversification Crops 115 

Food Crops 117 

Animal Husbandry 120 

Fisheries 120 

MANUFACTURING 121 

ENERGY 123 

Electricity 123 

Other Energy Sources 125 

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 125 

Petroleum 125 

Natural Gas 127 

Other Minerals 127 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 128 

Railroads 129 

Roads 130 

Ports and Maritime Shipping 131 

Air Transport 132 

Telecommunications 133 

FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE 134 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE 134 

National Debt 135 

Foreign Assistance 137 

FUTURE OF THE ECONOMY 138 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 141 

Robert E. Handloff 

FORMAL POWER 145 

The Constitution 145 

Civil Rights 146 

The Executive 147 

The National Assembly 148 

The Economic and Social Council 149 

Judicial System 151 

Local Government 153 



ix 



ACTUAL POWER 156 

The Party 156 

Party Organization 158 

Orientation Toward the Political System 160 

INTEREST GROUPS AND NATIONAL POLITICS 162 

Political Issues 162 

Interest Groups 168 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 172 

Foreign Relations and the Council of the Entente .... 173 
Relations with Ghana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, 

and Mali 174 

Relations with Other African States 176 

Relations with France 176 

Relations with the United States 177 

Relations with the Soviet Union and China 178 

Relations with Israel 178 

Chapter 5. National Security 181 

Joseph P. Smaldone 

ARMED FORCES 184 

Early Development 184 

Constitutional, Legal, and Administrative 

Structure 186 

Defense Mission and National Policy Structure 189 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 192 

Training 193 

Foreign Influences 197 

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN SOCIETY 200 

The Military in National Perspective 201 

National Service and Veterans Groups 201 

INTERNAL SECURITY 203 

Domestic Security 203 

Human Rights 206 

Internal Security Organization and Forces 206 

Crime and Punishment 210 

Appendix. Tables 215 

Bibliography 223 

Glossary 243 

Index 247 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Cote dTvoire, 1988 xxii 



x 



2 Precolonial Kingdoms 6 

3 Topography and Drainage 42 

4 Vegetation Zones, 1983 44 

5 Population by Age and Sex, 1988 50 

6 Major Ethnic Groups, 1983 52 

7 Percentage of Population by Ethnic Cluster, 1988 54 

8 Public Education System, 1988 82 

9 Cocoa, Coffee, and Timber Producing Areas 114 

10 Timber Production, Selected Years, 1961-87 116 

11 Economic Activity, 1983 126 

12 Transportation System, 1988 132 

13 Organization of the Ivoirian Government, 1986 150 

14 Organization of Ivoirian Defense Forces, 1985 188 

15 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1988 194 

16 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1988 195 



XI 



Preface 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study replaces the second edition of the 
original Area Handbook for Ivory Coast which was reprinted in 1973 
with an added summary of events covering the January 1963 to 
December 1972 period. Like the earlier study, this edition seeks 
to provide a concise and objective account of the history and 
dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of con- 
temporary Cote d'lvoire. Sources of information included schol- 
arly monographs and journals, official reports of governments and 
international organizations, periodicals, and foreign and domes- 
tic newspapers. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the 
book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources ap- 
pear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the 
metric system; a conversion table to aid readers is included (see 
table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

Authors have spelled place-names in accordance with usage estab- 
lished by the United States Board on Geographic Names. In trans- 
literating personal names, they have followed standard usage in 
official Ivoirian sources. 



xm 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republique de Cote d'lvoire. 
Short Form: Cote d'lvoire. 
Term for Citizens: Ivoirians. 
Capital: Abidjan. 

Date of Independence: August 7, 1960, from France. 

Geography 

Size: Total area 322,460 square kilometers. 

Topography: Southern boundary 515-kilometer coastline on Gulf 
of Guinea. Southeast marked by coastal lagoons; southern region, 
especially southwest, densely forested; northern region savanna zone 
of lateritic or sandy soils, with vegetation decreasing from south 



xv 



to north within region. Terrain mostly flat to undulating plains, 
with mountains in the west. 

Climate: Warm, humid climate transitional from equatorial to trop- 
ical. In north, heavy rains between June and October (110 cen- 
timeters annually); along equatorial coast, some rain in most 
months, but heaviest between May and July and August and Sep- 
tember (200 centimeters annually), with major dry season from 
December to April. Temperatures average between 25°C and 30°C 
and range from 10°C to 40°C. 

Society 

Population: As of 1987, estimated at 10.6 million, with average 
annual growth rate of 4.1 percent, one of highest in world. Roughly 
50 percent of population urban and concentrated in Abidjan and 
Bouake areas. Average population density thirty- two persons per 
square kilometer in 1987. Forty-five percent of population under 
age fifteen. 

Ethnic Groups: More than sixty ethnic groups. Major ethnic 
groups included: Baoule (15 percent), Senoufo (10 percent), Bete 
(6 percent), Lagoon peoples (5 percent), Agni (Anyi — 3 percent), 
and Mande cluster of groups, including Juula, Bambara, and 
Malinke (17 percent). Non-Ivoirian Africans, Lebanese, Asians, 
and Europeans composed nearly 27 percent of population. 

Languages: Number of African languages (grouped into four 
branches of Niger-Congo language family) corresponds roughly 
to number of ethnic groups. Sections of several groups speak differ- 
ent languages. Some languages used as mother tongue by more 
than one ethnic group. Official language, French; variants of 
Mande-kan spoken throughout country as commercial language. 

Religion: In 1980s one-fourth of population Muslim, one-eighth 
Christian (mostly Roman Catholic), and remainder local religions 
or, in smaller numbers, syncretic religions. 

Education: Six-year primary- school system compulsory where 
available. In 1987 enrolled 75 percent of boys and 50 percent of 
girls under fifteen. Only 19 percent of primary- school students en- 
rolled in public secondary schools. After four years, students sit 
for exams for certificate of lower cycle of secondary study {brevet 
d' etude du premier cycle — BEPC). A second three-year cycle led to 
baccalaureat, necessary for university entrance. Public schooling 
through university controlled and funded by central government. 
Fourteen percent of primary schools and 29 percent of secondary 



xvi 



schools private, mostly Catholic. Some Quranic schools in north 
tolerated but not supported by government. In 1988 overall liter- 
acy rate 43 percent; 53 percent for men and 31 percent for women. 

Health: In 1988 health services unable to meet needs of majority 
of population. Urban-rural and regional imbalances, low ratios of 
doctors to patients, and severe shortages of nurses and auxiliary 
health care personnel existed. Public health programs underfunded 
and personnel lacked adequate training. Nutritional deficiencies 
and impure water major sources of disease. Malaria, measles, and 
tropical ailments common; 250 cases of acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) reported by end of 1987. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Economy oriented toward private enterprise with 
extensive government participation through parastatals, investment, 
and tax policies. Foreign investment welcomed; multinational 
corporations heavily involved in two-thirds of largest thirty busi- 
nesses dealing in commodity exports, food processing, oil refin- 
ing, textiles, beverages, construction, and commercial wholesaling 
and retailing. Country's principal resource agricultural land. Major 
food crops yams, cassava, rice, maize, and plantains. 

Agriculture: Thirty-four percent of population engaged in sub- 
sistence farming. Cash cropping on small plots (coffee, cocoa, and 
cotton) and large plantations (bananas, palm oil, pineapples, rub- 
ber, and sugar). Agriculture second largest contributor to gross 
domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) and main source of exports. 
In late 1990s, not self-sufficient in food production. 

Manufacturing: Import substitution consumer goods, some in- 
termediate inputs for domestic markets, and food processing — 
coffee, cocoa, and sugar — for export. Most industry required im- 
ported intermediate materials. 

Mining: Some diamonds, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, 
copper, nickel, colombo-tantalite, ilmenite, and gold, but none in 
significant amounts; offshore oil met about two- thirds of local needs. 

Energy: Rural population heavily dependent on wood; urban popu- 
lation, on electric power, natural gas, and kerosene. 

Foreign Trade: Principal exports cocoa, coffee, and timber; other 
exports cotton, sugar, rubber, palm oil, and pineapples. Principal 
imports petroleum products, machinery, and transport equip- 
ment. 



xvn 



Currency: African Financial Community (Communaute Finan- 
cier Africaine) franc (CFA F) equal in 1988 to 315 per dollar and 
freely convertible to French francs (FF). 

Fiscal Year: January 1 through December 31. 

Transportation 

Railroads: Government-owned railroad runs 660 kilometers be- 
tween Abidjan and border with Burkina Faso, where, under differ- 
ent ownership, it continues on to Ouagadougou; one-meter gauge, 
single track except at stations. 

Roads: Extensive system totaling 53,736 kilometers; more than 
3,600 kilometers bituminous and bituminous-treated surface; 
32,000 kilometers gravel, crushed stone, laterite, and improved 
earth; 18,136 unimproved. Hard surface roads generally run north- 
south, linking cities to Abidjan. 

Ports and Shipping: Major ports at Abidjan and San-Pedro; minor 
port at Sassandra. At Abidjan, facilities included total of thirty- 
five deep water berths for general, bulk, and container cargo; roll- 
on/roll-off facility; and specialized quays for bananas, fish, tim- 
ber, cement, hydrocarbons, and tankers. In 1986 handled 9.5 mil- 
lion tons of cargo. 

Civil Aviation: Government-owned Ivoirian Air Transport and 
Liaison (Groupement Aerien de Transport et de Liaison — GATL), 
also known as Air Ivoire, provided domestic and regional service; 
international service provided by Air Afrique, owned by consor- 
tium of African countries and based in Abidjan. International air- 
ports at Abidjan, Bouake, and Yamoussoukro, plus 13 major 
domestic airfields, 17 smaller regional airfields, and 50 private air- 
fields. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitution of 1960 creates republic with strong, cen- 
tralized presidential government, independent judiciary, and na- 
tional legislature. President and 175-member National Assembly 
(Assemblee Nationale) elected by universal suffrage for five-year 
terms. In the late 1980s, all candidates had to belong to Democratic 
Party of Cote dTvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote dTvoire — 
PDCI), then the country's only legal party. 

Administrative Divisions: Forty- nine prefectures divided into sub- 
prefectures; thirty-seven municipalities enjoyed autonomous status. 



xvin 



Judicial System: Laws based on French and, to lesser extent, cus- 
tomary law. Upper-level courts included Supreme Court, High 
Court of Justice, and State Security Court; lower courts included 
courts of appeal, courts of first instance, courts of assize, and justice 
of peace courts. 

Politics: As of late 1988, Felix Houphouet-Boigny had served as 
president since independence. He had not named a successor, en- 
couraging rivalry between National Assembly president Henri 
Konan Bedie and Economic and Social Council president Philippe 
Yace. Economic austerity, calls for multiparty system, and increas- 
ing crime were potential threats to stability. 

Foreign Affairs: Leading member of Council of the Entente and 
West African Economic Community; pragmatic foreign policy; 
staunch ally of France and other Western nations on which Cote 
d'lvoire relied for development aid. Supported United States agenda 
on South Africa and Chad. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1987 armed forces numbered 9,730 personnel: 
army numbered 5,500; navy, approximately 700; air force, approx- 
imately 930; and Presidential Guard and Militia (Garde Presiden- 
tielle et Milice — GPM), approximately 2,600. Military service 
compulsory; however, volunteers easily filled needs. 

Major Tactical Units: Army included four infantry battalions of 
three companies each, one armored battalion of two squadrons, 
one antiaircraft artillery battalion, and one engineering battalion, 
all with support units. Navy included warships, auxiliaries, and 
service craft. Air force had one fighter-bomber squadron plus twenty 
transport aircraft and eleven helicopters for training and transport. 

Foreign Military Assistance: Relied almost exclusively on French 
weaponry, communications equipment, and training. Japan pro- 
vided a training ship plus technical assistance and training; Brit- 
ain, Netherlands, Sweden, and United States sold support aircraft, 
small naval craft, trucks, jeeps, and mortars; Switzerland provided 
assault rifles. 

Defense Expenditures: In 1986 defense spending came to CFA 
F32.4 billion, or less than 7.5 percent of government budget. 

Police and Paramilitary Forces: In 1987, National Security Police 
(Surete Nationale), a national police force, numbered 5,300; 
paramilitary National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), 



xix 



responsible for maintaining law and order in rural areas, numbered 
approximately 4,500. Municipal police, under local control, main- 
tained law and order in all urban administrations. 



xx 



MALI 



•10 



t . ' \LTingrela* » '/" 



BURKINA 
FASO 



7 



1 

Odienne 



' A 



10- 



J 



Ferkessedougou Vj 



GUINEA '-.x / ~\ 

\ )Kato'al Dabakala ^ 



Bouna 



* Touba 



( ""^Segue/a 
• — ^ g uBiankour^ ■ • . 

J\f h<}J \ 17 . - 



J Kaf/o/a 

TO 



7 .1 

Bondoukou ' 
^ -Tandf- ■ ■ 



SZuenoula 



14/. cf%— '30^ 



21 V^ oo C 

.C- . Bouake ) , X, 90 

ZSakpssOj- W ,Mbahiakro p. £.0 . 

26 24 . 

•4fc>engourcJi/ 



' /ss/a 



JBERIA 



. Boua/te Yamoussoukro - .^gourdu 

V; 5*2 ,^' m . b r^ ooa T • ) GHANA 
. : ^ 43 / • ***wO M 

' 9n0a .'4fi) n,,„ Ti^fal/Agbovill^ A I 



■ 33 y* 9 ™ '46; «„ teSA^y , 



/ 

f 49 : 48 j .J — 

J^^Sassandra ^hou Q u lf j guinea 
^San-Ptoro 




Atlantic Ocean 



o Boundary representation g 
not necessarily authoritative t 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Cote d'lvoire, 1988 



xxii 



Prefectures of Cote d'lvoire 



Abengourou (24) 
Abidjan (41) 
Aboisso (40) 
Adzope (39) 
Agboville (42) 
Bangolo (16) 
Beoumi (19) 
Biankouma (13) 
Bondoukou (7) 
Bongouanou (27) 
Bouafle (29) 
Bouake (21) 
Bouna (6) 
Boundiali (3) 
Dabakala (8) 
Daloa (30) 
Danane (14) 
Daoukro (25) 
Dimbokro (26) 
Divo (45) 
Duekoue (31) 
Ferkessedougou (5) 
Gagnoa (35) 
Grand-Lahou (44) 
Guiglo (32) 



Issia (34) 
Katiola (9) 
Korhogo (4) 
Lakota (46) 
Man (15) 
Mankono (10) 
Mbahiakro (22) 
Odienne (1) 
Oume (36) 
Sakasso (20) 
San-Pedro (48) 
Sassandra (47) 
Seguela (11) 
Sinfra (37) 
Soubre (33) 
Tabou (49) 
Tanda (23) 
Tiassale (43) 
Tingrela (2) 
Touba (12) 
Toumoudi (38) 
Vavoua (17) 
Yamoussoukro (28) 
Zuenoula (18) 



Prefectures have the same names 
as their respectve capitals. 



Introduction 



OBSERVERS OF AFRICA have often characterized Cote d'lvoire 
as different from the rest of Africa. Borrowing the metaphor of Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny, president of Cote d'lvoire, they have described 
it as an oasis of political stability and economic prosperity — in short, 
the "Ivoirian miracle." Indeed, if judged on the basis of political 
stability and economic performance during its first twenty years 
of independence, Cote d'lvoire does appear unique: it has had only 
one president and no coups since gaining independence, and be- 
tween 1960 and 1979 the gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary) grew by almost 8 percent per year, compared with minimal 
or negative growth rates elsewhere in Africa. However, that growth 
produced large — some would have said dysfunctional — disparities 
in wealth and income and skewed development. Consequently, the 
country was ill prepared when, in the late 1970s, world prices for 
coffee and cocoa, Cote d'lvoire's principal export commodities, 
dropped, while prices for its principal imports rose. Meanwhile, 
foreign borrowing to finance massive investments in infrastructure 
and public enterprises (that lost money) raised Cote d'lvoire's for- 
eign debt beyond its ability to meet its obligations. Budget reduc- 
tions and a structural adjustment program forced the vast majority 
of the population to lower its expectations, which in turn contributed 
to, among other social ills, heightened frustrations and a sharp in- 
crease in violent crime. By the end of the 1980s, Cote d'lvoire was 
confronting the same problems of political and economic develop- 
ment as other African countries and having to respond with many 
of the same difficult and often inadequate solutions. 

In the early precolonial period, the dense forests covering the 
southern half of the area that became Cote d'lvoire created bar- 
riers to large-scale sociopolitical organizations. In the savanna region 
to the north, dissimilar populations had neither the incentive nor 
the strength to overcome ethnic differences and forge a larger state. 
Prior to the eighteenth century, polities consisted of villages or 
clusters of villages whose contacts with the larger world were filtered 
through long-distance traders. 

European — in this case French — interest in the area remained 
desultory until late in the nineteenth century. Following the Franco- 
Prussian War in 1871, for example, the French ministry responsi- 
ble for colonies offered to exchange Cote d'lvoire with the British 
for the Gambia, which bisected the French colony of Senegal. The 
British refused, and France officially abandoned the territory. By 



xxv 



the late 1880s, however, the scramble for colonies gripped both 
France and Britain. In the western Sudan (see Glossary), French 
military officers and freebooters extended French domains, often 
without the knowledge or consent of the home government. Un- 
substantiated rumors of gold and a lucrative trade in the hinter- 
land of Cote d'lvoire once again stimulated French interest in the 
colony. In 1886 France again exercised direct control over the trad- 
ing posts on the Ivoirian coast, and in 1887 and 1888 Captain Louis 
Binger and Maurice Treich-Laplene negotiated a series of agree- 
ments with local chiefs in the north-central and northeastern regions 
of Cote d'lvoire to bolster French claims of effective occupation. 
Thus, by the end of the decade, France exercised sovereignty over 
most of the coastal region of Cote d'lvoire and claimed influence 
over certain regions of the interior. In 1893 Cote d'lvoire became 
a colony, and Binger served as its first governor. 

Over the next twenty years, French administrators used the mili- 
tary to subdue African populations that, with few exceptions, openly 
resisted French intrusions. In the 1890s, Samori Toure, seeking 
to construct a kingdom across much of the Sahel, including north- 
ern Cote d'lvoire, withstood French (and British) forces until he 
was captured in 1898. At about the same time in eastern Cote 
d'lvoire, the Agni (Anyi) and Abron peoples first resisted the French 
and, after military setbacks, either sabotaged or circumvented the 
colonial administration. In the early twentieth century, the Baoule 
of central Cote d'lvoire openly defied colonial authorities until for- 
cibly subdued in a bloody, so-called pacification campaign under- 
taken in 1906 by Governor Gabriel Angoulvant. 

The French administered Cote d'lvoire in a more direct, sys- 
tematic style than did their British counterparts, who preferred in- 
direct rule. French authorities routinely dismissed locally selected 
chiefs, replacing them with others having no legitimate claim to 
authority, and regrouped or consolidated villages in an attempt 
to impose a uniform administration throughout the country. As 
late as 1958, Paris still appointed governors, who administered the 
colony using a system of direct, centralized rule that left little room 
for Ivoirian participation. Most of the inhabitants were considered 
subjects of France with no political rights and a separate system 
of law. Thus, all adult males were forced to work ten days for no 
pay each year, often on plantations owned by the French, as part 
of a tax obligation to the state, and rural males were routinely 
drafted to work, again for no pay, on public works projects like 
roads and the railroad. 

World War II profoundly affected all of French West Africa 
(Afrique Occidentale Francaise — AOF; see Glossary). The rapid 



xxvi 



surrender of France and the institution of highly discriminatory 
policies under the Vichy regime alienated the African political elite, 
many of whom had served France in World War I and expected 
greater respect. During the immediate postwar years, an emergent, 
educated African elite demanded reforms in colonial policy. In 
response, France joined with its colonies in 1946 to form a com- 
munity known as the French Union and granted to African mem- 
bers rights of free speech, free association, and free assembly. France 
also eliminated separate legal codes and the practice of unlimited 
forced labor. 

Despite these concessions, wealthy Ivoirian planters were still 
incensed at having to work on the plantations of French settlers, 
who by law received more for their crops than they themselves did. 
As a result, the Ivoirian planters formed the African Agricultural 
Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain — SAA) to fight for equal rights. 
In 1946 the SAA gave rise to Cote d'lvoire's sole political party, 
the Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote 
d'lvoire — PDCI) under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. 
During the postwar years, the party, in cooperation with a regional 
coalition of anticolonialist groups, militantly challenged French poli- 
cies in Cote d'lvoire. Confrontation led to such violence and repres- 
sion that by 1951 the party was in near ruin. To stave off a collapse, 
Houphouet-Boigny abandoned his alliance with the French Com- 
munist Party and the radical politics of earlier years in favor of 
practical cooperation with French authorities. France then granted 
significant political and economic concessions to the colony, which 
soon became the wealthiest in French West Africa. 

In 1956 the French government authorized for all of its African 
colonies a series of momentous and fundamental reforms, which 
in effect substituted autonomy for integration with France as the 
cornerstone of French colonial policy. Two years later, under the 
leadership of President Charles de Gaulle, the Constitution of the 
French Fifth Republic provided for the free association of autono- 
mous republics within the French Community, in which France 
was the senior partner. Cote d'lvoire voted in favor of the Consti- 
tution, which was thought to be a more pragmatic course than com- 
plete independence. Nevertheless, following the lead of Senegal and 
Mali, Cote d'lvoire withdrew from the French Community and 
in August 1960 declared its independence. Houphouet-Boigny be- 
came Cote d'lvoire's first president, an office he still held in late 
1989. 

The original drafters of the Ivoirian Constitution of October 1960 
intended to establish a democratic government with a presidential 
system incorporating the principles of the separation of powers and 



xxvn 



an independent judiciary. Within a short time, however, gover- 
nance became highly authoritarian. Party leadership equated a uni- 
fied state with unanimous support for the PDCI under the untested 
belief that competition among parties would waste resources, lead 
to corruption, and destroy unity. By circumscribing the preroga- 
tives of the National Assembly and tailoring election laws, 
Houphouet-Boigny effectively denied the assembly an independent 
voice; and by doling out patronage, co-opting opponents, and pit- 
ting rivals against one another, he tightened his grip on government. 

Even those who objected to Houphouet-Boigny' s style admired 
the results of his policies: twenty years of economic growth and 
political stability. Nevertheless, invidious habits and attitudes that 
had developed over the twenty years of economic growth posed 
a potential threat to the political order. In few other countries was 
materialism as open and avowed an ideology. By the 1980s, the 
elite, using its official positions and connections to obtain wealth, 
had replaced the struggle for independence with the pursuit of 
privilege, leading to manifest extremes of wealth and poverty. This 
elite was infected with consumerism, and it could not afford to lose 
or even share power. At the same time, the sharp economic down- 
turn of the 1980s and Houphouet-Boigny 's advancing age caused 
fears that the ethnic rivalries he sought to dampen might ignite 
under a less charismatic successor. 

For Cote dT voire, ethnicity was a particularly thorny problem. 
The population included some sixty indigenous ethnic groups. The 
largest group (that of Houphouet-Boigny) was the Baoule, which 
comprised 15 percent of the population and was centered in the 
forest region southeast of Bouake. The Baoule were part of the larger 
Akan ethnic cluster, which also included the Abron and the Agni 
groups. The chief rivals of the Baoule were the Bete, who in the 
1980s made up approximately 6 percent of the population. Dur- 
ing the twentieth century, the Bete achieved recognition for their 
success in cash cropping and for their widespread acceptance of 
Christianity. Because the Bete nurtured strong beliefs in the su- 
periority of their culture and had a long history of resistance to 
foreign domination, they have often been accused of fomenting anti- 
government dissent. Other major ethnic groups included the Dan, 
the Malinke, the Juula, the Senoufo, and the Agni. The largest 
single foreign minority group was the Burkinabe (natives of Burkina 
Faso, formerly known as Upper Volta), who were generally Mossi. 
They were concentrated in rural areas, where they worked as farm 
laborers. The Lebanese, officially estimated at 60,000 but possi- 
bly numbering 180,000, dominated sectors of the wholesale and 
retail trade. In 1988 there were approximately 30,000 French 



xxviii 



citizens in Cote d' I voire, or about the same number as at in- 
dependence. 

Because no single ethnic group held a preponderance of power, 
none could automatically impose its will. Ethnic politics, therefore, 
were important in Cote d'lvoire, notwithstanding presidential state- 
ments to the contrary. And because of that cultural diversity, 
Houphouet-Boigny, making a virtue of necessity, perfected the po- 
litics of inclusion. All major ethnic groups were represented in his 
cabinet and the major policy-making bodies of the PDCI, making 
it easier to deflect responsibility at a time when the rising expecta- 
tions of Ivoirians were being thwarted. 

The Ivoirian economy in the late 1980s continued its downward 
spiral, primarily because world prices for coffee and cocoa, the coun- 
try's two principal exports, remained low. At the same time, ex- 
ports of timber, the third largest source of foreign exchange, declined 
because of continued overexploitation. Two offshore petroleum 
fields, which in the early 1970s were projected to make Cote d'lvoire 
self-sufficient in fuel, failed to achieve projected outputs, let alone 
self-sufficiency. Because of the relatively low world prices for petrole- 
um and Cote d'lvoire's high production costs, all the wells in one 
field were capped. 

Beginning in the mid-1970s, the government undertook a major 
effort to diversify the export economy by expanding production 
of palm oil, natural rubber, coconut oil, cotton, sugar, and tropi- 
cal fruits. Ten years later, the government implemented a program 
to modernize its import substitution industries, sell off unprofitable 
parastatals, and further expand exports to include processed foods, 
textiles, wood, and such nonagricultural products as building 
materials, chemicals, and electronics. 

The results of all three plans were mixed. The market for palm 
and coconut oils was eroded by substitutes with less saturated fat; 
sugar, produced by a grossly inefficient parastatal, simply added 
to a world surplus; and in other areas Cote d'lvoire was compet- 
ing with other states of Africa and Asia producing many of the same 
tropical agricultural goods. Exports produced under the industri- 
al expansion program were more expensive — at least initially — 
than similar goods produced elsewhere and so required export sub- 
sidies. Subsidies, however, required scarce funds. Meanwhile, 
Houphouet-Boigny adamantly refused to cut producer prices for 
coffee and cocoa; consequendy, production levels increased — some 
estimates for the 1988-89 cocoa harvest were as high as 700,000 
tons — which further depressed commodity prices. Finally, divest- 
ment from parastatals yielded lower returns than anticipated. 



xxix 



Moreover, the larger, more profitable companies were purchased 
by foreign interests, further adding to capital flight. 

The lack of investment capital was the undoing of the Ivoirian 
miracle. To finance development, Cote d'lvoire borrowed substan- 
tial amounts abroad, especially during the mid-1970s when un- 
usually high coffee and cocoa prices led planners to overestimate 
the potential of the economy. Thus, by 1976 high debt payments 
together with repatriated profits and foreign worker remittances 
had produced a negative net reserve position for the first time in 
the country's history. Debt servicing costs continued to mount to 
the extent that in May 1987 the government announced that it 
would suspend payments on its foreign debt. 

To stave off a financial collapse, Cote d'lvoire negotiated an eco- 
nomic recovery and structural adjustment program with the Paris 
Club (see Glossary), the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), and the London Club (see Glossary) that provided 
a respite from debt repayment. The subsequent retrenchments man- 
dated by the programs affected all income groups in the country, 
but they had the greatest impact on the poor. These measures gave 
rise to such symptoms of violent social dislocation as drug abuse 
and crime— which required additional expenditures and new po- 
litical options from the government. 

The party- government of Cote d'lvoire in the mid-1980s most 
closely resembled an old-fashioned political machine. Although it 
called itself a one-party democracy, Cote d'lvoire was not a 
democracy in the Western sense: the government controlled the 
press, limited civil liberties, and allowed no institutionalized op- 
position to frame debate. As economic austerity exacerbated po- 
litical tensions, individuals and informal groups called for greater 
political choice, which the government seemed unprepared to grant. 

Meanwhile, students protested against the role of foreigners in 
the economy and the government, which they saw as controlled 
by a small number of party leaders for the benefit of a privileged 
class of bureaucrats and landowners. Corruption in the business 
community, long considered an affliction of other African states, 
was becoming embarrassingly obvious in Cote d'lvoire. Reduced 
services, coupled with wage freezes and higher costs, were alienat- 
ing mid-level civil servants and professionals. And increasingly 
brazen attacks against expatriates by well-armed bandits were af- 
fecting tourism and foreign investment. A growing number of 
Ivoirians was questioning whether these problems could be solved 
by a government dominated by an octogenarian president with no 
apparent successor. 



xxx 



In the late 1980s, the choice of a successor to Houphouet-Boigny 
remained a dominant issue in Ivoirian politics. Because the style, 
form, tone, and policies of the government were the personal cre- 
ation of the president, the succession question had substantial im- 
plications. Two plausible contenders in 1989 were Philippe Yace 
and Henri Konan Bedie, representing, respectively, the first and 
second generations of Ivoirian politics. Houphouet-Boigny refused 
to designate an heir and left the decision to the political process, 
believing that the Ivoirian polity was mature enough to make a 
decision without recklessly endangering national security or 
precipitating military intervention into civilian politics. 

With the exception of a small uprising (the true size of which 
has never been documented) in 1970 near Gagnoa in the Bete 
region, the military has played no role in domestic peacekeeping. 
Moreover, Houphouet-Boigny co-opted the military with suffici- 
ently attractive perquisites (including high salaries and positions 
in the party) so that the senior officer corps had little interest in 
political meddling. To further promote satisfaction, the military 
was equipped with advanced equipment purchased from France. 

In its foreign affairs, Cote d'lvoire either befriended or attempted 
to isolate its immediate neighbors. Recognizing that the "oasis never 
encroaches upon the desert," Houphouet-Boigny sought mutually 
beneficial ties with Cote d'lvoire's neighbors despite ideological 
differences. And for good measure, he insisted that France main- 
tain a battalion of marines near Abidjan to buttress his own military. 

As Cote d'lvoire faced the 1990s, the problems of finding a suc- 
cessor to Houphouet-Boigny, discontent on the campus of its only 
university, an ossified party, and a beggar- thy-neighbor material- 
ism concerned Ivoirians. At the same time, a history of political 
stability coupled with a tradition of civilian rule and an apparent 
willingness on the part of the second and third generation of Ivoirian 
politicians to liberalize the political process and accommodate diver- 
gent views promised a less troubled future for the country. 

October 6, 1989 

* * * 

In mid- 1989, as the economy continued its decline, even lead- 
ing members of the establishment began voicing discontent, albeit 
in guarded terms. In September 1989, Houphouet-Boigny invit- 
ed political leaders — critics and supporters — to Abidjan for what 
was called "five days of dialogue." Uncharacteristically sharp and 
candid criticisms of the party and government over the five days 



xxxi 



conveyed a lack of confidence in the ruling elite, which was labeled 
narrow and selfish, and called for a more responsive party in a 
multi-party system. Less than a month later on October 16, 1989, 
Houphouet-Boigny reshuffled his cabinet and, in response to World 
Bank (see Glossary) recommendations, reduced it from 29 to 21 
members. 

Four months later, students protested recently announced wage 
cuts, tax increases, and the longstanding issue of single party rule 
with large-scale demonstrations that at times turned into violent 
confrontations with police in the streets of Abidjan and, in one in- 
stance, in Abidjan's Roman Catholic cathedral. In April and May 
1990, army and air force recruits protesting the cost-cutting deci- 
sion to limit their military service to a single tour of duty demon- 
strated in bases across Cote d'lvoire; a group of armed air force 
recruits even took over the international airport outside Abidjan 
for twelve hours. Police and firefighters also staged highly visible 
protests for higher wages. By mid-May, Houphouet-Boigny had 
capitulated on the issues of military duty and higher wages for police 
and firefighters, and he scrapped plans to increase income taxes. 
Most significantly, he pledged for the first time to legalize opposi- 
tion parties and promised to name a successor, although as of June 
1990, he had not yet done either. 



July 1, 1990 Robert Handloff 



xxxii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Nineteenth-century mud-brick mosque in the Sudanic 



SINCE THE 1950s, COTE DTVOIRE has been one of the few 
sub-Saharan African countries to enjoy political stability and a rela- 
tively sound economy. Much of the credit for Cote d T voire 's suc- 
cess goes to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the country's most prominent 
politician since 1944, who methodically shaped personal and in- 
stitutional controls and carefully cultivated and maintained close 
ties with Western industrialized countries. 

Cote dTvoire remained relatively isolated for much of its early 
history. Islam, which penetrated most other regions of West Africa 
before the sixteenth century, made only minor inroads into Cote 
d T voire 's forest belt. The country's rugged coastline and lack of 
suitable harbors discouraged European exploration until the mid- 
nineteenth century. Before that time, the only French contact with 
Cote dTvoire occurred in 1637, when missionaries landed at Assini, 
on the southern Ivoirian coast. This remote region was neither 
politically nor economically significant and therefore held little 
attraction for settlement or exploitation by European powers. 

In the 1880s, France pursued a more vigorous colonial policy. 
Driven by the growing forces of European imperial competition 
for foreign influence, as well as the promise of wealth to be found 
in a West African empire, French explorers, missionaries, trading 
companies, and soldiers gradually extended the area under French 
domination. They achieved control over the population, sometimes 
through deceit and coercion, by signing treaties with local rulers, 
who agreed to come under French protection in return for eco- 
nomic favors and protection from neighboring enemies. After Cote 
dTvoire officially became a French colony in 1893, France engaged 
in a so-called pacification campaign clearly intended to subjugate 
the indigenous population and to establish French sovereignty. 
Before World War I, the many instances of violent and protracted 
resistance to the French, especially among the Baoule, were the 
longest wars fought between Europeans and Africans in West 
Africa. In many instances, these were contained only when Ivoirians 
in positions of power recognized the tremendous economic advan- 
tages accorded them by France. 

By the 1940s, sources of strong opposition to the French colo- 
nial administration had emerged. At that time, France was neither 
able nor willing to crush opposition as in the past. Moreover, the 
opposition, which focused on the administration's institutionali- 
zation of forced labor and its discrimination in favor of French 



3 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



planters, intended — at least initially — simply to change colonial pol- 
icy rather than to achieve independence. Because all Ivoirians were 
affected by at least one of these discriminatory practices, many were 
hostile to the administration. Ivoirian planters, in particular, suf- 
fered from French discriminatory policies. In 1943, for example, 
they were forbidden to recruit their own labor and were sometimes 
removed from their own plantations to work for European enter- 
prises. This group thus stood to benefit greatly from the abolition 
of colonial labor recruitment policies and had strong reasons to 
struggle against certain aspects of French colonialism. They were 
behind the formation of an anticolonialist movement that in 1944 
resulted in the birth of the African Agricultural Union and later 
of the Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire. 

In other ways, French colonial rule had significant consequences 
for the modern history of Cote d'lvoire. The French colonial sys- 
tem introduced modern technology and economic development. 
It also reinforced the position of relatively privileged groups like 
the Ivoirian planters, when discriminatory practices were abolished 
after World War II. As a result of economic and social changes 
in France after World War II, French investments in the West 
African colonies grew at the same time as Paris thrust greater 
responsibilities and powers on its African colonies. There emerged 
in Cote d'lvoire a group whose economic interests were closely 
linked to those of France and whose continuing close relations with 
France ensured the stability of French economic interests in Cote 
d'lvoire. Thus, when Cote d'lvoire became independent in 1960, 
France was able to maintain a secure economic grip on the coun- 
try and continued to influence Ivoirian political decisions, much 
as it did before independence. 

The most significant features of modern Ivoirian history have 
been the development of the one-party state, which Houphouet- 
Boigny established to assure his own autocratic rule, and economic 
growth. When Cote d'lvoire gained independence in 1960 under 
the leadership of Houphouet-Boigny, the new president immedi- 
ately assumed strong powers as head of state, head of government, 
and leader of the ruling Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire. 
Houphouet-Boigny' s political strength derived from the country's 
economic prosperity. Until the late 1970s, Cote d'lvoire experienced 
enormous economic growth, based largely on agricultural exports. 
The benefits of economic prosperity were not equally distributed, 
however. Benefiting most was a bourgeoisie made up of wealthy 
politicians, who were often also business people and owners of 
prosperous coffee and cocoa plantations. But the president success- 
fully prevented significant pockets of resistance to his rule from 



4 



Historical Setting 



forming through a combination of co-optation and mild repres- 
sion. So successful was he that most of those whose rights were 
abused nonetheless recognized that they were materially better off 
than their neighbors. The greatest source of Houphouet-Boigny's 
popular appeal was, and continued to be in mid- 1988, the strength 
of his charismatic personality. 

Pre-European Period 

Little is known about the original inhabitants of Cote dT voire. 
Historians believe that they were all either displaced or absorbed 
by the ancestors of the present inhabitants. The first recorded his- 
tory is found in the chronicles of North African traders, who, from 
early Roman times, conducted a caravan trade across the Sahara 
in salt, slaves, gold, and other items. The southern terminals of 
the trans- Saharan trade routes were located on the edge of the 
desert, and from there supplemental trade extended as far south 
as the edge of the rain forest. The more important terminals — 
Djenne, Gao, and Timbuctu — grew into major commercial centers 
around which the great Sudanic empires developed. By control- 
ling the trade routes with their powerful military forces, these em- 
pires were able to dominate neighboring states. 

The Sudanic empires also became centers of Islamic learning. 
Islam had been introduced into the western Sudan (see Glossary) 
by Arab traders from North Africa and spread rapidly after the 
conversion of many important rulers. From the eleventh century, 
by which time the rulers of the Sudanic empires had embraced 
Islam, it spread south into the northern areas of contemporary Cote 
dT voire. 

Ghana, the earliest of the Sudanic empires, flourished in present- 
day eastern Mauritania from the fourth to the thirteenth century. 
At the peak of its power in the eleventh century, its realms extended 
from the Atlantic Ocean to Timbuctu. After the decline of Ghana, 
the Mali Empire grew into a powerful Muslim state, which reached 
its apogee in the early part of the fourteenth century. The terri- 
tory of the Mali Empire in Cote dTvoire was limited to the north- 
west corner around Odienne. Its slow decline starting at the end 
of the fourteenth century followed internal discord and revolts by 
vassal states, one of which, Songhai, flourished as an empire be- 
tween the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Songhai was also 
weakened by internal discord, which led to factional warfare. This 
discord spurred most of the migrations of peoples southward toward 
the forest belt. 

The dense rain forest covering the southern half of the country 
created barriers to large-scale political organizations as seen farther 



5 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Empire of Samory 
— - — Empire of Kong 

Abron Kingdom 

■hhb Baoule Kingdom 
Indenie Kingdom 



Present 
international 
boundary 

Precolonial 
kingdom 
capital 

Kilometers 



Sanwi Kingdom 



Source: Based on information from J. -N. Loucou, "Histoire," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 25. 



Figure 2. Precolonial Kingdoms 

north. Inhabitants lived in villages or clusters of villages whose con- 
tacts with the outside world were filtered through long-distance 
traders. Villagers subsisted on agriculture and hunting. 

Five important states flourished in Cote d'lvoire in the pre- 
European era (see fig. 2). The Muslim empire of Kong was estab- 
lished by the Juula in the early eighteenth century in the north-central 
region inhabited by the Senoufo, who had fled Islamization under 
the Mali Empire (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). 



6 



Historical Setting 



Although Kong became a prosperous center of agriculture, trade, 
and crafts, ethnic diversity and religious discord gradually weakened 
the kingdom. The city of Kong was destroyed in 1895 by Samori 
Toure (see Local Resistance and Establishment of Protectorates, 
this ch.). 

The Abron kingdom of Jaman was established in the seventeenth 
century by an Akan group, the Abron, who had fled the develop- 
ing Asante confederation in what is present-day Ghana. From their 
settlement south of Bondoukou, the Abron gradually extended their 
hegemony over the Juula in Bondoukou, who were recent emigres 
from the market city of Begho. Bondoukou developed into a major 
center of commerce and Islam. The kingdom's Quranic scholars 
attracted students from all parts of West Africa. 

In the mid-eighteenth century in east-central Cote d'lvoire, other 
Akan groups fleeing the Asante established a Baoule kingdom at 
Sakasso and two Agni kingdoms, Indenie and Sanwi. The Baoule, 
like the Asante, elaborated a highly centralized political and ad- 
ministrative structure under three successive rulers, but it finally 
split into smaller chiefdoms. Despite the breakup of their kingdom, 
the Baoule strongly resisted French subjugation. The descendants 
of the rulers of the Agni kingdoms tried to retain their separate 
identity long after Cote dTvoire's independence; as late as 1969, 
the Sanwi of Krinjabo attempted to break away from Cote d'lvoire 
and form an independent kingdom. 

Arrival of the Europeans 

The African continent, situated between Europe and the im- 
agined treasures of the Far East, quickly became the destination 
of the European explorers of the fifteenth century. The first Euro- 
peans to explore the West African coast were the Portuguese. Other 
European sea powers soon followed, and trade was established with 
many of the coastal peoples of West Africa. At first, the trade in- 
cluded gold, ivory, and pepper, but the establishment of Ameri- 
can colonies in the sixteenth century spurred a demand for slaves, 
who soon became the major export from the West African coastal 
regions. Local rulers, under treaties with the Europeans, procured 
goods and slaves from inhabitants of the interior. By the end of 
the fifteenth century, commercial contacts with Europe had spawned 
strong European influences, which permeated areas northward from 
the West African coast. 

Cote d'lvoire, like the rest of West Africa, was subject to these 
influences, but the absence of sheltered harbors along its coastline 
prevented Europeans from establishing permanent trading posts. 
Seaborne trade, therefore, was irregular and played only a minor 



7 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

role in the penetration and eventual conquest by Europeans of Cote 
d'lvoire. The slave trade, in particular, had little effect on the peo- 
ples of Cote d'lvoire. A profitable trade in ivory, which gave the 
area its name, was carried out during the seventeenth century, but 
it brought about such a decline in elephants that the trade itself 
virtually had died out by the beginning of the eighteenth century. 

The earliest recorded French voyage to West Africa took place 
in 1483. The first West African French settlement, Saint Louis, 
was founded in the mid-seventeenth century in Senegal, while at 
about the same time the Dutch ceded to the French a settlement 
at He de Goree off Dakar. A French mission was established in 
1687 at Assini, and it became the first European outpost in that 
area. Assini' s survival was precarious, however, and only in the 
mid-nineteenth century did the French establish themselves firmly 
in Cote d'lvoire. By that time, they had already established settle- 
ments around the mouth of the Senegal River and at other points 
along the coasts of what are now Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea- 
Bissau. Meanwhile, the British had permanent outposts in the same 
areas and on the Gulf of Guinea east of Cote d'lvoire. 

Activity along the coast stimulated European interest in the in- 
terior, especially along the two great rivers, the Senegal and the 
Niger. Concerted French exploration of West Africa began in the 
mid-nineteenth century but moved slowly and was based more on 
individual initiative than on government policy. In the 1840s, the 
French concluded a series of treaties with local West African rulers 
that enabled the French to build fortified posts along the Gulf of 
Guinea to serve as permanent trading centers. The first posts in 
Cote d'lvoire included one at Assini and another at Grand-Bassam, 
which became the colony's first capital. The treaties provided for 
French sovereignty within the posts and for trading privileges in 
exchange for fees or coutumes (see Glossary) paid annually to the 
local rulers for the use of the land. The arrangement was not en- 
tirely satisfactory to the French because trade was limited and mis- 
understandings over treaty obligations often arose. Nevertheless, 
the French government maintained the treaties, hoping to expand 
trade. France also wanted to maintain a presence in the region to 
stem the increasing influence of the British along the Gulf of Guinea 
coast. 

The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and 
the subsequent annexation by Germany of the French region of 
Alsace-Lorraine caused the French government to abandon its 
colonial ambitions and withdraw its military garrisons from its 
French West African trading posts, leaving them in the care of resi- 
dent merchants. The trading post at Grand-Bassam in Cote d'lvoire 



8 



The mosque at Kong, ca. 1897. Engraving from Louis Gustave Binger, 
Du Niger aii Golfe de Guinee, Paris, 1892. 



was left in the care of a shipper from Marseille, Arthur Verdier, 
who in 1878 was named resident of the Establishment of Cote 
d'lvoire. 

French Expansion in Cote d'lvoire 

In 1885 France and Germany brought all the European powers 
with interests in Africa together at the Berlin Conference. Its prin- 
cipal objective was to rationalize what became known as the Euro- 
pean scramble for colonies in Africa. Prince Otto von Bismarck 
also wanted a greater role in Africa for Germany, which he thought 
he could achieve in part by fostering competition between France 
and Britain. The agreement signed by all participants in 1885 stipu- 
lated that on the African coastline only European annexations or 
spheres of influence that involved effective occupation by Euro- 
peans would be recognized. Another agreement in 1890 extended 
this rule to the interior of Africa and set off a scramble for terri- 
tory, primarily by France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium. 

Local Resistance and Establishment of Protectorates 

In 1886, to support its claims of effective occupation, France again 
assumed direct control of its West African coastal trading posts and 
embarked on an accelerated program of exploration in the interior. 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

In 1887 Lieutenant Louis Binger began a two-year journey that 
traversed parts of Cote d'lvoire's interior. By the end of the jour- 
ney, he had concluded four treaties establishing French protectorates 
in Cote d'lvoire. Also in 1887, Verdier's agent, Maurice Treich- 
Laplene, negotiated five additional agreements that extended 
French influence from the headwaters of the Niger River Basin 
through Cote d'lvoire. 

By the end of the 1880s, France had established what passed for 
effective control over the coastal regions of Cote d'lvoire, and in 
1889 Britain recognized French sovereignty in the area. That same 
year, France named Treich-Laplene titular governor of the terri- 
tory. In 1893 Cote d'lvoire was made a French colony, and then 
Captain Binger was appointed governor. Agreements with Liberia 
in 1892 and with Britain in 1893 determined the eastern and western 
boundaries of the colony, but the northern boundary was not fixed 
until 1947 because of efforts by the French government to attach 
parts of Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) and French Sudan 
(present-day Mali) to Cote d'lvoire for economic and administra- 
tive reasons. 

Throughout the process of partition, the Africans were little con- 
cerned with the occasional white person who came wandering by. 
Many local rulers in small, isolated communities did not under- 
stand or, more often, were misled by the Europeans about the sig- 
nificance of treaties that compromised their authority. Other local 
leaders, however, thought that the Europeans could solve economic 
problems or become allies in the event of a dispute with belliger- 
ent neighbors. In the end, the loss of land and freedom by all the 
local rulers resulted more from their inability to counter European 
deception and brute strength than from a loss of will to respond 
to European encroachment. 

Throughout the early years of French rule, French military con- 
tingents were sent inland to establish new posts. The African popu- 
lation resisted French penetration and settlement, even in areas 
where treaties of protection had been in force. Among those offer- 
ing greatest resistance was Samori Toure, who in the 1880s and 
1890s was establishing an empire that extended over large parts 
of present-day Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'lvoire. 
Samori' s large, well-equipped army, which could manufacture and 
repair its own firearms, attracted strong support throughout the 
region. The French responded to Samori 's expansion of regional 
control with military pressure. French campaigns against Samori, 
which were met with fierce resistance, intensified in the mid- 1890s 
until he was captured in 1898. 



10 



Akan chief in traditional attire 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 




France's imposition of a head tax in 1900, aimed at enabling 
the colony to undertake a public works program, provoked a num- 
ber of revolts. Ivoirians viewed the tax as a violation of the terms 
of the protectorate treaties because it seemed that France was now 
demanding the equivalent of a coutume from the local kings rather 
than the reverse. Much of the population, especially in the interior, 
also considered the tax a humiliating symbol of submission. 

Repression and Conquest 

In 1906 Gabriel Angoulvant was appointed governor of Cote 
d'lvoire. Angoulvant, who had little prior experience in Africa, 
believed that the development of Cote d'lvoire could proceed only 
after the forceful conquest, or so-called pacification, of the colony. 
He thus embarked on a vigorous campaign, sending military expe- 
ditions into the hinterland to quell resistance. As a result of these 
expeditions, local rulers were compelled to obey existing antislavery 
laws, supply porters and food to the French forces, and ensure the 
protection of French trade and personnel. In return, the French 
agreed to leave local customs intact and specifically promised not 
to intervene in the selection of rulers. But the French often dis- 
regarded their side of the agreement, deporting or interning rulers 
regarded as instigators of revolt. They also regrouped villages and 
established a uniform administration throughout most of the colony. 



11 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Finally, they replaced the coutume with an allowance based on per- 
formance. 

French Rule Until World War II 

Evolution of Colonial Policy 

French colonial policy incorporated concepts of assimilation and 
association. Assimilation presupposed the inherent superiority of 
French culture over all others, so that in practice the assimilation 
policy in the colonies meant extension of the French language, in- 
stitutions, laws, and customs. 

The policy of association also affirmed the superiority of the 
French in the colonies, but it entailed different institutions and sys- 
tems of laws for the colonizer and the colonized. Under this pol- 
icy, the Africans in Cote d'lvoire were allowed to preserve their 
own customs insofar as they were compatible with French interests. 
An indigenous elite trained in French administrative practice formed 
an intermediary group between the French and the Africans. 

Assimilation was practiced in Cote d'lvoire to the extent that 
after 1930 a small number of Westernized Ivoirians were granted 
the right to apply for French citizenship. Most Ivoirians, however, 
were classified as French subjects and were governed under the 
principle of association. 

Until 1958, governors appointed in Paris administered the col- 
ony of Cote d'lvoire, using a system of direct, centralized adminis- 
tration that left little room for Ivoirian participation in policy making. 
The French colonial administration also adopted divide-and-rule 
policies, applying ideas of assimilation only to the educated elite. 
The French were also interested in ensuring that the small but in- 
fluential elite was sufficiently satisfied with the status quo to refrain 
from any anti- French sentiment. In fact, although they were strongly 
opposed to the practices of association, educated Ivoirians believed 
that they would achieve equality with their French peers through 
assimilation rather than through complete independence from 
France, a change that would eliminate the enormous economic ad- 
vantages of remaining a French possession. But after the assimila- 
tion doctrine was implemented entirely, at least in principle, through 
the postwar reforms, Ivoirian leaders realized that even assimilation 
implied the superiority of the French over the Ivoirians and that 
discrimination and inequality would end only with independence. 

Colonial Administration 

French expansion in Africa during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century was so rapid that it was difficult to find enough 



12 



Captain Louis Binger and Maurice Teich-Laplene. Engravings from Louis 
Gustave Binger, Du Niger au Golfe de Guinee, Paris, 1892. 

administrators to govern the growing number of possessions 
effectively. For a brief period, therefore, the French adopted a sys- 
tem of indirect rule using indigenous leaders as their surrogates. 
The local rulers, however, exercised authority only by sanction of 
the French administrators. Those rulers who refused to submit to 
French directives were deposed and replaced with more coopera- 
tive ones. 

With the consolidation of French power in West Africa at the 
end of the nineteenth century, French officials increasingly assumed 
direct administrative powers, and they reduced local rulers to the 
level of low-ranking civil servants. In 1895 France grouped the 
French West African colonies of Cote dTvoire, Dahomey (present- 
day Benin), Guinea, Niger, French Sudan (present-day Mali), 
Senegal, Upper Volta, and Mauritania together and subordinated 
their governors to the governor of Senegal, who became governor 
general. A series of additional decrees in 1904 defined the struc- 
ture of this political unit and organized it into French West Africa 
(Afrique Occidentale Francaise — AOF; see Glossary). 

France divided the individual colonies into districts known 
as cercles, each of which was governed by a district commander 



13 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



(commandant du cercle) who, because of poor communications between 
the cercles and the colonial governors, exercised his responsibilities 
with relative autonomy. Within a cercle, the commander ruled 
through a hierarchy of local rulers, whom he appointed and could 
dismiss at will. He was advised by a council of notables (conseil des 
notables) consisting of these local rulers and of other individuals ap- 
pointed by him. 

Most of the inhabitants of the colonies were subjects of France 
with no political rights. Moreover, they were drafted for work in 
mines, on plantations, as porters, and on public projects as part 
of their tax responsibility. They were also expected to serve in the 
military and were subject to the indigenat (see Glossary), a separate 
system of law. 

Economic Development and Social Change 

As France consolidated its holdings in Cote d'lvoire, it began 
to take steps to make the colony self-supporting. In 1900 the French 
initiated a policy that made each colony responsible for securing 
the resources — both money and personnel — needed for its adminis- 
tration and defense; France would offer assistance only when needed. 

The public works programs undertaken by the Ivoirian colonial 
government and the exploitation of natural resources required mas- 
sive commitments of labor. The French therefore imposed a sys- 
tem of forced labor under which each male adult Ivoirian was 
required to work for ten days each year without compensation as 
part of his obligation to the state. The system was subject to ex- 
treme misuse and was the most hated aspect of French colonial rule. 
Because the population of Cote d'lvoire was insufficient to meet 
the labor demand on French plantations and forests, which were 
among the greatest users of labor in the AOF, the French recruited 
large numbers of workers from Upper Volta to work in Cote 
d'lvoire. This source of labor was so important to the economic 
life of Cote d'lvoire that in 1932 the AOF annexed a large part 
of Upper Volta to Cote d'lvoire and administered it as a single 
colony. 

In addition to the political and economic changes produced by 
colonial rule, the French also introduced social institutions that 
brought about fundamental changes to Ivoirian culture. Catholic 
missionaries established a network of churches and primary schools, 
which in time provided the literate Ivoirians needed by govern- 
ment and commerce. Some of the wealthier and more ambitious 
Ivoirians continued their educations at the few secondary schools 
and at French universities, adopting European culture and values 



14 




Koulango village. Engraving from Louis Gustave Binger, Du Niger ail 

Golfe de Guinee, Paris, 1892. 



15 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



and becoming members of a new African elite. The members of 
this elite were accepted as cultural and social equals by their white 
counterparts and were exempt from military and labor service. 

Except in remote rural areas, the colonial government gradually 
destroyed the traditional elite by reducing the local rulers to junior 
civil servants and by indiscriminately appointing as rulers people 
with no legitimate claims to such titles. In areas where traditional 
leaders retained their position and power, they often developed 
strong rivalries with educated Ivoirians who tried to usurp that 
leadership on the grounds that their education and modern out- 
look better suited them for the position. 

Impact of World War II 

World War II had a profound effect on the future of all French 
West Africa. The fall of France and the establishment of the 
German- allied Vichy government in France forced the French colo- 
nies to declare loyalty either to the Vichy regime or to the Free 
French under General Charles de Gaulle. Although all the AOF 
governors remained loyal to the Vichy government, Ivoirians largely 
favored the Free French. 

The Vichy government, espousing Nazi racial theories, subjected 
French West Africa to economic exploitation and overt racism. 
French planters intensified their labor recruitment practices and 
military conscription. Farmers were forced to meet production 
quotas to supply the armed forces at the expense of the local resi- 
dents, whose standard of living had already been greatly lowered 
by the cutoff of imports from Europe. 

The onset of World War II and the rapid surrender of France, 
the self-described purveyor of a so-called higher civilization, sharply 
revised political thinking in Cote d'lvoire. Ivoirians resented Vichy 
policies and began to express feelings of Ivoirian nationalism. 
Ivoirian intellectuals were attracted by some of the Marxist ideas 
introduced by anti-Nazi movements and by some French teachers 
and labor organizers. In 1943 branches of an organization known 
as Communist Study Groups were established in the principal cities 
of West Africa, including Abidjan in Cote d'lvoire. Many Afri- 
can intellectuals in these groups later became prominent as post- 
war national leaders. 

Brazzaville Conference 

After the defeat of France and the alignment of many West Afri- 
cans with the Free French, the political maturity of the indigenous 
populations developed. De Gaulle recognized the need to revise 
the relationship between France and its colonies in Africa. In 



16 



Historical Setting 



January 1944, Free French politicians and high-ranking colonial 
officials from the French African colonies met in Brazzaville (in 
present-day Congo). The Brazzaville Conference, as it came to be 
known, recommended political, social, and economic reforms. It 
accepted the representation of the colonies in the French Consti- 
tuent Assembly, which was to draw up a new French constitution 
after the war, and the subsequent representation of the colonies 
in whatever parliamentary body the constitution established. The 
conference also recommended that the colonies be administered 
with greater autonomy and that both French citizens and Africans 
be permitted to elect a legislative assembly. In addition, the con- 
ference committed the French government to respect local customs, 
abolish the indigenat, adopt a new penal code, end labor conscrip- 
tion, improve health and educational facilities, and open positions 
in the colonial administration to Africans. 

The only immediate effect of the conference was the passage of 
a law in August 1944 granting workers in the AOF the right to 
organize. In October 1945, after the defeat of Germany and the 
end of the war, the first countrywide elections were held in Cote 
dTvoire to choose two delegates for the French Constituent As- 
sembly, which was to meet in Paris before the end of the year. 
French citizens residing in Cote dTvoire elected one delegate, and 
a restricted African electorate chose Felix Houphouet-Boigny as 
the other delegate. Houphouet-Boigny, a wealthy African planter 
and French-educated physician, was the cofounder of the African 
Agricultural Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain — SAA), which was 
formed in 1944 to fight for the abolition of forced labor and the 
rights of African planters. Much of Houphouet-Boigny' s support 
came from the SAA, whose members included some 20,000 Afri- 
can planters as well as laborers, civil servants, traders, and other 
Africans engaged in the money economy. In spite of his popularity, 
however, Houphouet-Boigny won by only a narrow margin. 

Two factors explain the closeness of the vote. First, the French 
colonial administration disapproved of the SAA and consequently 
supported the candidacy of a Mossi, costing Houphouet-Boigny 
the votes of the majority of Mossi, who constituted one of the lar- 
gest ethnic groups in Upper Volta. And second, Houphouet- 
Boigny, a Baoule, faced rival candidates from the Bete and Agni 
ethnic groups. Houphouet-Boigny' s support came from most of 
the rural voters in the south and the forest area, but he would not 
have won the election without the support of most of the voters 
in the Bobo Dioulasso region in Upper Volta (a part of Cote d'lvoire's 
annexed territory). 



17 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



When the French Constituent Assembly met in Paris, 63 of the 
600 delegates represented the African colonies. The African 
delegates, all members of the educated elite, demanded liberal re- 
forms in the colonial system, for which they received support from 
French socialist and communist delegates. In the end, the assem- 
bly reevaluated colonial policy and drafted a plan for the union 
of France and the colonies. 

In addition to abolishing the indigenat and forced labor system, 
in 1945 and 1946 the French government decreed a number of other 
important reforms concerning Africans. It granted freedom of 
speech, association, and assembly to the residents of the colonies; 
it provided funds for economic and social development; it permit- 
ted the AOF to adopt a new penal code; and it granted all inhabi- 
tants of French colonies French citizenship. France's failure to define 
closely the rights of citizenship, however, prevented the indigenous 
populations of the colonies from the full exercise of civil rights on 
the grounds that they were not yet ready for it. 

French Union 

The first draft of the French Fourth Republic's constitution, 
which included whole passages of the Brazzaville recommendations, 
proved too liberal for the French electorate, which rejected it in 
a May 1946 referendum. When a second Constituent Assembly 
convened in June, pressure from conservative elements in France 
and in the colonies was strong, and sharp differences of opinion 
developed among the delegates. The advocates of colonial auton- 
omy included all the colonial deputies and the French political left 
wing. Most African deputies, including Houphouet-Boigny, sup- 
ported the idea of local self-government and political equality for 
the French and the Africans. The French political right and center, 
however, favored a nominally federalist system, within which France 
would preserve its dominant position. A compromise was finally 
reached, and the plan for the French Union was written into a new 
draft constitution, which was adopted by the assembly on September 
28, 1946. It was approved as the constitution of the Fourth Republic 
in a referendum held in France and the overseas possessions on 
October 13, 1946. 

Under the French Union, the French West African colonies were 
designated as overseas territories. The French government exer- 
cised all legislative and executive powers, and the administration 
of Cote d'lvoire continued under the French Ministry of Over- 
seas Departments and Territories. 

Despite the acceptance of the French Union in Cote d'lvoire, 
longstanding economic grievances gave rise to the development of 



18 



Colonial architecture, 
Grand-Bassam 
Courtesy Eszti Votaw 



anticolonial sentiment. With the large-scale introduction of cash 
crops between World War I and World War II, a wealthy African 
planter class emerged. These Africans competed with Europeans 
who had come to Cote d'lvoire to make their fortunes. Colonial 
policies strongly favored the Europeans: they received free labor 
under the forced labor system, higher prices for their crops, and 
access to protected markets. African resentment against this dis- 
crimination grew during World War II, when economic hardships 
weighed especially heavily on African plantation owners. 

The rights to free speech and assembly, guaranteed by the con- 
stitutional reforms of 1946, permitted the formation of African po- 
litical parties. A number of parties based on ethnic and regional 
interests were organized in Cote d'lvoire and elected members to 
the Territorial Assembly, created as a result of the 1946 reforms, 
and the Abidjan municipal council. The Democratic Party of Cote 
d'lvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote d'lvoire — PDCI), created 
in 1946 out of the SAA to appeal to a wider following than its 
predecessor, became the dominant party. It soon attracted the rad- 
ical intellectuals from the wartime Communist Study Groups and 
became a significant political force in French West Africa. Its leader, 
Houphouet-Boigny, was rapidly becoming a prominent national 
figure. Having successfully sponsored the law abolishing forced 
labor, he had regained support from the Mossi of Upper Volta. 
He served in 1946 as a delegate to the French Constituent Assembly 



19 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

and, later that year, to the newly constituted French National As- 
sembly. 

Regional Political Cooperation 

Increasing political activity and a growing national conscious- 
ness were both responsible for and stimulated by the postwar 
constitutional reforms. Pressure from the SAA and similar organi- 
zations in other territories brought about most of the 1946 reforms. 
The reforms grouped the territories into the AOF under one elected 
council, the Grand Council in Dakar, thereby encouraging cooper- 
ation across territorial boundaries. As a result, in 1947 Houphouet- 
Boigny and several other French West African leaders formed the 
African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Democratique Africain — 
RDA). 

The RDA was established during a critical period in French his- 
tory. In 1946 and 1947, France was confronted by open rebellion 
in Indochina and Madagascar and by unrest in North Africa. Inter- 
nally, the alliance between conservatives and communists, uneasy 
from the start, was collapsing. The French viewed the RDA, which 
called for full equality and consequentiy enjoyed the support of Afri- 
can and French communists, as another serious threat to French 
colonial interests. As a result, the French colonial administration 
harassed the RDA, which was also opposed by Africans allied with 
the more moderate French Socialist Party. Nevertheless, the RDA 
soon emerged as the dominant political force in French West Africa, 
and Cote dTvoire, where African and European planters were in 
direct competition, provided the most fertile ground for recruiting 
a militant African party. Consequently, Cote dTvoire became the 
stronghold of the RDA, and Houphouet-Boigny became the RDA 
leader. Thus, France also considered Cote d'lvoire and Houphouet- 
Boigny' s party, the PDCI, as threats to French colonial rule. 

After a strongly conservative and discriminatory colonial adminis- 
tration was installed in 1947, relations between the PDCI and the 
administration became openly hostile. The administration actively 
sponsored rival parties and manipulated elections. It dismissed 
PDCI supporters from government jobs and jailed most PDCI 
leaders. Only his parliamentary immunity enabled Houphouet- 
Boigny to escape imprisonment. The PDCI retaliated by organiz- 
ing strikes, boycotts of European goods and services, and mass 
demonstrations. In 1949 the hostility erupted into violence as 
government troops fired on African demonstrators on several oc- 
casions. 

By 1951 the PDCI was close to collapse. Its alliance, through 
the RDA, with the French Communist Party had alienated the more 



20 



Historical Setting 



moderate elements of the party. Government-sponsored rival parties 
had eroded much of its popular support and drastically weakened 
its position in elective bodies of the French Union. Houphouet- 
Boigny, in a radical effort to preserve the PDCI, severed connec- 
tions with the French Communist Party and expelled the RDA's 
secretary general, who supported the communist association. He 
then abandoned the PDCI policy of militant opposition to the ad- 
ministration and embarked on a policy of practical cooperation. 
This policy change restored the strength and prestige of the PDCI 
at home and of the RDA in the rest of the AOF and France. Also, 
it led to political concessions as well as significant economic cooper- 
ation with France and members of the local French community. 
Within a short time, Cote dT voire became the wealthiest territory 
in the AOF. 

Transformation of the Democratic Party of 
Cote d'lvoire 

By the end of 1946, the PDCI achieved its political monopoly 
by bargaining with potential contenders, rather than through open 
competition. In any event, the party received widespread support 
throughout the country. For example, an African could be elected 
in Cote d'lvoire only with the endorsement of the PDCI. 

The organization of the PDCI, based on that of the French Com- 
munist Party, was determined during the party's First Territorial 
Congress in October 1947. The Executive Committee presided over 
party cells located throughout the country. Although the PDCI be- 
came a direct party, operating on the principle of democratic cen- 
tralism, it deviated from French Communist Party organization 
in that it was not a vanguard party with restricted membership. 
Instead, it became a mass organization whose members were re- 
quired only to purchase a party card and pay annual dues. 

Ideologically, the PDCI discouraged the transition to indepen- 
dence or even greater democracy on the pretext that intraparty dis- 
agreements prevented the party from implementing its democratic 
governing mechanisms. Instead, the PCDI's leadership gave 
Houphouet-Boigny almost autocratic control. In addition, sous- 
section (subsection at the cercle level) officials and others in positions 
of responsibility frequently nominated village committees in rural 
areas instead of allowing them to be elected. As a result, most rural 
party committees reflected the preexisting ethnic imbalance. At the 
national level, PDCI leaders had stipulated from the party's birth 
that party congresses would be held annually as part of the 
democratic process. In fact, by 1956 only two had been held: in 



21 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

1947 and 1949. Consequently, those in party offices enjoyed long, 
uncontested tenures. 

Reform and the French Community 

The reforms of 1956, or lot cadre, passed by the French Fourth 
Republic, acknowledged the growing nationalism and a develop- 
ing political consciousness in the AOF. From its inception, the loi 
cadre drew on the suggestions of African leaders who were permit- 
ted to participate in the decision-making process. 

Conceptually, the loi cadre ended the integrationalist phase of 
French colonial policy and granted considerable internal auton- 
omy to the overseas territories. Universal suffrage and the elimi- 
nation of the dual college electoral system led to the creation of 
district and local representative councils and a great enlargement 
of the powers of the territorial assemblies. Each territory could for- 
mulate its own domestic policies, although the territories continued 
to rely on France for decisions concerning foreign affairs, defense, 
higher education, and economic aid. As its most important provi- 
sion, the loi cadre established the Council of Government, which 
assumed the major executive functions of each territory, until that 
time carried out by a colonial official appointed in Paris. 

After the dissolution of the French Fourth Republic in 1958, 
General Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth Republic, 
had even more extensive reforms written into a new constitution, 
reflecting not only de Gaulle's own pragmatic and anti- imperialist 
ideas but also the economic and political changes that had occurred 
since 1946. The French Constitution of 1958, creating the Fifth 
Republic, provided for the free association of autonomous repub- 
lics within the newly created French Community, in which France 
was the senior partner. The community had jurisdiction over for- 
eign policy, defense, currency, common ethnic and financial pol- 
icy, policy on strategic raw materials, and, unless specifically 
excluded by agreement, higher education, internal and external 
communications, and the courts. An elected president, who was 
also the president of the Fifth Republic, presided over the com- 
munity's executive, which consisted of an executive council and 
a senate elected indirectly by each member state in proportion to 
the population. Each member state was to have its own govern- 
ment and a separate constitution. 

In September 1958, France presented a referendum to the com- 
munity. Each member could accept the Constitution and conse- 
quent membership in the community or reject it and immediately 
sever all ties with France. Cote d'l voire voted almost unanimously 
in favor of the Constitution, further confirming the almost mystical 



22 



Historical Setting 



feeling of brotherhood with France that more than fifty years of 
cultural assimilation had instilled, particularly among the economic 
and political elite. The elite prudently recognized that although 
Cote dTvoire was the wealthiest French African territory, it lacked 
the financial resources and the trained work force to develop as 
rapidly as it could as a member of the community. Also, because 
Africanization of high-level posts within the government had barely 
begun in 1957, too few trained Ivoirians were available to staff the 
administration. A continued association with France was seen as 
the pragmatic course. 

In March 1959, Cote dTvoire adopted its first constitution as 
a self-governing republic. It provided for a unicameral legislature 
elected by universal, direct suffrage and an executive headed by 
a prime minister elected by a majority vote of the legislature and 
responsible to it. The PDCI won all seats of the newly formed legis- 
lature, and Houphouet-Boigny resigned his post in the French 
government to form the first government of Cote dTvoire. 

Independence and the Institutionalization of the 
One-Party System 

In 1959 several West African members of the French Commu- 
nity formed the Mali Federation. Although the federation initially 
included Senegal, French Sudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, all 
but Senegal and French Sudan withdrew quickly under pressure 
from Houphouet-Boigny, who regarded the federation's desire for 
independence from France as a threat to the economic develop- 
ment of the former French colonies. Nonetheless, the federation 
gained independence in June 1960 and split into the two indepen- 
dent nations of Senegal and Mali. 

Meanwhile, to counterbalance the Mali Federation, Houphouet- 
Boigny in 1959 successfully convinced several other West African 
leaders to form the Council of the Entente (Conseil de l'Entente — 
Entente) — a loose grouping that included Niger, Dahomey (present- 
day Benin), Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), and Cote 
dTvoire — to pool their resources for economic development. 

Houphouet-Boigny' s argument against independence quickly 
lost its appeal among other members of the French Community 
following the independence of Senegal and Mali. In addition, in 
early 1960 the French government sponsored an amendment to 
the 1958 Constitution that permitted community members to 
gain complete independence but remain within the community. 
Houphouet-Boigny was opposed to this reconstituted community, 
which he considered a new federation, and in August 1960 Cote 



23 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

d'lvoire withdrew from the community and became independent. 
Houphouet-Boigny was the first head of state. 

On October 31, 1960, the National Assembly of Cote d'lvoire 
adopted a constitution establishing an independent republic. Those 
involved in the drafting of the Constitution, including Houphouet- 
Boigny and other PDCI members, wanted to establish a strong 
and stable government based on democratic principles. They also 
wanted a presidential system based on the separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government and 
an independent judiciary. In practice, however, a gap developed 
between the democratic principles written into the Constitution and 
political practice. The PDCI leadership equated national unity with 
unanimous support for the PDCI and believed that competition 
among political parties would waste resources and destroy unity. 
Therefore, election provisions made it almost impossible for another 
party to win seats in the National Assembly. As the sole political 
party, the PDCI came to exercise political control over all branches 
of government. 

By the late 1960s, power was concentrated in the hands of 
Houphouet-Boigny, who, in addition to his position as president, 
was also titular president of the PDCI. Loyal colleagues received 
positions of authority within the police and armed forces, as well 
as in the government and PDCI. Philippe Yace, who held the po- 
sitions of secretary general of the PDCI and president of the Na- 
tional Assembly, was the second most powerful figure in Cote 
d'lvoire. The president appointed the administrative heads of the 
6 departments (departements), 24 prefectures (prefectures), and 107 sub- 
prefectures (sous-prefectures), which constituted the administration 
of Cote d'lvoire (see Local Government, ch. 4). Houphouet-Boigny 
also selected the thirty-five members of the Economic and Social 
Council (Conseil Economique et Social), a government body, and, 
with the Political Bureau, chose the members of the National As- 
sembly. 

Houphouet-Boigny further consolidated his power by circum- 
scribing the prerogatives of the National Assembly (see The Na- 
tional Assembly, ch. 4). Presidential and PDCI control of assembly 
membership precluded an independent or opposition role by the 
assembly in the decision-making process. At the same time, the 
existence of an assembly with responsibility for approving proposed 
laws legitimized the government's democratic pretensions. 
Moreover, the PDCI used the assembly as a means of co-opting 
potential government opponents and securing their loyalty by 
providing deputies with a variety of privileges and amenities. Fi- 
nally, the government channeled its major decisions through the 



24 



Historical Setting 



assembly to the ethnic and interest groups that its members sup- 
posedly represented, thereby again giving the appearance of legiti- 
mate government. 

Houphouet-Boigny also took steps to ensure the new regime's 
security. Although Cote d'lvoire had no military until more than 
a year after independence, one was finally organized and strength- 
ened with French assistance. Ivoirian members of the French colo- 
nial marine infantry who had been born in Cote d'lvoire were 
transferred to Abidjan in October 1961 and formed the core of the 
first battalion. By late 1962, the military comprised about 5,300 
soldiers organized into four battalions (see Constitutional, Legal, 
and Administrative Structure, ch. 5). 

Internal Dissent and Further Consolidation of Power 

Despite Houphouet-Boigny' s efforts to consolidate power and 
build a strong military, several events in the early 1960s demon- 
strated the vulnerability of the new regime. In 1962 a group of 
young radical PDCI members, displeased with the regime's moder- 
ate policies, allegedly planned to capture Houphouet-Boigny and 
other party leaders. More than 125 people were arrested and secretiy 
tried in the president's hometown of Yamoussoukro. Forty-four 
of the alleged plotters were convicted. In 1963 the government an- 
nounced the discovery df another plot, which allegedly involved 
a coalition of hostile groups, including left-wing youth, discontented 
politicians, and northerners who resented southern domination in 
the government. In April 1971, Houphouet-Boigny released the 
last of those who had been jailed following the 1963 trials and vir- 
tually admitted that the charges had been baseless. 

Changes in Government and Party Structures 

In 1965 Houphouet-Boigny reorganized his administration to 
accommodate the growing number of Ivoirians qualified to fill 
government positions. The four existing departements were redivided 
into six departements with twenty-four prefectures. A corresponding 
increase in the number of prefects (prefets) took place. By the end 
of 1972, there were 115 subprefectures. This rise in the number 
of administrative subdivisions facilitated public access to govern- 
ment offices that the new civil code, implemented in 1964, neces- 
sitated. 

Houphouet-Boigny also purged the party of more than 200 party 
leaders in mid- 1964. The group included five members of the Po- 
litical Bureau and six members of the Executive Committee of the 
party's Youth Auxiliary, who had been implicated in alleged 
treasonous activities. In the ensuing overhaul of the party structure, 



25 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



party leaders modified the PDCI's organization to parallel the re- 
organized state bureaucracy; forty-five new party sections, cor- 
responding to the number of new subprefectures in 1965, were 
added to the existing sections. Each was led by an elected secre- 
tary general. The number of party sections was increased again 
in 1970 to correspond to the increase in the number of subprefec- 
tures. The new sections were subdivided into village committees 
in rural areas and into ward and ethnic subcommittees in towns. 

Sources of Popular Discontent 

After independence, the production of export cash crops such 
as coffee and cocoa supported the development of nonagricultural 
economic growth, particularly in the Abidjan area (see Growth and 
Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). The commercial development 
of Abidjan and its growing status as the administrative center of 
the country consequently attracted even more French private in- 
vestment and personnel. This concentration of economic and po- 
litical activity in Abidjan led to population shifts toward the south 
and the creation of a modern capital, the life of which contrasted 
sharply with Cote d T voire 's up-country village life. 

The country's increasing economic wealth, however, did not 
benefit all segments of the population. Rapid urbanization brought 
massive urban unemployment and rising conflict. Labeled by the 
government as the sans-travail, unemployed Ivoirians in Abidjan 
began to organize protest demonstrations in 1969 to pressure the 
government to achieve greater Ivoirianization of low-level jobs. On 
September 30, 1969, about 1,600 demonstrators were arrested in 
the capital, leading to resentment of both government and foreign 
workers among the sans-travail. 

Another problem area existed between Ivoirian intellectuals and 
some elites on the one hand and white Europeans, mainly the 
French, who held numerous skilled jobs in the economy and civil 
service, on the other hand. The Ivoirian government was reluc- 
tant to undertake a large-scale Ivoirianization of the economy. It 
wanted to preserve Cote d T voire 's economic ties to France and 
to avoid staffing the administration with untrained bureaucrats. 
Consequently, many Ivoirians perceived Houphouet-Boigny as 
favoring Europeans over Ivoirians in employment. 

Another rift resulted from the influx from other African coun- 
tries of hundreds of thousands of unskilled workers, most of whom 
were Mossi from Upper Volta. The Ivoirian government en- 
couraged the import of cheap foreign African laborers, who worked 
on the large coffee and cocoa plantations and in industry. Compe- 
tition between Ivoirian and foreign workers exploded into violence 



26 



Historical Setting 



in September and October 1969, when widespread attacks on Mossi 
workers occurred in Abidjan. 

A fourth area of conflict resulted from the antagonism between 
students and the PDCI government. This antagonism manifested 
itself in recurrent protests by university students. Large numbers 
of Ivoirian students who had studied in France or were influenced 
by students from many other sub-Saharan African countries re- 
jected the PDCI's ideological movement away from socialism that 
had begun in 1950. They rejected what they perceived as the re- 
gime's neocolonial policies vis-a-vis France. Many students also 
objected to the government's placement of the major student 
organization under the control of the PDCI. 

A confrontation between the students and the government 
occurred in May 1969, when the student organization, the Move- 
ment of Ivoirian Primary and Secondary School Students (Mouve- 
ment des Etudiants et Eleves de Cote d'lvoire — MEECI), presented 
a list of demands to the government for specific reforms at Abi- 
djan University (present-day National University of Cote d'lvoire) 
and held a strike in which 150 students participated. The govern- 
ment arrested all Ivoirian student protesters in Abidjan, expelled 
all foreign students, and closed the university for two weeks, lead- 
ing to further expressions of student discontent at the university. 
The government's crackdown aroused the sympathy of other dis- 
contented groups, including the sans-travail and secondary students 
in other towns. For its part, the government considered student 
activity as a threat to its authority and political stability, and it 
blamed the strike on outside communist influences. 

Consolidation of Power in the 1960s and 1970s 

After the 1963 alleged coup plot, Houphouet-Boigny took steps 
to ensure party and military loyalty. His success over the ensuing 
years lay in his carefully crafted system of checks and balances, 
using ethnic differences, political animosities, and co-optation to 
guarantee his own supremacy. To satisfy the political elite, he resort- 
ed to state and party patronage, mostly in the form of high-paying 
jobs. To diffuse the potential for ethnic conflict resulting from per- 
ceived inequalities in the development process, he divided cabinet 
appointments among representatives of Cote d' I voire 's major ethnic 
groups. 

To fortify his hold over the armed forces, Houphouet-Boigny 
assumed direct control of the police and military, the size of which 
he reduced from 5,300 to 3,500 members. He divided responsibil- 
ity for internal security among seven groups — a 3,000-man militia 
linked to the party and composed almost exclusively of Baoule 



27 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



(Houphouet-Boigny's ethnic group); a 3,000-man gendarmerie; 
the police; a special presidential guard; a small navy; a small air 
force; and the army. He also broadened his executive powers so 
that he alone could appoint and promote senior military officers. 
With the removal of political rivals following the 1962 and 1963 
conspiracy trials, Houphouet-Boigny's position was unchallengeable. 

In the 1970s, as the Ivoirian polity became somewhat more 
sophisticated, Houphouet-Boigny of necessity refined his style. He 
began replacing aging and loyal party militants with younger in- 
tellectuals and highly trained technocrats for whom he often created 
positions in his government — and who therefore owed him fealty. 
After the 1970 party congress, Houphouet-Boigny also began nam- 
ing younger members to the political bureau and as candidates to 
the National Assembly. He ingratiated himself with the middle and 
lower classes by speaking out frequendy about the failures of govern- 
ment officials. His preferred method of addressing popular issues 
was through dialogues in which the public could air their grievances 
to their seemingly attentive leader. During the first dialogue in Janu- 
ary 1974 with 2,000 party workers, Houphouet-Boigny invited criti- 
cisms and appointed various committees to study and recommend 
reforms. In March a second dialogue with foreign and local busi- 
ness leaders elicited resolutions and warnings to inefficient and cor- 
rupt cadres and to the Lebanese and French business communities. 
No reforms of substance occurred following either of these sessions, 
but by allowing public criticism, albeit in a tightly controlled en- 
vironment, the president remained informed about popular dis- 
satisfaction. Subsequently he could take steps either to remedy or 
to suppress problems while maintaining his firm grip over Ivoirian 
politics. 

Houphouet-Boigny also continued to invite traditional, or eth- 
nic, leaders to participate in both party and government at the local 
level so that he could maintain constructive ties with the traditional 
elite. Nevertheless, he was not always able to extinguish all micro- 
nationalist sentiments. For example, the Agni of Sanwi claimed 
that their kingdom had become part of Cote d'lvoire without their 
consent (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). In December 
1969, the Sanwi king called for the kingdom to secede and led a 
separatist revolt. Government troops swiftly suppressed the rebel- 
lion. In November 1970, a Bete leader, Gnagbe Niabe (also known 
as Gnabe Opadjele) proclaimed himself grand chancellor of Cote 
d'lvoire. When Houphouet-Boigny refused to accept Gnabe 's can- 
didacy for president or grant his request for a cabinet post, Gnabe 
gathered a large group of supporters and marched on Gagnoa. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Again, government troops captured the rebel leader, ending the 
small rebellion. 

Houphouet-Boigny's ability to maintain stability lay in his be- 
lief in strong management and organization, which led him from 
independence to building an administration based on the solid, 
bureaucratic institutions left by the French. In fact, the large num- 
ber of French bureaucrats and entrepreneurs remaining in Cote 
d'lvoire supported Houphouet-Boigny's monopoly on political 
power and thereby contributed to the perceived effectiveness of the 
public and private sectors of the Ivoirian economy. In November 
1975, he was reelected president, claiming nearly 100 percent of 
the vote. 

In the early 1970s, notwithstanding political calm and rapid eco- 
nomic growth, underemployment and unemployment continued 
to pose problems in Cote d'lvoire. Immigrants continued to flood 
the lowest end of the job market, while whites continued to dominate 
the top executive jobs. In addition, the uneven distribution of so- 
cial services and jobs throughout the country exacerbated the re- 
gional economic disparities arising from the growing concentration 
of wealth in the south. And finally, the adverse effects of the 1973 
Sahelian drought on northern farmers caused even greater dissatis- 
faction among the rural population. 

Houphouet-Boigny relied on his charisma and the government's 
coffers to dispel discontent. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he 
gained popular favor by alternating Ivoirian independence festivities 
between Abidjan and the different prefecture capitals. Prefecture 
capitals hosting the festivities underwent massive rehabilitation, 
which included jobs in construction for new governmental build- 
ings, streets, and housing. And when neither charisma nor largess 
mollified his critics, Houphouet-Boigny skillfully blamed others. 
In July 1977, he reorganized his cabinet, dismissing four of the 
country's most influential political figures, who, although instru- 
mental in the growth of the Ivoirian economy, were also accused 
of involvement in fraudulent schemes to enrich themselves. These 
figures became useful scapegoats for continuing fraud and mal- 
distribution of the nation's wealth. 

On two occasions in the early 1970s, Houphouet-Boigny traveled 
to the north to convince local populations that he was not to blame 
for the state of affairs and to dispense politically timely aid in the 
form of development programs. The enthusiasm generated by the 
president's northern visits spread to other regions seeking largess 
from a presidential visit. Eager to exploit this nationwide burst of 
personal support, the government scheduled presidential trips 
throughout the country over the next several years. 



29 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

The military also showed signs of restlessness. An alleged coup 
conspiracy by a group of discontented young officers, in June 1973 
followed by the 1974 military overthrow of Niger's Hamani Diori, 
Houphouet-Boigny' s lifelong friend, undermined Houphouet- 
Boigny's confidence in the government's security and precipitated 
changes in the military. Although many Ivoirian political observ- 
ers thought that the conspirators of the alleged coup had done noth- 
ing more than discuss among themselves the need for greater 
economic equality in Cote d'lvoire, the government dealt with them 
harshly. Shortly thereafter, Houphouet-Boigny replaced two senior 
French military officers, who had allegedly fomented discontent 
among Ivoirian officers, with Ivoirians. Further changes, designed 
to instill military loyalty by giving the armed forces more scope 
in national affairs, took place in July 1974, when Houphouet-Boigny 
appointed military officers to both high- and low-level positions in 
the civil administration. And finally, in February 1979, Houphouet- 
Boigny appointed eight army officers as prefects and subprefects 
to give the military a greater stake in maintaining the status quo. 

Economic and Political Issues of the Late 1970s 
and 1980s 

Growing Economic Problems 

The worldwide economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s 
caused the prices of cocoa and coffee, Cote d'lvoire's principal ex- 
ports, to drop sharply, resulting in a significant economic slow- 
down. Combined with soaring commercial interest rates, the 
recession abruptly truncated the growth of the Ivoirian economy 
and exacerbated tensions in the labor force, where underemploy- 
ment and unemployment had become acute. In mid- 1978 com- 
plaints about inflation, the public debt, decreasing exports, the role 
of foreigners in the economy, and the succession question appeared 
in antigovernment tracts distributed in Abidjan. Popular manifesta- 
tions of discontent with the regime's rigid policies, as well as with 
declining revenue, high urban unemployment, and the atrophied 
one-party political system, continued into the early 1980s. As was 
by now typical, Houphouet-Boigny dealt quickly with the com- 
plaints by proposing more rapid Ivoirianization and steps to de- 
centralize and democratize local administrations. The government 
also trimmed the budget of several development programs. 

Perhaps foreseeing political problems, Houphouet-Boigny took 
steps to consolidate further his own control. In 1980, again run- 
ning unopposed, he was elected to a fifth term in office. In the 
same year, the Seventh Party Congress of the PDCI, following 



30 



Historical Setting 



instructions from the president, abolished the post of PDCI secre- 
tary general and established Houphouet-Boigny as the party's 
executive chairman, assisted by the new nine-member Executive 
Committee of the Political Bureau. 

Succession Question 

The question of who would succeed Houphouet-Boigny became 
the significant political issue by the beginning of the 1980s. Many 
political observers believed that if Houphouet-Boigny did choose 
a successor, internecine feuds would erupt within the PDCI. 
They also believed that, at least initially, no one could combine 
Houphouet-Boigny's prestige, charisma, and experience with the 
political acumen that he had exercised over Ivoirian politics for 
almost thirty years. 

In 1980 a constitutional amendment created the office of vice- 
president, who was to succeed to the presidency in the event of 
a midterm vacancy and who would be chosen by and elected at 
the same time as the president. The next elections, however, were 
not scheduled until 1985, and Houphouet-Boigny had given no 
indication of his plans for a vice-presidential running mate. (In 
1985 Houphouet-Boigny resolved the problem by amending the 
constitution, eliminating the position of vice-president.) 

In the 1970s, Philippe Yace, the president of the National As- 
sembly and PDCI secretary general, seemed to be the most likely 
successor. In 1975 the National Assembly adopted a law stipulat- 
ing that power would pass to the president of the assembly, con- 
firming Yace as the second most powerful man in the country. 
Nevertheless, Yace, who was popular with party officials, had many 
enemies, mostly because of his role as chief accuser in the fabri- 
cated 1963 plot. 

In 1980 the prospects for designating a presidential successor were 
even more obscured when Houphouet-Boigny abolished the post 
of PDCI secretary general held by Yace, who had fallen into dis- 
favor with the president because he was thought guilty of pride. 
Shortly thereafter, Yace was also stripped of his position as presi- 
dent of the National Assembly. 

By the early 1980s, the list of possible successors included mem- 
bers of the old guard in the top echelons of the party as well as 
technocrats — middle-aged, university-educated Ivoirians — who 
filled executive positions in the administrative bureaucracy and the 
economy. Among the old guard who enjoyed great support inside 
the PDCI were Minister of State Mathieu Ekra; Senior Minister 
of State Auguste Denise; and president of the Economic and 
Social Council Mamadou Coulibaly. The most likely candidate, 



31 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



however, was Henri Konan Bedie, a Baoule, a technocrat, and 
the new National Assembly president. According to Article 11, 
amended, of the Constitution, the president of the National As- 
sembly takes over the office of the president of the republic should 
the latter die or become incapacitated. The provisional president 
can then run for a full term in elections, which are to take place 
within sixty days. As provisional president, Bedie would have an 
edge over possible rivals. Moreover, demographic trends favored 
Bedie, who as a second- generation politician enjoyed growing sup- 
port from younger and middle-aged Iviorians who believed perhaps 
that Yace, a first- generation figure, was now too old. A third group 
of political rivals was a younger generation of politicians, most in 
their thirties, who were known for their effectiveness in the eco- 
nomic sphere and favored closer ties with the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 

In the mid-1980s, political infighting threatened to spill over 
boundaries of the narrow circle of the party leadership, however. 
That Houphouet-Boigny continued to resist naming a successor 
proved disconcerting to all those in positions of power, as well as 
to the West and especially to France, which had extensive invest- 
ments in Cote d'lvoire. 

Party Decentralization 

As the Ivoirian bureaucracy assumed a more prominent posi- 
tion in the postindependence years, the PDCI withered steadily. 
Increasingly it became a sinecure for the old guard, who lacked 
the ability to hold government office but remained personally loyal 
to the president. Also, by the early 1970s the one-party political 
structure was based on a purely ethnic system of representation 
at the local level that lacked any democratic procedures and that 
had produced an economically privileged political class. Moreover, 
the party and government hierarchies were characterized by 
nepotism and corruption. And finally, the poorly defined and over- 
lapping responsibilities of party officials caused infighting and po- 
litical rivalry. 

In the late 1970s, Houphouet-Boigny, faced with growing party 
disarray, began to decentralize the PDCI at the local level, where 
a substantial change in party leadership took place. For the first 
time, the local party secretary generals, previously elected as part 
of a slate, were now to be chosen in open elections. 

Discontent on Campus 

The academic community was the most vocal protest group. The 
first sign of difficulty occurred in 1982, when the union of students 



32 



Historical Setting 



went on strike to protest government efforts to halt political speeches 
on the National University of Cote d'lvoire campus. Houphouet- 
Boigny responded in his typical paternalistic fashion: he chastised 
the students, dissolved their movement, and forced them to return 
to their villages until they all had apologized in writing to the govern- 
ment. Laurent Gbagbo, a young professor who during the strike 
spoke out on the need for a multiparty system, went into volun- 
tary exile in France and became a symbol for young Ivoirians who 
wanted to liberalize the ruling party. 

Further disturbances occurred in 1983, when approximately 
4,000 secondary-school teachers, members of the National Union 
of Secondary School Teachers of Cote d'lvoire (Syndicat National 
des Enseignants du Secondaire de Cote d'lvoire — SYNESCI), went 
on strike to protest the elimination of their housing allowances. 
Their strike was also an expression of solidarity with those students 
and professors who had protested over issues of free speech the year 
before and, more significant, had voiced their basic opposition to 
Houphouet-Boigny. Because the teachers' union was the only union 
independent of the PDCI (SYNESCI refused to affiliate with the 
official government union), the government dissolved the union 
during the strike. In addition, the teachers complained that 
Houphouet-Boigny had unfairly penalized them and ignored cabi- 
net members who, they alleged, had mismanaged the economy. 
Reacting once again in an arbitrary manner that further alienated 
teachers and students alike, Houphouet-Boigny closed all the secon- 
dary schools and sent the 200,000 students home. 

Other Sources of Discontent 

The teachers' strike quickly expanded into a major political issue 
at a time when underlying popular discontent had already come 
close to the surface. Shortly before the strike, the president had 
announced an expensive move of the capital from Abidjan to 
his village birthplace, Yamoussoukro. The move promised to in- 
crease vastiy the value of land in the region, much of which was 
owned by the president and his family. And then, after the strike, 
Houphouet-Boigny delivered an extraordinary speech to the PDCI's 
Political Bureau in which he divulged the sources and use of his 
own extensive wealth. The consequent publication of the speech 
surprised much of the population, many of whom had been ad- 
versely affected by the country's increasing economic difficulties, 
and aroused tremendous popular disapproval. 

In 1984, despite record harvests and prices for cash crops and 
a rescheduling of the external debt, the political atmosphere 
remained glum. Public investigations revealed high levels of 



33 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

corruption in the public housing sector and led to a protracted tri- 
al and the subsequent imprisonment of a number of high-ranking 
officials. More important, the trial implicated higher authorities, 
including past and present ministers and members of the president's 
family, none of whom was brought to justice. 

Popular discontent also increased in response to the president's 
implementation of austerity measures. In the public sector, the 
government froze salaries. Throughout 1984 the employees retali- 
ated by threatening strikes, work stoppages, and absenteeism. In 
the private sector, where politicians who were also business peo- 
ple had always enjoyed privileged treatment, financial irregulari- 
ties were usually ignored. But the austerity measures took aim at 
the business people, eliminating their privileges and exposing finan- 
cial scandals. For example, Emmanuel Dioulo, Abidjan's mayor, 
reportedly defrauded the National Agricultural Development Bank 
of US$32 million. At the end of March 1985, when the PDCI's 
Executive Committee lifted Dioulo 's parliamentary immunity so 
that he could be tried on criminal charges, Dioulo fled the coun- 
try. Following the Dioulo affair, Houphouet-Boigny launched a 
series of tax investigations of Yace and other prominent political 
figures who had acquired personal fortunes. 

During Houphouet-Boigny 's 1984 annual summer vacation in 
Europe, a number of political tracts, published by unidentified op- 
position groups, appeared in the capital. The tracts questioned the 
president's political views and denounced the failure of the PDCI 
to manage the economy. The PDCI leadership responded to the 
attacks by organizing a series of trips to the interior to speak per- 
sonally to the population. This measure, however, only created 
more tension because the leaders competed among themselves for 
coverage in the national media and exposed their sometimes bit- 
ter rivalry. One reason for the increasing intensity of the rivalry 
was the scheduled September 1985 Eighth Party Congress of the 
PDCI, to be followed by legislative and presidential elections. 

In addition to the succession issue and the economic crisis, urban 
populations were faced with a worsening crime wave for which 
Ivoirians blamed foreigners primarily from Ghana and Burkina 
Faso (see Crime and Punishment, ch. 5). Some gangs, however, 
were directed by the Ivoirian underworld, an organized crime group 
that sometimes recruited unemployed youths from Burkina Faso. 
Many of the attacks were aimed at affluent French and Lebanese 
business people. 

Thus, by the end of 1984, uncertainty and instability permeated 
the Ivoirian political and economic sectors, replacing the growth 
and optimism of a decade earlier. The most pressing issue, however, 



34 



Historical Setting 



as viewed by the Ivoirian political elite and Western governments 
(France in particular), was whether Houphouet-Boigny would desig- 
nate an official successor for the 1985 elections. The Ivoirian elite 
seemed committed to a stable transition of power, mostly to pro- 
tect their economic interests. Clearly, many Ivoirian politicians be- 
lieved that this designation would eliminate much of the then- 
pervasive popular discontent. 

* * * 

Detailed written accounts of Cote d T voire 's early history sim- 
ply are not available because the archaeological record has yet to 
be fully explored. There do exist numerous transcriptions of oral 
accounts, with their limitations in reassembling the historical record, 
by ancestors of the indigenous population. Two secondary sources 
that include sections on the early history of the region are Virginia 
Thompson and Richard AdlofP s French West Africa and Robert W. 
July's A History of the African People. 

More recent literature on Cote dT voire is copious and varied. 
Aristide R. Zolberg's One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast is the 
best known and most detailed source for an analysis of recent 
Ivoirian politics, and Michael A. Cohen's Urban Policy and Political 
Conflict in Africa is an excellent source for a discussion of the coun- 
try's contrasting urban and rural life. Other analytical studies of 
Ivoirian politics, both precolonial and postcolonial, include Chris- 
tian Potholm's chapter in Four African Political Systems titled "The 
Ivoirian Political System"; two articles by Bonnie Campbell, one 
in John Dunn's West African States titled "The Ivory Coast"; and 
the other in Paul M. Lubeck's The African Bourgeoisie titled "The 
State and Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast;" and an ar- 
ticle by Martin Staniland titled "Single-Party Regimes and Po- 
litical Change: The P. D.C.I, and Ivory Coast Politics." 

Literature that deals extensively with the nature and extent of 
Houphouet-Boigny' s personal power is found in Claude Welch's 
No Farewell to Arms? and Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg's 
Personal Rule in Black Africa. One other article of note, which deals 
in great depth with the Ivoirian succession issue, is Tessilimi 
Bakary's "Elite Transformation and Political Succession" in 
I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado's The Political Econ- 
omy of Ivory Coast. 

One of the best sources for a critical assessment of Houphouet- 
Boigny is Laurent Gbagbo, a government opponent, whose book, 
Cote dTvoire: Economie et societea la veille de ITndependance (1940-1960), 
examines the events and conditions that brought Houphouet-Boigny 
to power. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



35 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Sculpted door from northern Cote d'lvoire showing Senoufo symbolic figures 



CULTURAL DIVERSITY is impressive in Cote dTvoire. Urban 
and agricultural workers, herders, traders, and fishermen; matri- 
lineal and patrilineal organizations; villages and chiefdoms; and 
progressive and conservative political tendencies contribute to this 
national mosaic. Added to this indigenous variety are French, 
Lebanese, and African immigrants and visitors who live and work 
throughout the country. This complex nation is changing, however, 
and attitudes toward change vary among and within these groups. 
During the 1980s, the pace of change was affected by the numer- 
ous oppositions that characterized Ivoirian society — rich-poor, 
urban-rural, modern- traditional, and south-north. Cote dTvoire 
was developing its own balance of these tensions, with a result far 
more complex than a simple combination of indigenous cultures 
and colonial legacies. 

Religious systems have changed in ways that reflect other social 
trends. In this nation of "miraculous" economic development, as 
it is so often dubbed, with its clearly privileged elite, people have 
on the whole retained traditional African religious beliefs. Usu- 
ally combined with Christian or Muslim precepts, or both, local 
religions nonetheless permeate views regarding the nature of cause 
and effect. The syncretisms emerging from these strains of con- 
tinuity and change are, like the nation itself, unique, despite similar- 
ities with other African states. 

Political systems, like religions, reflect elements of modern and 
indigenous values in their development, and in Cote dTvoire these 
influences were especially evident in the practice of justifying 
authority in personal terms. The patrimonial style of President Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny indelibly marked political development through 
the early decades of independence. He crafted, although not single- 
handedly, a nation that exemplified moderation in some respects, 
resisting political trends and social extremes. Social development 
was generally steady and gradual rather than abrupt or catastrophic. 
The resulting society was marked by a general optimism regard- 
ing the possibility of benefiting from the system. The lure of af- 
fluence fostered an individualism that was absent in traditional 
cultures, as materialism "caught on" but did not obliterate tradi- 
tional beliefs about the nature of the universe. Alienation was 
moderated by the hope of participation in the nation's material 
growth. 



39 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Efforts to improve educational opportunities were important in 
this changing social environment, both for individual advancement 
and for social control. The government placed a high priority on 
schools, adapting the system inherited from France to advance local 
interests — but still relying heavily on French assistance. In health 
care service delivery as well, Cote dT voire made substantial im- 
provements in the system it inherited from colonial times, raising 
material standards of living, at least for some. Like many benefits 
of development both before and after independence, however, these 
advantages were most readily available to those who were already 
able to exploit the changing social system to their own advantage. 

Physical Setting 

Location and Size 

Cote d'lvoire lies on the West African coast on the Gulf of Guinea 
(see fig. 3). Its outline is roughly that of a square, 560 kilometers 
on a side, with an area of 322,460 square kilometers — nearly the 
same as New Mexico. It is bounded on the east by Ghana, on the 
north by Burkina Faso and Mali, and on the west by Guinea and 
Liberia. The entire southern border is Gulf of Guinea coastline. 

Physical Features 

The nation consists of a large plateau rising gradually from sea 
level to almost 500 meters altitude in the north. Vegetation changes 
from lagoon and semitropical growth in the south to savanna grass- 
land and scrub in the north (see fig. 4). Mountain ranges extend 
along the western border, and a few peaks dot the northeast corner. 
Four major river systems flow southward forming parallel drainage 
basins. Cutting across these basins are three geographic regions 
roughly parallel to the coast — the lagoon region, the forest region, 
and the savanna region. 

The Lagoon Region 

The lagoon region (zone lagunaire) is a narrow coastal belt extend- 
ing along the Gulf of Guinea from the Ghana border to the mouth 
of the Sassandra River. It consists of a strip of low, sandy islands 
and sandbars built by the combined action of heavy surf and ocean 
currents. These barrier islands, known as the cordon littoral, have 
almost closed the rivers flowing into the gulf. The resulting series 
of lagoons range in width from about a hundred meters to seven 
or eight kilometers, and adjacent lands seldom rise more than thirty 
meters above sea level, leaving the area subject to frequent flood- 
ing during rainy seasons. 



40 



The Society and Its Environment 



Most of the lagoons are narrow, salty, and shallow and run 
parallel to the coastline, linked to one another and the gulf by small 
watercourses or canals. Where large rivers empty into the gulf, 
broad estuaries extend as much as ten to twenty kilometers inland. 
The sandy soil supports the growth of coconut palms and salt- 
resistant coastal shrubs. The dense rain forest that once came down 
to the water's edge along the continental side of the lagoons has 
been largely supplanted by clearings for farms and towns and by 
second-growth woodlands. In the few remaining undisturbed areas, 
dense mangrove thickets appear along the edges of marshy inlets. 

The Forest Region 

A broad belt of dense forest covers nearly one-third of the coun- 
try, extending north of the lagoon region in the east and reaching 
down to the coastline in the west between the Sassandra River and 
the mouth of the Cavally River. Its northern boundary stretches 
from the city of Man in the west to Bondoukou in the east, dip- 
ping down in the center of the country to the confluence of the 
Bandama Blanc and Bandama Rouge rivers. This boundary marks 
the transition from forest to grassy woodlands where plantation 
agriculture and burning have encroached on the forest. From the 
border with Ghana west to the Sassandra River, the gently rolling 
relief of the forest region is broken by small hills. West of the 
Sassandra, the Dan Mountains and the Toura Mountains reach 
1,300 meters elevation. Mt. Nimba, near the border with Liberia 
and Guinea, reaches 1,752 meters. 

The Savanna 

The northern half of the nation is generally characterized as 
savanna — a large plateau consisting primarily of rolling hills, low- 
lying vegetation, and scattered trees. Vegetation varies from wood- 
lands to grasslands and occasional patches of dry scrub in the far 
north. Some narrow strips of forest extend toward the north along 
watercourses and drainage lines. The southern portion of the 
savanna is sometimes referred to as the transition zone (zone de tran- 
sition) and the northern portion as the sudanic zone (zone soudanienne), 
although the entire region is transitional between the narrow belt 
of forest paralleling the coastline and the Sahara Desert. The gently 
rolling plains are broken occasionally by granite domes or small 
hill masses, the most extensive being the Komonos Hills. In the 
northwest, a number of peaks exceed 800 meters elevation. 

A major divide extends across the northeastern corner of Cote 
dT voire near Burkina Faso, separating the main southward 
drainage system from the Volta River Basin, which drains to the 



43 




42 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



International 
— • - — boundary 

® National capital 

• Populated place 

) 50 100 Kilo meters 

» 50 1 00 Miles 



Vegetation zones 



Forest 



Source: Based on information from Y. Monnier, "Vegetation," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 17. 

Figure 4. Vegetation Zones, 1983 



north. Near Bondoukou, where the divide crosses the Ghana bor- 
der, Mt. Bo we de Kiendi reaches 725 meters elevation. In the north, 
Mt. Yeleve reaches an altitude of 685 meters. 

Rivers 

Four major river systems follow meandering courses from north 
to south, draining into the Gulf of Guinea. From west to east these 
are the Cavally, Sassandra, Bandama, and Comoe — all relatively 



44 



The Society and Its Environment 



untamed rivers navigable only short distances inland from the coast. 
In the north, many smaller tributaries change to dry streambeds 
between rains. 

The Cavally River has its headwaters in the Nimba Mountains 
of Guinea and forms the border between Cote d'lvoire and Liberia 
for over half its length. It crosses rolling land and rapids and is 
navigable for about fifty kilometers inland from its exit to the sea 
near Cape Palmas. 

The Sassandra River Basin has its source in the high ground 
of the north, where the Tienba River joins the Feredougouba River, 
which flows from the Guinea highlands. It is joined by the Bagbe, 
Bafing, Nzo, Lobo, and Davo rivers and winds through shifting 
sandbars to form a narrow estuary, which is navigable for about 
eighty kilometers inland from the port of Sassandra. 

The Bandama River, often referred to as the Bandama Blanc, 
is the longest in the country, joining the Bandama Rouge (also 
known as the Marahoue), Solomougou, Kan, and Nzi rivers over 
its 800-kilometer course. This large river system drains most of 
central Cote d'lvoire before it flows into the Tagba Lagoon oppo- 
site Grand-Lahou. During rainy seasons, small craft navigate the 
Bandama for fifty or sixty kilometers inland. 

Easternmost of the main rivers, the Comoe, formed by the Leraba 
and Gomonaba, has its sources in the Sikasso Plateau of Burkina 
Faso. It flows within a narrow 700-kilometer basin and receives 
the Kongo and Iringou tributaries before winding among the coastal 
sandbars and emptying into the Ebrie Lagoon near Grand-Bassam. 
The Comoe is navigable for vessels of light draft for about fifty 
kilometers to Alepe. 

Large dams were built in the 1960s and 1970s to control the flow 
of major rivers to the south. These projects created reservoirs, now 
referred to as lakes bearing the names of the dams — Buyo on the 
Sassandra, Kossou and Taabo on the Bandama, and Ayame on 
the small Bia River in the southeast corner of the country. Lake 
Kossou is the largest of these, occupying more than 1,600 square 
kilometers in the center of the country. 

Climate 

The climate is generally warm and humid and is, overall, tran- 
sitional from equatorial to tropical. Seasons are more clearly dis- 
tinguishable by rainfall and wind direction than by temperature. 
Continental and maritime air masses, following the apparent move- 
ment of the sun from north to south, determine the cycle of the 
seasons that is associated with heat and cold farther from the 
equator. 



45 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

During half of the year, a warm maritime air mass pushes north- 
ward across Cote d' I voire in response to the movement of the sun. 
Ahead of it, a low pressure belt, or intertropical front, brings warm 
air, rain, and prevailing winds from the southwest. As the solar 
cycle reverses, a dry continental air mass moves southward over 
the nation, permitting the dusty harmattan to dominate. Surface 
winds are gentle, seldom exceeding fifteen to twenty kilometers per 
hour. 

Two climatic zones are created by the alternating wind patterns. 
In the north, rainfall amounts delineate two major seasons. Heavy 
rains fall between June and October, averaging 110 centimeters 
annually. Along the coast, four seasons prevail. Some rain falls 
in most months, with an average of 200 centimeters annually, but 
four seasons are generally distinguishable. Heavy rains fall between 
May and July in most years, followed by a short dry season dur- 
ing August and September. A second rainy season comes during 
October and November, followed by the major dry season from 
December to April. 

Temperatures and humidity generally follow the same pattern, 
with average temperatures between 25 °C and 30°C and ranges 
from 10°C to 40°C. Temperatures are higher in the north but may 
exceed 30°C even in the south. Annual and daily ranges of both 
temperature and humidity are small along the coast but increase 
progressively toward the north. The average relative humidity is 
85 percent in the south and 71 percent in the north. 

Population 

Cote d'lvoire's first national census in 1975 counted 6.7 mil- 
lion inhabitants, allowing 1987 estimates of 10.6 million. The 1987 
annual growth rate was 4.1 percent. Regional variations were 
marked, with annual growth of only 1 percent in the far north, 
but throughout the country, population growth rates, which in- 
cluded high net immigration rates, were increasing. In the late 
1980s, population projections for the year 2000 exceeded 20 mil- 
lion people. 

Country- wide, life expectancy rose from thirty-nine to fifty-one 
years between 1960 and 1988, and during the same period, the 
average annual birth rate also increased steadily to 45.9 per 1,000 
population. Fertility rates were about average for West Africa at 
6.6 births per adult female. Fertility rates were lowest in Abidjan 
and highest in rural areas, where infant mortality also remained 
relatively high. 

Mortality rates overall declined sharply after 1960, when one- 
third of all infants died before the age of five. Infant mortality in 



46 



Granite outcropping near Mankono 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 

the first year of life declined to 110 deaths per 1,000 births in the 
late 1980s. The crude death rate was just over 14 per 1,000 popu- 
lation. 

Distribution 

Population density increased steadily from twenty-one inhabi- 
tants per square kilometer in 1975 to thirty-two in 1987. This na- 
tional average masked uneven distribution, however, with much 
of the population concentrated in the south and fewer than ten in- 
habitants per square kilometer in parts of the north. The south- 
western corner of the country presented a low-density exception 
to this pattern. Population distribution reflected Ivoirian history 
more than physical environment. Most areas of high density cor- 
responded to the first centers of settlement by major ethnic groups, 
especially the Akan and Mande, altered in the north by nineteenth- 
century conquests by Samori Toure (see Pre-European Period, 
ch. 1). Colonial policy moved villages nearer transportation routes 
in order to control the population and to provide a ready labor sup- 
ply. In the late 1980s, the population was still distributed along 
main roads as the result of resettlements, which had continued into 
the 1930s in the southwest. 

Ivoirian settlement patterns in the late 1980s also revealed con- 
tinued southward migration from the savanna to the forest, a process 



47 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

first set in motion by precolonial invasions from the north and con- 
tinued by colonial policies emphasizing cash crop and plantation 
agriculture. This migration pattern was aided by postindependence 
urban and industrial development, which took place primarily in 
the southeast. 

Composition 

Urbanization was rapid after 1950, as the urban population grew 
by an average of 1 1 .5 percent per year until 1965 and about 8 per- 
cent per year from 1966 to 1988. As a result, Cote d'lvoire had 
a high urban-rural population ratio compared with the rest of sub- 
Saharan Africa. Roughly one-half of the 1987 population lived in 
urban areas, defined as localities of more than 10,000 inhabitants 
and those of more than 4,000 inhabitants where more than half 
of all households depended on nonagricultural incomes. In 1988 
about 20 percent of the total population lived in the capital city 
of Abidjan. 

Foreigners — mostly West Africans — made up from 27 percent 
to 50 percent of the population and were more highly urbanized 
than indigenous groups. Foreign migrants have sought jobs in 
Ivoirian industry, commerce, and plantation agriculture since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, especially after World War II. 
Most have found work in urban areas, but in 1980 the number 
of Ivoirians who migrated from rural to urban areas was almost 
equaled by the 75,000 migrant farm workers from neighboring 
states. 

Because of moderately high fertility, falling mortality rates, and 
labor immigration, the Ivoirian population was fairly young by 
world standards (see fig. 5). About 45 percent of the 1987 popula- 
tion was under the age of fifteen, and the dependency ratio — the 
number of elderly and young dependents in relation to 100 working- 
age adults — was 92 nationwide. There were 110 males per 100 
females, reflecting the largely male immigrant work force. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages 

Ethnic Diversity 

The population of Cote d'lvoire is ethnically diverse. More than 
sixty indigenous ethnic groups are often cited, although this num- 
ber may be reduced to seven clusters of ethnic groups by classify- 
ing small units together on the basis of common cultural and 
historical characteristics. These may be reduced to four major cul- 
tural regions — the East Atlantic (primarily Akan), West Atlantic 
(primarily Krou), Voltaic, and Mande — differentiated in terms of 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



environment, economic activity, language, and ove r -Jl cultural 
characteristics. In the southern half of the country, East Atlantic 
and West Atlantic cultures, separated by the Bandama River, each 
make up almost one-third of the indigenous population. Roughly 
one-third of the indigenous population lives in the north, includ- 
ing Voltaic peoples in the northeast and Mande in the northwest 
(see fig. 6). 

In Cote d'lvoire, as across Africa, national boundaries reflect 
the impact of colonial rule as much as present-day political real- 
ity, bringing nationalism into conflict with centuries of evolving 
ethnic identification. Each of Cote d'lvoire's large cultural group- 
ings has more members outside the nation than within. As a result, 
many Ivoirians have strong cultural and social ties with people in 
neighboring countries. These centrifugal pressures provided a 
challenge to political leaders in the 1980s, as they did to the gover- 
nors of the former French colony. 

Most representatives of East Atlantic cultures are Akan peoples, 
speakers of languages within the Kwa branch of the Niger-Congo 
language family: Many are descendants of eighteenth-century 
migrants from the kingdom of Asante. The largest Akan popula- 
tions in Cote d'lvoire are the Baoule, who make up nearly 15 per- 
cent of the total population, and the Agni (Anyi), who make up 
only about 3 percent of the total (see fig. 7). Much larger Akan 
populations live in Ghana and Togo. Akan societies are generally 
organized into farming communities but have a history of highly 
centralized chiefdoms and kingdoms tracing descent through mater- 
nal links. In the region that is now Cote d'lvoire, they did not form 
large empires like the Asante of Ghana. 

Smaller groups live in the southeastern lagoon region, where con- 
tact and intermarriage between the Akan and earlier inhabitants 
have resulted in ways of life that reflect elements of several cul- 
tural traditions. These Lagoon cultures comprise about 5 percent 
of the population. They depend on fishing and crop cultivation for 
subsistence and are not organized into centralized polities above 
the village level. 

Across the Bandama River, West Atlantic cultures are repre- 
sented by Krou peoples, probably the oldest of Cote d'lvoire's 
present-day ethnic groups. Traditional Krou societies were or- 
ganized into villages relying on hunting and gathering for subsis- 
tence and descent groups tracing relationships through male 
forebears. They rarely formed centralized chiefdoms. The largest 
Krou population in Cote d'lvoire is the Bete, who made up about 
6 percent of the population in the 1980s. 



49 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from World Bank, March 17, 1988. 



Figure 5. Population by Age and Sex, 1988 

In the north, cultural differences are greater than in the south. 
Descendants of early Mande conquerors occupy territory in the 
northwest, stretching into northern Guinea and Mali. The nation 
of Mali took its name from one of the largest of these societies, 
the Malinke. In the 1980s, Mande peoples — including the Malinke, 
Bambara, Juula, and smaller, related groups — made up about 17 
percent of the population of Cote d'lvoire. 

To the east of the Mande are Voltaic peoples. The most numer- 
ous of these, the Senoufo, made up about 10 percent of the total 
population in the 1980s. The Senoufo migrated to their present 
location from the northwest in the sixteenth and nineteenth cen- 
turies. Both historical periods are still in evidence in two forms of 
social organization found in the area — one based on small descent 
groups and the other on more complex confederations similar to 
those of the Mande. 

Language Diversity 

French is the official language and is used throughout the coun- 
try, but linguistic diversity still reflects the ethnographic mosaic 
of its peoples. Four of the eight major branches of the Niger-Congo 
language family are represented, including the Kwa, Atlantic, 
Mande, and Voltaic (Gur). Language areas correspond closely, 
but not exactly, to the four cultural regions of the nation. 



50 



The Society and Its Environment 



Agni and Baoule, both Kwa languages and to some extent mutu- 
ally intelligible, are the most widely spoken languages in the south. 
Variants of Mande and Senoufo are the most widely spoken in the 
north but are also heard in virtually all southern trading areas. Most 
Ivoirians speak two or more languages fluently, but no single Afri- 
can language is spoken by a majority of the population. 

French is used in schools and commerce and is spoken more fre- 
quently by men than by women. Most publications, including 
government documents, are also printed in French. Vernacular 
newspapers are not widely available, although biblical texts and 
educational materials have been translated into major African lan- 
guages. 

Arabic is taught in Quranic schools, which are most common 
in the north, and is spoken by immigrants from Lebanon and Syria. 
Non-Ivoirian African languages are also heard, including Mossi, 
Gourounsi, Fanti, Ewe, Fon, and Wolof. Many Ivoirians under- 
stand English, which is taught in high school and at the National 
University of Cote d'lvoire (formerly the University of Abidjan), 
but English is not popular even among educated people. 

Lineage Patterns 

In Cote d'lvoire, as in most of Africa, family relationships reflect 
beliefs about kinship that differ markedly from those of most Euro- 
peans and Americans. Kinship groups are relatively resistant to 
change through modernization, and, as a result, one traditional 
descent group — the lineage — is so common that it can be discussed 
in general terms, without reference to specific Ivoirian cultures. 
The organization of the lineage is based on the belief that relation- 
ships traced through males and those traced through females are 
substantially different. Kinship terms and behavioral expectations 
differ accordingly. 

The patrilineage, or group formed by tracing descent through 
male forebears to a male ancestor, is an important social unit 
throughout most of Africa. In eastern Cote d'lvoire, however, many 
societies are organized into matrilineages, tracing descent through 
female forebears to one female ancestor. Each type of lineage in- 
cludes both men and women, sometimes five or six generations 
removed from the founding ancestor, but the linking relatives are 
of one gender. In this way, second and third cousins within the 
same lineage may be considered closer relatives than first cousins 
in two different lineages, i.e., children of a brother and sister. 

Lineages generally share corporate responsibility for socializing 
the young and maintaining conformity to social norms. Lineage 
elders often meet to settle disputes, to prescribe or enforce rules 



51 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



DIDA 



International 
boundary 

, Cultural region 
boundary 

National capital 
Ethnic group 

Kilometers 



CULTURAL REGIONS 
Mande 

(2) Krou 

(3) Voltaic 

Akan 

Cultural regions have only one major 
family language but may include 
several ethnic groups. 



Source: Based on information from J. -C. Arnaud, "Ethnies," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 27. 



Figure 6. Major Ethnic Groups, 1983 

of etiquette and marriage, to discuss lineage concerns, and in gen- 
eral to preserve the group itself. They also serve as pressure groups 
on individuals, bringing nonconformists in line with socially accepted 
standards. Lineage rules usually require individuals to marry out- 
side their lineage, and the resulting alliances are important sources 
of social cohesion. Although these practices were widely condemned 
by some of the teachings of early European missionaries and by 
colonial officials, they have been preserved nonetheless because they 



52 



The Society and Its Environment 



provide a coherent set of expectations by which people can live in 
harmony with the universe as it is perceived in that society. 

Lineage ties serve to emphasize the unity of living and deceased 
relatives by descent through ritual observances and ceremonies. 
At times, however, lineages break apart in response to the pres- 
sure of interpersonal rivalries or when they become too large to 
maintain close ties. When such fission occurs, related lineages usu- 
ally maintain some ties and celebrate occasions together. If they 
consider their alliance important enough to be preserved for several 
generations, the resulting confederation of lineages, usually termed 
a clan, may include thousands of individuals and become a power- 
ful interest group in the regional or national context. Aside from 
their political potential, many aspects of lineage behavior and ex- 
pectation are still important in Cote d'lvoire, giving people their 
sense of history and social responsibility and serving to define the 
role of the individual in society. 

East Atlantic Cultures 

Akan 

Akan societies are best known for the large kingdom of Asante, 
which evolved in what is now Ghana. The westernmost Akan 
peoples — the Agni, Baoule, and several smaller groups — are descen- 
dants of people who fled from Asante and now make up about one- 
fifth of the Ivoirian population. 

Historians believe that Akan civilization evolved in stages, be- 
ginning about A.D. 1000, forming urban setdements by about A.D. 
1400, and giving rise to the Asante and other large kingdoms by 
about A.D. 1600. They became known for their elaborate use of 
gold, their military organization, and their success in international 
trade. Military expertise probably provided the basis for their 
regional dominance, but their dramatic success from A.D. 1600 
on also resulted from their use of slaves in gold mining and agricul- 
ture and from the spread of Islam. 

Most Akan societies are organized into matrilineages (abusua). 
Each lineage is identified with a home village or section of a town, 
although lineage members may be dispersed. Lineages demonstrate 
their autonomy with respect to other similar groups through the 
ownership of a symbolic chair or stool, named for the female founder 
of the lineage. Possession of the ritually important stool is seen as 
vital to the existence of the group. Large lineages may segment 
into branches, each led by an elder or headman, but a branch does 
not possess a stool as a symbol of its social autonomy. 



53 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



Southern Mande 




Mande 



Krou 



Senoufo 



Lobi 



Foreigners 



Akan 



Lagoon Peoples 



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of State, "The Tribes of 
the Ivory Coast," April 1970; and Cote d'lvoire, National Census Information, 



Figure 7. Percentage of Population by Ethnic Cluster, 1988 

Despite their matrifocal center, Akan societies are dominated 
by men. Men occupy most leadership positions, but they succeed 
former leaders based on their relationship through their mothers 
and sisters. Thus, a leader is succeeded, and his valuable property 
is inherited, by his brother or his sister's son. 

Matrilineal descent and inheritance produce particular strains 
in the social fabric under the pressures of modernization. Tensions 
often arise between a man's sons, who help him acquire wealth 
and property, and his sister's sons, who may inherit it. Similarly, 
a man is expected to support children of deceased maternal rela- 
tives, a demand that may conflict with the interests of his own chil- 
dren. Akan people used to cope with this contradiction by allowing 
a senior woman in the lineage to rule that a matrilineal relative 
had to relinquish his rights in favor of a man's son. More recently, 
the Ivoirian government has refused to enforce legal claims to 
matrilineal rights and has condemned, but not eliminated, prac- 
tices related to matrilineal descent. 

Agni political organization was derived from its lineage foun- 
dations, in that lineages grouped in villages were united as a chief- 
dom. The chief served as the guardian and protector of this domain 



1976. 



54 



The Society and Its Environment 



and as priest, judge, administrator, and custodian of the sacred 
stool, which in the 1980s was still recognized as a symbol of unity 
of the entire chiefdom. An Agni chief was succeeded by a man nomi- 
nated by the senior women of the lineage. This nominee, usually 
one of the deceased chief s matrilineal heirs, was confirmed, or on 
rare occasions rejected, by a council of lineage elders. Most of the 
chiefs' traditional political authority has been eroded or transformed 
by modern national law, but their ritual authority remained im- 
portant in the 1980s, confirmed by their custody of the sacred stool. 

The Agni were particularly successful at assimilating other groups 
into their political organization, with the result that many people 
in the southeast trace their ancestry both to Agni chiefdoms and 
to smaller, distinct societies that fell under Agni control. One 
mechanism of assimilation was grouping semiautonomous chief- 
doms under an Agni paramount chief, who held ultimate author- 
ity over his subjects. In at least four regions, these polities evolved 
into kingdoms — Indenie, Moronou, Comoenou, and Sanwi — which 
still evoke strong loyalties and ethnic pride. The continuing im- 
portance of the kingdoms was demonstrated in 1959 and 1969, when 
Sanwi attempted to secede from Cote d'lvoire in the hope of demon- 
strating Agni autonomy from Baoule domination. 

In 1988 the Baoule constituted about 15 percent of the popula- 
tion, making this the nation's largest indigenous ethnic group, 
although the Agni population in neighboring states was larger. 
Baoule society was less highly centralized than the Agni, with vil- 
lages grouped into small chiefdoms. Baoule agricultural successes 
were remarkable, however, partly because of careful control of land, 
which was held in common by an entire village and redistributed 
each year to those most efficient at cultivating it. Hunting sup- 
plemented agriculture. 

The Baoule were also successful in absorbing neighboring peo- 
ples into their society by political means and intermarriage. Baoule 
women married freely into other societies, in part because their 
children inherited their lineage membership from their mother. As 
a result, many Baoule still have extended kin ties reaching into 
other ethnic communities, and this network provides political sup- 
port for Baoule politicians. Assimilation by the Baoule also involved 
the transfer of their myth of origin — which emphasized the value 
of agriculture, respect for authority, and individual sacrifice for 
society — to smaller neighboring groups. 

Ivoirian president Houphouet-Boigny has used his Baoule iden- 
tity pragmatically to pursue political goals. For example, he re- 
fused to name a successor to his presidency, saying that to do so 
was not in keeping with tradition. At the same time, he condemned 



55 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

the Baoule traditional practice of matrilineal inheritance and de- 
scent for failing to strengthen the unity of the nuclear family, which 
he considers the pillar of modern Ivoirian society and the main- 
stay of economic development. 

Most influential among smaller Akan cultures of eastern Cote 
d'lvoire are the Abron (Brong in Ghana), Aboure, Ehotile, and 
Nzima. Together they make up only about 2 percent of the total 
population. All are matrilineal peoples with a heterogeneous popu- 
lation and mixed economy. None achieved the elaborate political 
centralization of the Agni nor the postindependence importance of 
the Baoule. 

Lagoon Cultures 

Along the coastline from the nation's eastern border to the Ban- 
dama River is a series of lagoons, where fishing and trading 
dominate local economies. Lagoon societies include the Mekyibo, 
Attie, Mbato, Ebrie, Abidji, Adioukrou, Alladian, Avikam, Abbe, 
and others, each of which, in turn, is known by a variety of names 
within the region and is subdivided into smaller groups. 

Residents of inland villages are subsistence farmers, and many 
lagoon peoples produce cash crops. Although not Akan language 
speakers, they speak related Kwa languages and are organized into 
matrilineages and chiefdoms similar to the Agni and Baoule to the 
north. This cultural assimilation reflects the local history of occa- 
sional domination by Akan armies from the north. Ebrie, Attie, 
and Adioukrou societies are further segmented into age classes 
organized for warfare, mutual aid, and communal work projects. 
Age-groups continued to operate in the 1980s, providing an im- 
portant source of social cohesion. 

Although the nation's capital, Abidjan, is in traditional Ebrie 
territory, the Ebrie made up less than 10 percent of the popula- 
tion of the city in the late 1980s. Many local groups have been dis- 
placed by Akan peoples and others moving into the densely 
populated southeast corner of the nation. Some of these survive 
in scattered villages; others were absorbed into the coastal econ- 
omy by early French arrivals and flourished under this arrange- 
ment. As a result, this complex and heterogeneous lagoon region 
exhibits an eclectic variety of cultural and linguistic traits that defy 
simple classification. 

West Atlantic Cultures 

Krou 

The dominant peoples in the southwest region, where the forest 
zone reaches the coastal lagoons, are the Krou. Krou languages are 



56 



Lobi homestead, northeastern 
Cote d'lvoire 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 




a subgroup within the Kwa branch of the Niger-Congo language 
family, related to those of the Akan and lagoon peoples to their 
east. Krou societies are found along the coast from Monrovia, 
Liberia, to the Bandama River in Cote d'lvoire. They include the 
Bete, Dida, Guere, Wobe, and several smaller groups. 

Krou cultures generally lack the centralization characteristic of 
the Akan to the east. The basic social unit is the patrilineage, trac- 
ing descent through males to a common male ancestor for both 
men and women. The lineage, which usually coincides with a vil- 
lage, is further subdivided into segments or branches. Village leader- 
ship may be exercised by a council of elders, sometimes headed 
by a chief whose power is limited by the council. The result is an 
uncentralized, but not anarchic, society. Few status distinctions 
are recognized other than age and lineage membership, although 
many Krou people kept slaves from neighboring societies before 
the arrival of European slave traders. Villages maintain ties based 
on presumed common descent, reinforced by ceremonial exchanges 
and gifts. Unrelated villages maintained neutral relations but were 
rarely united into a larger polity until the colonial era. 

For their livelihood, the Krou rely on farming supplemented by 
hunting in forest areas. Land is held collectively by members of 
a village but is worked by individual lineage branches or families. 
Age-groups were traditionally assigned military and religious 
responsibilities, and they still organized communal work projects 



57 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

in the late 1980s. Women were important in the village, with 
responsibilities for most activity concerning crops. They also formed 
age-groups or village councils, which were traditionally consulted 
before implementing political decisions, although women's coun- 
cils lost influence under colonial rule. 

The Bete, the largest Krou society, are probably the descendants 
of groups pushed southward from savanna woodland to forested 
areas by warfare to the north. They are divided into patrilineage- 
based villages, often allied with other villages by tracing descent to 
a common ancestor. Lineage exogamy prohibits marriage within the 
patrilineage and contributes to links among patrilineages through 
intermarriage. 

Marriage is a family responsibility, as it is in many societies. 
The family of the groom compensates the family of the bride for 
their loss, a practice crudely translated as "bride-price." This ex- 
change legitimizes children of the marriage, who are considered 
members of their father's patrilineage, while their mother retains 
her membership in her father's lineage. 

Polygyny, or plural marriage by Bete men, remained relatively 
common in the 1980s, although as in all societies, it was an expen- 
sive means of gaining prestige, sexual access, and children, and 
it was not recognized by Ivoirian law. Divorce, although not com- 
mon, was socially acceptable and allowed children to retain their 
membership in their father's patrilineage even if they continued 
to live with their mother. 

In the twentieth century, the Bete have been recognized for their 
success in cash cropping and for their widespread acceptance of 
Christianity. They have a strong ethnic consciousness despite these 
foreign influences and have been active both within the govern- 
ment and in antigovernment dissent groups since independence. 
They also have a long history of resistance to foreign domination 
and strong beliefs in their own cultural superiority. 

Around the Bete are a number of smaller groups, including the 
Dida, Guere, Wobe, Neyo, Niaboua, and several others. Most are 
organized into farming villages, with a greater dependence on fish- 
ing along the coast. Many villages share common basic features 
with neighboring groups, and most have an ethnically mixed labor 
force and large immigrant population. Some have adopted myths 
of origin of other groups to legitimize their pride in their past, and 
many maintain strong loyalties to the region, despite their appar- 
ent mixed origins. 

The Southern Mande 

Dan and Gouro cultures of western Cote d'lvoire share numer- 
ous culture traits in common with the Krou peoples to their south, 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



but they speak languages related to that of the Mande to their north. 
Their traditional political organization was not complex, resem- 
bling the villages of the southwest more than the highly central- 
ized polities of the Mande. /Because of their cultural eclecticism, 
the Dan, Gouro, and smaller, related groups of west-central Cote 
d'lvoire are sometimes classified as Southern Mande or ' 'Peripheral 
Mande, ' ' a label they would reject. They made up slightly less than 
8 percent of the total population in the late 1980s. 

Mande Cultures 

The largest cultural complex in northwestern Cote d'lvoire is 
that of the Mande peoples, descendants of renowned inventors of 
West African agriculture — independent of, but approximately coin- 
cident with, early crop domestication in the Middle East. As traders, 
artisans, and cultivators, they developed highly complex political 
structures. Two large empires are still remembered today — the 
Soninke Empire of Ghana, which dates from about the fourth to 
the thirteenth century, and the Malinke Empire of Mali. The 
Malinke, like the Soninke, extended their dominion into what is 
now northern Cote d'lvoire between the thirteenth and fifteenth 
centuries (see Pre-European Period, ch. 1). In about 1670, their 
Bambara subjects threw off Malinke rule and established several 
independent states, which were attacked by Fulani armies in the 
nineteenth century and subsequently fell under the domination of 
a Malinke conqueror, Samori Toure. 

Most Mande societies are organized into patrilineages and 
agricultural homesteads. Animal husbandry plays an important role 
in the economy, although commerce is also well developed, with 
large markets in both rural and urban settings. 

Among the three Mande groups that continue to dominate the 
northwest are the Malinke, also found in neighboring Guinea and 
Mali, and the Bambara, most of whom live in Mali. More recent 
Mande immigrants to the region include the Juula, who are dis- 
persed throughout the nation but are identified with the area near 
the city of Kong. None of these three groups retains its ancient 
hierarchical political structure, but each has a hereditary nobility 
and fairly extensive social stratification. The Malinke and Bambara 
group men and women according to fairly narrow age ranges, and 
the resultant sororities and fraternities serve to strengthen social 
solidarity and organize communal work projects. 

Most Mande people speak variants of a common language, some- 
times referred to as Mande-kan, and they share numerous other 
cultural traits. At the same time, they have different histories and 



59 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



myths of origin, and, most important from their point of view, they 
have different religions. 

The Bambara have retained the substance of local beliefs and 
practices and are known locally as pagans. The Malinke have 
adapted tenets of Islam to their native beliefs, creating a wide vari- 
ety of Islamic and syncretic sects. The Juula are strongly Muslim — 
so much so that many Bambara refer to themselves as Juula if they 
convert to Islam. Similarly, in other areas of Cote d'lvoire, Mus- 
lim Malinke are referred to as Juula outside their home area, in 
recognition of their Islamic beliefs. Non-Muslims in the northwest 
are often called Bambara, regardless of ethnic affiliation. 

The term Juula is also a local term for a trader and is used am- 
biguously in the region to refer to merchants and sedentary descen- 
dants of former Juula. The lines of ethnic identity are also blurred 
because traders are often recognized authorities on Islamic law and 
may be Juula in both senses of the term. 

The Juula have a history of itinerant preaching, teaching, and 
trading, and they won converts easily in areas characterized by 
patrilineal descent, patriarchal family organization, and plural mar- 
riage. The Wattara clan (jaamu) among the Juula was centered in 
the region of Kong, where it developed into a mini-kingdom sur- 
rounded by Senoufo people and was destroyed by Samori Toure 
in the nineteenth century. 

Voltaic Cultures 

Voltaic cultures are found in northeastern Cote d'lvoire, northern 
Ghana, and Burkina Faso. They share cultural similarities with 
the Mande peoples to their west but have not influenced the polit- 
ical history of the region to the same extent. Northern Voltaic 
peoples — such as the Mossi, who are based outside Cote d'lvoire — 
built large empires, but the Senoufo and the Lobi are organized 
into small chiefdoms based on unilineal descent. 

The Senoufo occupy north-central Cote d'lvoire, Mali, and 
Burkina Faso and are also known as the Seniambele and Siena. 
Senoufo is a Juula word meaning "speaker of Sene," but language 
is among the few culture traits that unify this heterogeneous group. 
They have several myths of origin, each popular in a different area. 
Several of these involve an ancestor known as Nangui or Nengue, 
who left the Juula capital of Kong to establish the Senoufo city of 
Korhogo, which means "heritage." Senoufo history refers to Juula 
traders as early as the thirteenth century, when Islam arrived in 
the region. The territory was raided by Samori Toure in the late 
nineteenth century, and the resulting decline continued into colonial 
times. 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Senoufo economy is primarily agricultural. Commerce is 
well developed in the area, but in most cases it is conducted by 
Juula rather than Senoufo traders. The close relationship between 
the Senoufo farmer and the land is emphasized in religious obser- 
vances and mediated through the lineage. Each lineage has a mythi- 
cal ancestor, often identified with an animal that is said to have 
helped found the lineage. This animal, or "totem," occupies a spe- 
cial niche in the Senoufo worldview, as the subject of a ritual taboo 
and symbol of social unity. The head of the lineage exercises moral 
and religious authority and is believed to propitiate local gods and 
ensure good harvests. Aside from the lineage head, status distinc- 
tions are relatively few, although many people kept slaves from 
other societies until well into the twentieth century. 

Villages are unified by male age- grades, uniting youths close in 
age within secret brotherhoods known as poro in this region and 
parts of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Poro societies have survived in 
part because they help maintain order, especially in times of so- 
cial upheaval. They also serve as repositories of social customs and 
religious values, providing a conservative balance against the rapid 
acculturation in Ivoirian society as a whole. 

Akan influence is fairly strong among the Senoufo, some of whom 
have adopted matrilineal descent systems resembling that of the 
Akan. Villages were unified under the authority of an appointed 
chief during colonial times, a practice that drew villagers into the 
national system but also disrupted established channels of authority 
and was resisted by many of the culturally conservative Senoufo 
people. 

Adjacent to Senoufo territory are the Lobi, Koulango, and several 
smaller Voltaic societies. They inhabit an isolated, relatively unde- 
veloped corner of the country. They probably arrived in the area 
from the east and organized themselves in autonomous villages. 
They resisted the spread of Islam, which was brought by Juula 
traders and teachers over several centuries. More recently, they 
have rejected many aspects of European acculturation and lack the 
overall fascination with economic progress that characterizes much 
of the nation. 

Foreigners 

The presence of a large foreign population — estimated by some 
to be as high as 50 percent of the total in 1985 — complicates eth- 
nic relations in Cote dT voire. The area was the scene of popula- 
tion migration and mobility long before the imposition of national 
boundaries. Many ethnic groups overlap present boundaries, plac- 
ing citizenship and ethnic loyalties in conflict, and some foreigners 



61 




62 




63 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

have remained in Cote d'lvoire long enough to feel they are Ivoi- 
rians. Official demographic and employment data often include 
immigrant workers and residents. Despite these complications, the 
government has attempted to codify the legal distinction between 
citizen and noncitizen, and this distinction is becoming increas- 
ingly important to many people. 

In the mid-1980s, the largest single foreign minority group was 
the Burkinabe, most of Mossi ethnic identity, who numbered about 
1.2 million — nearly one-half of the foreign population. Unlike most 
other foreigners, Mossi immigrants were concentrated in rural areas, 
where they worked as agricultural laborers. Some Mossi workers 
were also found in low- wage urban jobs. 

Other ethnic groups represented in the foreign population in- 
cluded Krou peoples from Liberia, Fanti and Ewe from Ghana, 
and smaller numbers of Bobo, Gourounsi, Dogon, Hausa, Djerma, 
and Fulani from neighboring states. Lebanese immigrants, offi- 
cially estimated at 60,000 but possibly numbering close to 200,000 
in 1987, worked in commerce and business in many towns. The 
French population, once as high as 60,000, had declined to about 
30,000, or the same number as at independence. Other Europeans 
and Africans were also found in this complex and cosmopolitan 
nation. 

The Role of Religion 

Most Ivoirians practice local religions, which are sometimes in- 
fused with elements of Christianity or Islam, or both. Government 
estimates in the 1980s suggested that about one-fourth of the popu- 
lation was Muslim and one-eighth, Christian — mostly Roman 
Catholic. 

Islam and Christianity are practiced in a variety of forms through- 
out the country, as different social and spiritual problems bring 
forth a variety of responses. Islam has been practiced in the far 
north for roughly seven centuries, shifting its appeal over this time 
from its strength as a world religion and its basis in written testa- 
ments to its symbolic importance as an alternative to European 
religions. Christian missionaries arrived at the coast in the seven- 
teenth century but did not win converts in large numbers until the 
nineteenth century. Christianity's appeal was strongest among edu- 
cated Africans and those who sought advancement through Euro- 
pean contact. Christian holidays are officially recognized, but 
Muslim celebrations are also held, and, as in many areas of na- 
tional life, tolerance is the general attitude toward the practice of 
religion. 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



Religious communities generally coexist peacefully, in part be- 
cause no world religion has been enthusiastically embraced by a 
majority of people. Conversions have been an individual matter 
in most cases, and many families include Muslims and Christians 
living together. Religious tolerance is also part of government pol- 
icy. The president personally contributes to the cost of building 
mosques and churches, and he encourages both Muslims and Chris- 
tians to assist in projects undertaken by other religious communi- 
ties. Religious practitioners have also earned substantial goodwill 
through the services they offer their communities, especially in 
health and education, and by their overall contribution to social 
harmony. 

The Constitution calls for a secular state, although this is not 
interpreted as strict separation of church and state. Officials often 
attend religious ceremonies as representatives of the state, and some 
mission schools receive government aid. Missionaries are gener- 
ally welcomed throughout the nation, although their teachings sel- 
dom replace centuries-old systems of spiritual belief and practice 
that form the basis of cultural unity. 

African religions have maintained their credibility because they 
provide effective explanations for many of life's dilemmas in ways 
that can only be understood in their cultural context. Local religions 
reassure people that they are living in harmony with the universe 
and that this harmony can be preserved by maintaining proper rela- 
tionships with all beings. For this reason, separating religion from 
other aspects of life serves to distort, rather than clarify, its meaning. 

According to most local belief systems, spiritual beings — a cre- 
ator, ancestral spirits, and spirits associated with places and 
objects — can influence a person's life and luck. This is the major 
premise on which belief and practice are based. The distinction 
between the spiritual and physical "worlds," in Western secular 
terms, is unimportant in the face of what is interpreted as over- 
whelming evidence that physical events may have spiritual causes. 

Lineages are also important in understanding the organization 
of many Ivoirian religions. The spiritual unity of the descent group 
transcends distinctions among the unborn, the living, and the de- 
ceased. In this context, religious differences are not based on dis- 
agreements over dogma or doctrine. Rather, groups living in 
different social and physical environments encounter different 
spiritual and physical dangers, and their religious needs differ ac- 
cordingly. This diversity accounts, in part, for early missionaries 
in West Africa who often described the spiritual "chaos" they en- 
countered, when they were actually observing different social group- 
ings, each with different spiritual obligations to ancestral and other 



65 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



spirits, acting in accordance with common beliefs about the na- 
ture of the universe. 

Local Religions 

Religions of the South 

Most Akan recognize a supreme being, Nyame, who created all 
things and from whom lesser gods derive their power. Nyame is not 
worshiped directiy but is approached through intermediaries. These 
lesser gods (abosom) may inhabit lakes, streams, rivers, or trees. 
Below them are minor deities whose power is invoked through amu- 
lets or charms (suman) worn for protection. 

Ancestral spirits (samanfo) surpass these deities in importance 
among most Akan peoples, as it is the ancestors who safeguard the 
prosperity of the lineage and provide assistance in meeting daily 
challenges. Ancestral spirits are often consulted, offered food and 
drink, and reminded that people are depending on them, in the 
hope that an individual will be able to act with confidence, espe- 
cially in dealing with others in the lineage. Failure to perform 
sacrifices to ancestral spirits not only damages a person spiritually 
but also brings forth the wrath of the ancestor and can result in 
tragedy or unhappiness. 

An individual's spirit, or soul (elaka among the Agni; okra among 
the Baoule), is immortal and indestructible. A living individual also 
possesses other spiritual substances, including sunsum, which is 
adaptable and determines a person's character, and mogya, which 
determines a person's membership in a matrilineage. Through 
transgressions — failure to perform rituals or obey moral precepts — 
an individual can damage the soul or lose it entirely. Upon death, 
the soul (or in some areas, part of the soul) may enter the kingdom 
of the dead, where its existence is happy and peaceful, or it may 
reenter a human being to continue on its path toward fulfillment. 

Akan religious practitioners include lineage heads, village chiefs 
(when the head and the chief are not the same individual), and 
priests who officiate at ritual observances for cults honoring specific 
deities. These priests (akomfo) undergo extensive training as ap- 
prentices to established practitioners. Priests can also act as diviners, 
and the most esteemed among them are believed to be clairvoyant, 
able to locate the source of spiritual difficulty for their clients, who 
consult them for a fee. They also give instructions for coping with 
adversity. Priests sometimes act as doctors, since many diseases 
are believed to have spiritual causes. 

Sorcerers (obayifo) are spiritual practitioners who, in the Akan 
worldview, bring about evil. Their actions are believed to be 



66 



Man with a radio, Bondoukou 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 
Drummer, Broukro 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 
Mauritanian shopkeeper, 
Bondoukou 
Courtesy Karen Peterson 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

motivated by envy or hatred, and, it is feared, they may be em- 
ployed by one's enemies. Sorcery often consists of poisoning, which 
may be counteracted by a priest or detected by a diviner, but one 
of the hazards of dealing with the spiritual realm is that sorcerers 
are sometimes disguised as priests or diviners. A person may use 
amulets or other objects to ward off the evil effects of sorcery, but 
these are sometimes powerless against the anger of an ancestor. 

Collective religious ceremonies are important to the life of many 
Akan peoples. The most important of these is the yam festival, 
which serves several functions. It is a memorial service for the dead 
and begs for their protection in the future; it is a time of thanks- 
giving for good harvests; and it is a ritual of purification that helps 
rid the group of evil influences. It also provides an opportunity 
to recall the discovery of the yam — now an important part of the 
diet of many Akan people — and to salute the Akan chief who, it 
is said, risked his life by tasting this unknown food before others 
in his chiefdom. The yam festival is considered vital to the group's 
survival, and it serves important social functions — it defines the 
group, symbolizes its unity, and reminds people of their obliga- 
tions to others. 

Religion among the Krou peoples of the southwest resembles 
that of the Akan, with an important difference in the presence of 
a second powerful deity alongside the creator. This second god is 
an evil deity or devil, who works against the creator god, produc- 
ing a duality that is an important theme in Krou culture. All individ- 
uals exhibit a balance of good and evil, in this view, and maintaining 
this balance is important both to the individual and to the entire 
universe. 

Religions of the North 

Northern religions contain the notion of dual deities found in 
the southwest, although the two often complement rather than op- 
pose each other. Ancestral spirits are especially important because 
it is believed that they can directly influence an individual's for- 
tunes in this life. 

The cosmology of the Mande peoples of the northwest is described 
in their myth of origin, variants of which are retold throughout 
the region. The myth recounts God's creation of the universe and 
of four sets of twins from seeds. They were commanded to popu- 
late the earth and teach their offspring how to grow crops. They 
used the first music to plead for rain, and the Niger River was 
formed from the resulting series of floods. Each area along the river 
is associated with a wild animal that either prevented the sowing 
of seeds or protected the fields. Features of the river and surrounding 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



terrain are also associated with activities of the first ancestors, re- 
inforcing the bond between the group's spiritual existence and the 
land — a bond that has confused foreign missionaries, government 
officials, and development workers in recent decades. 

In Lobi society in the northeast, divination is important as a 
means of determining the cause of death, disease, or other misfor- 
tune. Diviners do not predict the future; rather, they prescribe a 
course of action that emphasizes accepted social values in an effort 
to help people cope with present-day dilemmas. The diviner's role 
is similar to that of a counselor or confessor, who reminds people 
of the need to maintain proper relationships with all beings and 
provides them with a new perspective on relationships that have 
gone wrong. 

Secret societies are found in several areas of northern Cote 
dTvoire (see Voltaic Cultures, this ch.). They serve important func- 
tions in the initiation and education of the young, and they pro- 
vide vehicles for preserving beliefs about the past. Senior members 
are responsible for ritual instruction of new members and for the 
observance of funerals and ceremonies to ensure agricultural 
prosperity. Blacksmiths have secret societies of their own, and in 
some areas this occupational group is believed to have special 
spiritual powers. Medical and ritual specialists also undergo ap- 
prenticeships with established practitioners, thereby reinforcing their 
status. 

World Religions 

Islam 

Islam is a monotheistic religion based on revelations received 
in seventh-century Arabia by the Prophet Muhammad. His life 
is recounted as the early history of the religion, beginning with his 
travels from the Arabian town of Mecca about 610. Muhammad 
preached a series of divine revelations, denouncing the polytheistic 
religions of his homeland. He became an outcast from Mecca and 
in 622 was forced to flee to the town of Yathrib, which became 
known as Medina (the city) through its association with him. The 
flight (hijra) marked the beginning of the Islamic Era and of Islam 
as a powerful force in history, and it marked the year 622 as the 
beginning of the Islamic calendar. Muhammad ultimately defeated 
his detractors in battle and consolidated his influence as both tem- 
poral and spiritual leader of most Arabs before his death in 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his 
words that were regarded as coming directly from God in the 
Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Muhammad's teachings and 



69 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

the precedents of his behavior as recalled by those who knew him 
became the hadith (sayings). From these sources, the faithful con- 
structed the Prophet's customary practice, or sunna, which they 
endeavor to emulate. The Quran, hadith, and sunna form a com- 
prehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the faithful 
in most Muslim countries. 

Islam came to West Africa in three waves. In the ninth century, 
Berber traders brought the faith from North Africa to the ancient 
empire of Ghana. Beginning in the thirteenth century, the Malinke 
rulers of the Mali Empire contributed to its spread throughout much 
of the savanna, a process that continued into the eighteenth cen- 
tury, when the Juula established a Muslim kingdom in what is now 
northern Cote d'lvoire. Finally in the nineteenth century, the 
Malinke warrior Samori Toure contributed to the southward spread 
of Islam (see Pre-European Period, ch. 1). 

The central requirement of Islam is submission to the will of God 
(Allah), and, accordingly, a Muslim is a person who has submit- 
ted his will to God. The most important demonstration of faith 
is the shahadah (profession of faith), which states "There is no God 
but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his prophet." Salat (daily 
prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage 
to Mecca) are also required. 

In Cote d'lvoire, only the most devout Muslims pray, fast, and 
give alms as required by strict tenets of Islam, and only the most 
wealthy perform the hajj. Most Ivoirian Muslims are Sunni, fol- 
lowing the Maliki version of Islamic law. Sufism, involving the 
organization of mystical brotherhoods (tariqa) for the purification 
and spread of Islam, is also widespread, laced with indigenous be- 
liefs and practices. The four major Sufi brotherhoods are all 
represented in Cote d'lvoire, although the Qadiriya, founded in 
the eleventh century, and the Tidjaniya, founded in the eighteenth 
century, are most popular. The Qadiriya is prevalent in the west, 
and the Tidjaniya, in the east. The other two major Islamic brother- 
hoods have few adherents in Cote d'lvoire. The Senoussiya is iden- 
tified with Libya, where its influence is substantial. The Ahmadiya, 
a Shiite sect originating in nineteenth-century India, is the only 
non-Sunni order in Cote d'lvoire. 

The significant religious authority is the marabout. He is believed 
to be a miracle worker, a physician, and a mystic, who exercises 
both magical and moral authority. He is also respected as a dis- 
penser of amulets, which protect the wearer — Muslim or non- 
Muslim — against evil. The influence of marabouts has produced a 
number of reactions in Ivoirian society, among them a series of 
reformist movements inspired by Wahabist puritanism, which 



70 



Mausoleum in eastern Cote d'lvoire 
Courtesy Karen Peterson 



originated in nineteenth-century Saudi Arabia. These reform move- 
ments often condemn Sufism and marabouts as un-Islamic, but the 
poor see that marabouts often speak out on behalf of the downtrod- 
den and that reform movements appear to support the interests 
of wealthier Muslims. 

Hamallism began as an Islamic reform movement in the French 
Sudan early in the twentieth century and has provided a channel 
for expressing political and religious discontent. Its founder, Hamal- 
lah, was exiled from the French Sudan to Cote d'lvoire during the 
1930s. He preached Islamic reform tempered by tolerance of many 
local practices, but he condemned many aspects of Sufism. Ortho- 
dox brotherhoods were able to convince the French authorities in 
Cote d'lvoire that Hamallah had been responsible for earlier po- 
litical uprisings in the French Sudan. Authorities then expelled 
Hamallah from Cote d'lvoire and banned his teachings. 

The relative success of Islam may be related to its compatibility 
with many aspects of African culture — for example, plural mar- 
riage for men, which was opposed by Christian missionaries. None- 
theless, Islam was also embraced because it provided symbolic 
identification with successful traders and travelers throughout the 
world, and it was seen as an alternative to European religion. Its 
agents were black, and it preached on behalf of those who lacked 
the trappings of Western civilization. In the 1980s, about one-fourth 



71 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



of all Ivoirians, including most Juula and Malinke people, called 
themselves Muslims. 

Christianity 

Only about one-eighth of the population was Christian in the 
1980s. In general, Christianity was practiced by the middle class 
and in urban centers of the south. It was most prevalent among 
the Agni and lagoon cultures of the southeast, least so among the 
Mande of the northwest. Roman Catholicism was the largest Chris- 
tian religion, but Methodist, Baptist, and a number of smaller mis- 
sion churches also existed. 

Roman Catholicism made a brief appearance in Cote d'lvoire 
in the mid-seventeenth century and reappeared two centuries later 
when French missionaries began to work among the Agni. The 
first African Roman Catholic mission in Cote d'lvoire was estab- 
lished in 1895, and the first African priest was ordained in 1934. 
In the 1980s, the Roman Catholic Church operated seminaries and 
schools throughout the country. Although Cote d'lvoire is officially 
a secular state, the president expressed pride in Abidjan's large 
Roman Catholic cathedral and alone funded construction of a 
basilica at Yamoussoukro, his birthplace, by 1990. Some villages 
have also adopted patron saints, whom they honor on both secu- 
lar and religious holidays. 

The largest Protestant religion as of the mid-1980s was Harrism, 
begun in 1914 by William Wade Harris, a Liberian preacher who 
proselytized along the coast of Cote d'lvoire and Ghana. Harris 
set an example for his followers by leading a simple life and es- 
chewing conspicuous wealth. He condemned the use of amulets 
and fetishes as idolatry, and he preached against adultery, theft, 
and lying. His was a simple, fairly austere form of Christianity, 
which was open to Roman Catholics and Protestants and did not 
preach open defiance of colonial authority. 

In 1915 Harris was expelled from the region by an uneasy colonial 
governor, an action that revitalized his church, leaving dozens of 
small "Harrist" churches along the coast. A decade later, Methodist 
missionaries made contact with Harris and attempted to continue 
his work among the lagoon peoples. Harris succeeded in part be- 
cause of his ethnic background — he was African but not Ivoirian — 
but also because he converted women as well as men — a practice 
that had been scorned by earlier Christian missionaries who failed 
to recognize the impact of matrilineal descent on an individual's 
spiritual life. Harrism was subsequently recognized as a branch 
of Methodism. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 

Syncretic Religions 

Both Islam and Christianity have been adapted to indigenous 
religions in a variety of ways. Beyond these localized versions of 
world religions, however, are complex systems of belief and prac- 
tice that incorporate many elements of more than one religion. Most 
widely recognized among these syncretic religions are numer- 
ous offshoots of Harrism along the coast, where new prophets, 
preachers, and disciples blend traditional beliefs, Harrism, and 
modern-day political advice to help deal with the problems of every- 
day life. 

Syncretic religions are generally more common among minori- 
ties in a particular area or among groups that perceive themselves 
to be resisting political domination by their neighbors. The Agni 
have remained heavily Catholic, for example, whereas the neigh- 
boring Baoule have evolved a variety of syncretisms, following 
prophets that promise good fortune as a reward for allegiance to 
them. Small groups in the far northeast have also evolved a vari- 
ety of belief systems to maintain their traditions, incorporate selected 
aspects of Islam, and resist domination by outsiders. 

Social Organization and Social Change 

For centuries Cote dT voire has been the scene of social and eco- 
nomic change brought about by cross-cultural contact, trans- 
Saharan and coastal trade, and innovation by local inhabitants. 
Established patterns of change were dramatically altered by the im- 
position of colonial rule and the transition to independence, and 
by the 1980s patterns of social and cultural change reflected 
responses to these disruptions and to the processes and policies of 
government. 

The colonial imposition of plantation agriculture allowed the 
emergence of the first nontraditional African elite, when those who 
could claim rights to land began to employ farm laborers to produce 
cash crops for the colonial regime (see Economic Development and 
Social Change, ch. 1). This group of planters, as they came to be 
known, formed the core of the earliest Ivoirian political machine, 
which continued to influence the course of change in the 1980s. 
Alongside the rural elite, a fledgling civil servant middle class also 
appeared in response to the needs of the bureaucracy, as new levels 
of political awareness and activism surfaced throughout the region. 

The African Agricultural Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain — 
SAA), formed in 1944 as a union of planters, led the opposi- 
tion to colonial agricultural policies (see Brazzaville Conference, 
ch. 1). Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a Baoule elder and French- trained 



73 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



medical doctor, became head of the SAA and of the preindepen 
dence movement, the Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire (Part 
Democratique de Cote d'lvoire — PDCI), which emerged to leac 
the struggle. The PDCI emphasized participation through tradi- 
tional ethnic group leaders and ethnic committees (comites ethniques). 
Ethnic committees helped channel grass-roots participation in the 
political process, but in 1985 they were replaced by local commit- 
tees (comites de base). 

From the French perspective, those who had gained wealth and 
prestige by exploiting new opportunities in the changing environ- 
ment were considered most qualified for political decision making 
on behalf of the colony (see Evolution of Colonial Policy, ch. 1). 
Houphouet-Boigny gained a multiethnic constituency as leader of 
the PDCI by acting as a broker between colonial officials and emerg- 
ing African elites, and especially by opposing colonial forced-labor 
policies. During the 1950s, the PDCI gradually adopted a strategy 
of collaboration with colonial officials, a strategy Houphouet-Boigny 
pursued successfully enough to become the nation's first president 
at independence in 1960. 

Even as an early leader in the preindependence PDCI, Houphouet- 
Boigny had defined interest groups and grievances for the nation. 
In 1974, after a decade of moderate discontent and dissidence, he 
convened a series of dialogues that served the dual purpose of air- 
ing cross-ethnic grievances and maintaining the president's image 
as a traditional-style leader, using the analogy of the African "palaver' ' 
(palabre). Teachers, students, former students, parents of students, 
tenants, union members, union leaders, transporters, the military, 
and the party youth wing, the Movement of Ivoirian Primary and 
Secondary School Students (Mouvement des Etudiants et Eleves de 
Cote d'lvoire — MEECI), were invited. Excluded were representa- 
tives of the growing number of unemployed and of ethnic groups, 
with the notable exception of the Lebanese community. 

Economic modernization paralleled political and social change 
in the shift from colonial to African power arrangements. Spurred 
by the opening of the Vridi Canal to the Gulf of Guinea in 1950 
and the concentration of government functions in the southeastern 
port of Abidjan, population migration toward the south increased, 
and secondary towns developed along routes to Abidjan. Moder- 
nization essentially became the process of urbanization, and the 
distinction between urban and rural came to symbolize the widening 
rift between rich and poor. 

Urban Society 

Urban ethnic associations performed important social functions, 
from the initial reception of new migrants to the burial of urban 



74 




The basilica Notre Dame of Peace at Yamoussoukro 

Courtesy Clair Votaw 
Muslims kneeling in prayer 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 



75 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



residents. They also served as important mutual aid networks and 
facilitated communication with home villages. Rapid urbanization 
brought together people from numerous ethnic groups, however, 
and these contacts contributed to changing values and produced 
demands that went beyond the reach of traditional leadership roles. 
In this changing environment, ethnic organizations lost influence 
as cultural and economic brokers. Most grievances arose in response 
to government policy choices, and because these policies were not 
phrased in terms of ethnic groups, neither were grievances against 
them. Neighborhood and city wide problems demanded broader 
solutions, and multiethnic associations emerged as important in- 
terest groups. 

Ethnicity was further diminished as a factor in urban politics 
as foreigners were drawn to Cote dTvoire's lucrative job market 
and as Houphouet-Boigny maintained fairly balanced ethnic rep- 
resentation among political appointments, without bringing tradi- 
tional leaders into top levels of administration. He encouraged the 
most ambitious and educated young men from different regions 
to participate in nation building, and to do so through his patronage. 

Houphouet-Boigny 's patrimonial style of governing began to 
shape the social landscape, as the political skills he acquired dur- 
ing the waning years of colonial rule — his expertise as a strategist, 
his nonconfrontational manner of dealing with political rivals, and 
his paternalistic approach to allies — helped consolidate his support. 
In the late 1980s, he continued to emulate the style of his Baoule 
elders, softening strong leadership enough to maintain broad popu- 
lar support, satisfying crucial popular demands, and co-opting 
potential opponents (see Political Issues, ch. 4). 

As a result of these factors — the urban emphasis, the relative 
unimportance of ethnic differences, and Houphouet-Boigny' s 
patrimonial style of governing — a self-perpetuating elite emerged. 
Social relations were ordered more by access to status, prestige, 
and wealth than by ethnic differences, and for most people the locus 
of this access was the government. Wealth and government ser- 
vice became so closely linked that one was taken as a symbol of 
the other. 

Elites 

Access to land, housing, secondary education, jobs, and social 
services determined paths of opportunity and social mobility in 
Ivoirian society, where, for the first three decades after indepen- 
dence, there were clear-cut cleavages between a ruling elite and 
people who lacked privileged access to resources. This self- 
reinforcing system allowed a wealthy, urban, privileged minority 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



to receive most of the benefits available to the society as a whole. 
For example, most urban land concessions were granted to people 
in government and administration and to their relatives and clients. 
In fact, political appointments were often accompanied by land con- 
cessions in Abidjan, and many Ivoirians attributed the scarcity of 
land and high levels of rent to this form of patronage. 

Urban housing was also a fairly good measure of political sta- 
tus. Cabinet ministers received monthly housing allowances and 
lived in relative luxury. Government housing policy favored con- 
struction of expensive quarters for upper-income families. Rents 
were high as a proportion of income and often required deposits 
of several months or years rent in advance. Building a private home 
required "good standing" within the community in order to meet 
credit and permit restrictions. 

Secondary education was also an important urban resource and 
vehicle of social mobility. Although primary schools were found 
throughout the country, secondary schooling was primarily an 
urban activity, channeling graduates into urban occupations and 
contributing to the rural exodus. A large proportion of pupils who 
entered primary school were eliminated at crucial points in the edu- 
cation ladder, especially through limits on secondary school and 
university admissions, but many also dropped out throughout the 
system. In general, students' educational attainments reflected their 
parents' level of education. Even when the government achieves 
its goal of universal primary education, access to secondary school- 
ing is expected to remain an extremely limited, highly valued 
resource. 

By the 1980s, employment had become the most significant indi- 
cator of social status. High-level government employees earned sa- 
laries several times the national average, and public sector salaries 
generally exceeded those in the private sector, although this situa- 
tion was changing in the late 1980s as the government succeeded 
in freezing civil service pay scales. Rural wages lagged far behind 
those in urban areas, where the number of unemployed far exceeded 
the number of available jobs. In a circular fashion, those who were 
employed had an edge in the job market and in most other areas 
of social life. Social services were more readily available to those 
who had jobs or had just lost them, and social service organiza- 
tions tended to be located in wealthier sections of town. In gen- 
eral, the distribution of government subsidies helped to maintain 
the distance between urban elites and the rural and urban poor. 

The Ivoirian middle class was still a small minority, primarily 
traders, administrators, teachers, nurses, artisans, and successful 
farmers. The middle class constituted the highest social stratum 



77 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



in rural areas and some small towns, but the majority of small farm- 
ers were not included, nor were the many low- wage earners in urban 
areas. Middle-class status was, in Cote d'lvoire as elsewhere, 
marked by continual striving, for one's self and one's children, to 
acquire the symbols of wealth. In cities, opportunities for social 
mobility were limited for the middle class and the poor, who con- 
tinued to depend on the patronage of the elite to achieve most of 
their goals. 

The Role of Women 

Houphouet-Boigny's political style and longevity shaped Ivoirian 
elites into a wealthy, male, educated social stratum. By the late 
1980s, women were beginning to emerge within this group, as edu- 
cation and acculturation enabled them to challenge the established 
order. Official attitudes toward the status of women were prag- 
matic, like most official attitudes in Cote d'lvoire. Beliefs about 
the role of women in society were partly the result of ethnic condi- 
tioning, however, and the cultural bias against equality between 
the sexes was embodied in customary law, where ethnic diversity 
and cultural conservatism slowed the pace of modernization of regu- 
lations regarding women. 

Role expectations for women changed, however, altered by 
colonial legislation, which liberated captives throughout franco- 
phone Africa in 1903, and then by the Mandel Decree of 1939, 
which fixed the minimum age of marriage at fourteen and made 
mutual consent a formal necessity for marriage. The Jacquinot 
Decree of 1951 invoked the power of the state to protect women 
from claims to their services — by their own or their husband's 
family — after marriage. Moreover, it enabled women to obtain a 
divorce more easily and invalidated in-laws' claims to any bride- 
price that had been paid to a woman's family to legitimize the mar- 
riage. This decree also recognized monogamy as the only legal form 
of marriage and allowed couples to marry without parental con- 
sent. These changes altered popular perceptions of marriage and 
established the colonial government as the authority on most aspects 
of the status of women. 

At independence, the government of Houphouet-Boigny ac- 
knowledged existing decrees affecting the status of women and went 
on to establish the primacy of the nuclear family, raise the mini- 
mum age for marriage to eighteen, and condemn in general terms 
the notion of female inferiority. At the same time, however, legis- 
lation during the 1960s established a husband's right to control 
much of his wife's property, and it required a woman to obtain 
her husband's permission to establish a bank account or obtain a 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



job. The government also placed restrictions on a woman's right 
to divorce, denied legal recognition of matrilineal rights of in- 
heritance (inheritance by a man's nephews before his sons), and 
finally, condemned the practice of bride-price. 

In 1963 women reacted to the extent and direction of govern- 
ment control by forming the Association of Ivoirian Women 
(Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes — AFI). They also persuaded 
the president to establish the Ministry of Women's Affairs 
(Ministere de la Condition Feminine) in 1976 and to appoint AFI 
leader Jeanne Gervais as minister. Gervais's goals were to obtain 
better educational and employment opportunities for women and 
to establish judicial equality for women. Legislation was enacted 
in 1983 to allow a woman to control some of her property after 
marriage and to appeal to the courts for redress of a husband's 
actions. 

The status of women, in practice and in the law, was still well 
below that of men through most of the 1980s, but educational op- 
portunities for women were improving at all levels. In 1987 about 
one-sixth of the students at the National University of Cote d'lvoire 
were women, and the number of women in the salaried work force 
had also increased. Women made up almost one-fourth of the civil 
service and held positions previously closed to them, in medicine, 
law, business, and university teaching. 

Social Attitudes 

Despite official descriptions of their society as "classless" and 
egalitarian in the 1980s, Ivoirian citizens were acutely aware of 
the distinction between the rich and the poor. Peop^ perceived 
"temporary distortions" in the social fabric — as socia inequities 
were described by the president — as continuing trends. They at- 
tributed these distortions to a variety of factors but rarely to the 
role of the government in maintaining and subsidizing the elite. 
Regional and international competition in commodity markets was 
cited as a source of economic recession and hardship in gf leral. 
Within Cote d'lvoire, regional inequities were often blamed on 
mismanagement by presidential advisers but not on the president 
himself. Cabinet ministers, in particular, were often blamed for 
poor policy decisions and implementation and were often subjected 
to invidious comparisons with presidential wisdom and imagination. 

Ivoirians were also adept at generalizing about each other and 
about immigrants to their nation, placing blame for social ills on 
ethnic groups more often than on socioeconomic forces. The Baoule, 
the president's own constituency, were "too dominant" among 
high officeholders, in their critics' view. The related, and rival, 



79 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Agni often expressed anti-Baoule sentiments, while the Agni them- 
selves, because of their tradition of hierarchical organization, were 
criticized for elitist attitudes toward other ethnic groups. Groups 
that avoided centralization among indigenous polities, such as the 
Bete, were stereotyped, in turn, as "unsophisticated." The Lobi 
and related groups from the northeast were similarly stereotyped. 
Non-Africans, even those born in Cote d'lvoire, were blamed for 
"draining the wealth from the nation." Within the foreign work 
force, Mossi farm laborers were looked down upon, whereas French 
white-collar workers were both despised and emulated. These and 
other social reactions served to legitimize popular views of Ivoiri- 
an society and to confirm ethnic pride. 

At the same time, Ivoirian society was permeated with a sense 
of apathy about social development, except among those in or very 
close to political office. Even those who acknowledged the nation's 
strengths often did not feel like active participants in its develop- 
ment. The large foreign presence within the economy, the en- 
trenched political machine, and the relatively unchanging living 
conditions among the poor contributed to this sense of alienation 
from the overall progress that has marked Cote d'lvoire since in- 
dependence. 

Education 

The Ivoirian education system is an adaptation of the French 
system, which was introduced at the end of the nineteenth century 
to train clerks and interpreters to help administer the colony. The 
education system was gradually expanded to train teachers, farm- 
ers, and artisans, but by 1940, only 200 Africans had been admit- 
ted to primary schools. In 1945 the nation had only four university 
graduates, despite an official policy, described as "assimilationist," 
aimed at creating a political elite that would identify with France 
and French culture. The education system was made into a depart- 
ment of the French national system under the jurisdiction of the 
minister for education in Paris in the last decade of colonial rule, 
but by limiting access to a tiny minority of Africans, it generally 
failed to supplant Ivoirian values with French ones. 

Education assumed much greater importance as independence 
approached, leading some village elders to establish and support 
village schools. Primary- school enrollments increased eightfold dur- 
ing the 1950s; secondary-school enrollments increased ninefold. 
Schools began to prepare students for the university, and scholar- 
ship programs were implemented to send a select few to Europe 
or to Dakar, Senegal, for further study. 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



During the 1980s, education was an important national priority; 
it received nearly one-third of the national budget in 1985. Respon- 
sibility for educational development lay with the Ministry of Na- 
tional Education and Scientific Research, which also prescribed 
curricula, textbooks, and teaching methods; prepared qualifying 
examinations; and licensed teachers, administrators, and private 
educational institutions. 

As a result of its emphasis on education, Cote d'lvoire boasted 
a 43 percent literacy rate overall, 53 percent for men and 31 per- 
cent for women in 1988. About 15 percent of the total population 
was enrolled in some type of educational institution, but enroll- 
ments were still much higher in urban than rural areas. 

The Education System 

The education system comprised three stages: primary school 
lasted six years, leading to a certificate of primary studies; second- 
ary school lasted seven years, leading to a certificate or baccalaureat 
(see fig. 8). University education, available only in Abidjan, cul- 
minated in a university degree. A large number of technical and 
teacher-training institutions also provided postprimary and post- 
secondary education. There was no system of adult education, 
although many adults attended night courses or, in rural areas, 
received literacy and other instruction via radio. 

Most public schools were tuition free, although students paid 
an entrance fee and bought uniforms. Most supplies were free, and 
some students received government scholarships, usually in return 
for a period of government employment after graduation. 

In 1980 approximately 14 percent of primary schools and 29 per- 
cent of secondary schools were private. Most of these were Catholic, 
staffed by religious and lay teachers, with salaries partially subsi- 
dized by government funding. Catholic schools operated primarily 
in the south and east but were also located throughout the coun- 
try. Religious instruction was not permitted in government schools. 
Quranic schools were common in the north and were tolerated, 
but not supported, by the government. Some students attended 
both public and Quranic schools. 

The school year was divided into three terms, beginning in Sep- 
tember and separated by short Christmas and Easter holidays and 
a two-month summer recess. The average week consisted of ap- 
proximately thirty hours of classes, Monday through Saturday 
morning. Most instruction encouraged mental discipline more than 
analytical thinking or creativity by emphasizing rote memoriza- 
tion and oral recitation. 



81 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



HE 




1 




GU 




HC 




EA 




RT 


GRANDES 


1 


ECOLES 







N 


SPECIALIZED 




TRAINING 




INSTITUTIONS 



UNIVERSITY 



HIGHER 
TEACHER" 
TRAINING. 

SCHOOL 



School 
Year 
_6 




PRIMARY SCHOOLS 



Source: Based on information from International Yearbook of Education, 32, New York, 1980, 
112-3. 



Figure 8. Public Education System, 1988 

Primary Education 

Approximately 1.5 million pupils attended primary school in 
1987, representing about 75 percent of boys and 50 percent of girls 
below age fifteen. Primary- school enrollments increased at a rate 
of about 7.2 percent per year from 1960 to 1980, climbing to 9.1 
percent between 1976 and 1980. This rate slowed after 1980, 
averaging 4.2 percent from 1981 to 1984 and 2.2 percent after 1984. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Children entered primary school at the age of seven or eight and 
passed through six grades, divided into preparatory, elementary, 
and intermediate levels. In the first six months, students mastered 
French, the language of instruction. Classes in reading, writing, 
and arithmetic were taught, gradually supplemented by history, 
geography, natural sciences, music, art, and physical education. 
Rural schools also required students to work in school gardens and 
learn basic agricultural methods. Standard school-leaving exams 
led to the certificate of elementary education (certificat d' etudes 
primaires elementaires — CEPE) and determined entrance to secondary 
institutions. 

Secondary Education 

About 250,000 students, or about 19 percent of primary-school 
graduates, attended government-funded secondary schools in 1987. 
Most of those preparing for university attended a college or lycee, 
both of which included seven years of study divided into two cycles. 
Significant differences between these two institutions almost dis- 
appeared in the decades following their introduction by the French, 
but the lycee was generally administered by the national govern- 
ment and the college by the municipal government with national 
funding. 

After the first cycle or four years of secondary school, students 
took exams and were awarded the certificate of the lower cycle of 
secondary study (brevet d' etude du premier cycle — BEPC). This qualifi- 
cation generally allowed them to continue at the college or lycee, 
enter a teacher-training institution, or find an entry-level job in 
commerce or government. After the second cycle of three years 
of study, graduates earned the baccalaureat, which indicated a level 
of learning roughly equivalent to one or two years of university 
study in the United States. In Cote dT voire, as in France, it quali- 
fied a student for university entrance. 

Secondary-school enrollments grew at a rate of about 1 1 per- 
cent per year from 1960 to 1984, but that rate has declined since 
1984. The dropout rate was especially high for girls, who made 
up only 18 percent of the student body during the last two years 
of secondary school. An average of one-fourth of all secondary stu- 
dents received the baccalaureat. 

Complementary courses were the most common type of alter- 
native secondary education, administered as four-year programs 
to improve the academic education of those who did not qualify 
for college or lycee. Complementary courses were established dur- 
ing the 1950s, when expanding educational opportunities was a 
high priority, and they were located throughout the country to 



83 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



compensate for the urban bias in secondary education. Comple- 
mentary courses often provided a combination of academic and 
practical training, leading to an elementary certificate (brevet elemen- 
taire — BE) or the BEPC, and enabled some students to enter the 
second cycle at a college or lycee, or a vocational training institution. 

Additional secondary-level courses were administered by reli- 
gious organizations, most often the Catholic Church. These courses 
consisted of seven years of study divided into two cycles, with a 
certificate of completion awarded after each cycle. Teacher-training 
was available, often as an alternative to academic university prepa- 
ration, at a variety of postprimary levels. Secondary-level teacher 
training could lead to a BE certificate and admission to a normal 
school (ecole normale), which might also be attended by students who 
left lycees or colleges after the first four years of study. 

Vocational training, attended by 47,000 students in 1982-83, 
was available at a variety of postprimary institutions. This train- 
ing included courses in agriculture, engineering, public works, 
transportation management, secretarial and commercial subjects, 
and building trades. Graduates often worked as apprentices or pur- 
sued further training at higher technical institutes. 

Higher Education 

The National University of Cote d'lvoire, which was founded 
as the Center for Higher Education at Abidjan in 1959 and be- 
came the University of Abidjan in 1964, had an enrollment of 
18,732 in 1987. Of this number, about 10,000 were Ivoirians and 
3,200 were women. Still heavily dependent on French assistance, 
it included faculties of law, sciences, and letters and schools of 
agriculture, public works, administration, and fine arts. Other in- 
stitutions of higher learning, known as grandes ecoles, awarded cer- 
tificates of training in specialized fields in cooperation with, but not 
as part of, the national university. 

Teachers 

In the mid-1980s, five classes of teachers were distinguished by 
their educational preparation and salary level: professors, who 
taught at the secondary or university level; assistant professors at 
the secondary level; and instituteurs , instituteurs-adjoints, and moni- 
tors at the primary level. Teachers' salaries were generally higher 
than salaries of civil servants with similar qualifications in the 
mid-1980s, although many people still left teaching for more lucra- 
tive professions. The government responded to teacher shortages 
with a variety of training programs and short courses and by recruit- 
ing expatriates to teach at the secondary and postsecondary levels. 



84 




Administration building, National University of Cote d'lvoire 

Courtesy Eszti Votaw 

Teachers were organized into a number of unions, most of them 
incorporated into the government- controlled central union federa- 
tion, the General Federation of Ivoirian Workers (Union Gene- 
rale des Travailleurs de Cote d'lvoire — UGTCI). The National 
Union of Secondary School Teachers of Cote d'lvoire and two 
smaller unions remained outside the UGTCI and were outspoken 
in their criticism of government educational policies and educa- 
tional finances in particular. Despite this tradition of criticism, many 
government officials achieved political office through leadership 
positions in the teachers union (See Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

Problems in Education 

During the early 1980s, Cote d'lvoire spent a higher share of 
its gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) and of its national 
budget on education than any other country in the world. Although 
this served as an indication of the nation's high regard for educa- 
tion, expatriate teachers' salaries accounted for a disproportion- 
ate share of current expenditures, reducing the benefits to the nation 
itself. Generous scholarships for secondary- school students also 
reduced funds available for younger children. 

The Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research as- 
signed highest priority to problems of financing educational de- 
velopment and reducing the number of school dropouts. Reducing 



85 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

regional inequities was also important; in 1986 enrollments in the 
south averaged about four times those in the north. The govern- 
ment employed innovative methods to improve the education sys- 
tem, including the use of televised instruction in primary schools 
in the 1970s — a project that was abandoned as too expensive. Com- 
puters and automated data processing equipment were being used 
at the National University in 1987 and were to be introduced at 
lower levels of the educational system by 1990. By the late 1980s, 
the government was also producing its own textbooks, previously 
purchased in France, to reflect local rather than foreign cultural 
values. 

The internal efficiency of the education system was relatively low, 
partly because of the large number of students who repeated courses 
and the high dropout level. The number of school-aged children 
was expected to grow at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent by 
1995, increasing the school-aged population by 50 percent. Unfor- 
tunately, teacher- training programs could not keep pace with these 
changes, and educational planners were in particular demand. The 
link between education and employment was also weak, exacer- 
bated by the economic recession of the 1980s. Graduates, in effect, 
expected more than society could give them. As in many countries, 
academic institutions and personnel often annoy government offi- 
cials with their outspoken criticism of national policies (see Discon- 
tent on Campus, ch. 1). A number of mechanisms are used to co-opt 
or intimidate dissident leaders, although a few of their criticisms 
have been received favorably and have produced policy changes. 
Some outspoken teachers have been offered government jobs, in effect 
to receive the brunt of criticism they have generated. Some students 
have been expelled from the university. The campus was closed down 
following antigovernment demonstrations in 1982, and campus or- 
ganizations were banned. Secondary- school teachers who protested 
against the elimination of their housing benefits in 1983 found their 
professional organizations banned as well. 

Health and Welfare 

Economic progress since independence outpaced improvements 
in the general health status of the population, despite substantial 
improvements in health conditions. As in other areas, nationwide 
statistics mask sharp regional and socioeconomic disparities. In the 
mid-1980s, life expectancies ranged from fifty-six years in Abidjan 
to fifty years in rural areas of the south and thirty-nine years in 
rural areas of the north. The resulting overall national average of 
fifty-one years represented a marked improvement over that of 
thirty-nine in 1960. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



Infant and child mortality rates remained high in rural areas, 
where access to potable water and waste disposal systems was limited 
and housing and dietary needs often remained unmet. An estimated 
127 infants per 1,000 births died in their first year of life, a rate 
that fell steadily from 1960 to 1985. In 1987 one-half of all deaths 
were infants and children under the age of five. Infectious diseases — 
primarily malaria, gastrointestinal ailments, respiratory infections, 
measles, and tetanus — accounted for most illness and death in chil- 
dren. Unsanitary conditions and poor maternal health also con- 
tributed to infant deaths. Close spacing of births contributed to 
high rates of malnutrition in the first two years of life. 

In 1985 the nation had a generally adequate food supply, aver- 
aging 115 percent of the minimum daily requirement, but seasonal 
and regional variations and socioeconomic inequalities contributed 
to widespread malnutrition in the north, in poorer sections of cities, 
and among immigrants. 

Public health expenditures increased steadily during the 1980s, 
but the health care system was nonetheless unable to meet the health 
care needs of the majority of the population. Medical care for 
wealthy urban households was superior to that available to rural 
farm families, and the health care system retained its bias toward 
curing disease rather than preventing it. Chronic shortages of equip- 
ment, medicines, and health care personnel also contributed to over- 
all poor service delivery, even where people had access to health 
care facilities. In many rural areas, health care remained a family 
matter, under the guidance of lineage elders and traditional healers. 

Staffing policies in the health sector led to low ratios of doctors 
to patients and even more severe shortages of nurses and auxiliary 
health care personnel in the 1980s. In 1985 there were 6.5 doctors 
per 100,000 people, and 0.7 dentists, 10.9 midwives, 24.9 nurses, 
and 11.2 auxiliaries. For this same population, 158 hospital beds 
were available, 120 of them in maternity care centers. In the north- 
east, these ratios were much lower, and rural areas of the south- 
west also received less attention by medical planners. 

Maternal Health Care (MHC) centers taught classes aimed at 
reducing maternal and infant mortality. The World Health Or- 
ganization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) also assisted in programs to vaccinate children 
against poliomyelitis, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, tuberculosis, 
yellow fever, and measles, and to vaccinate pregnant women against 
tetanus. 

In 1987 the government began to implement testing programs 
for antibodies to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which 
causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). By the end 
of that year, it had reports of 250 AIDS cases nationwide, most 



87 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

in urban areas. Although this number was small in comparison 
with many nations of East Africa and Central Africa, it represented 
twice the number of reported AIDS cases one year earlier and posed 
a potentially serious health threat. The government neither re- 
pressed reports on the spread of HIV nor treated them lightiy. With 
French medical and financial assistance, and in collaboration with 
WHO's Special Program on AIDS (SPA), it began to implement 
blood screening programs and to establish public information 
centers to meet immediate needs. By 1988, however, no medium- 
term program to prevent the spread of HIV was in place. 

The Ministry of Public Health and Population, which bore 
nationwide responsibility for health care planning, lacked adequately 
trained personnel and information management systems, and it 
shared the urban bias found throughout much of the government 
in the 1980s. It sought private sector involvement in disease preven- 
tion and declared the improvement of health care standards a na- 
tional priority. At the same time, historical, ethnic, socioeconomic, 
and political factors contributing to the nation's health problems 
continued to complicate policy making at the national level. 

Social Programs 

Social programs generally benefited the wealthy more than the 
poor, subsidizing those who had access to resources and an under- 
standing of public services. Public housing, a high priority under 
successive development plans since 1960, was an example of this 
trend. Most available public housing was in Abidjan. It was gen- 
erally of high quality, so even with subsidized rents, it was beyond 
the means of poorer families. The result was government assistance 
to relatively high- wage earners. 

Some World Bank (see Glossary) programs were helping redress 
this imbalance by providing funding for low-income housing and 
low-cost transportation programs. World Bank assistance in housing 
in the late 1980s was also aimed at providing low-interest loans 
to enable families to purchase their own homes. 

Social Problems 

Through the 1980s, Cote d'lvoire shared the concerns over 
poverty, unemployment, and crime that plagued developing and 
industrial countries alike. Human resource management was com- 
plicated by the large urban-rural ratio, however, and by popula- 
tion growth and economic recession. The cultural expectation of 
assistance through the extended family helped offset problems of 
unemployment, but high mobility within the work force resulted 
in more dispersed families, and this dispersal, in turn, contributed 
to rising problems of poverty and unemployment. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



Poverty, population mobility, and ethnic and cultural diversity 
contributed to rising crime rates during the first two decades of 
independence. During the 1980s, white-collar crime — embezzle- 
ment, fraud, and misappropriation of funds — rose at a faster rate, 
and urban crimes such as robbery and theft generated widespread 
concern. In 1987 the president declared dishonesty and fraud a pub- 
lic disgrace and proclaimed his intention to wage a vigorous war 
against them. Drug abuse — primarily involving cocaine, marijuana, 
and heroin — was also declared a scourge against society, but the 
appropriate public response to these problems was not defined. 

* * * 

Ethnographic background reading on Akan, Mande, and Voltaic 
societies is available in a variety of works by Meyer Fortes, R. S. 
Rattray, Charles Humana, Elliott Skinner, Kenneth Little, Helga 
Diallo, and Germaine Dieterlen. Alexander Alland, Jr.' s When the 
Spider Danced presents a personal account of ethnographic research 
among the Abron during the 1960s. 

Michael A. Cohen's Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa 
focuses on urbanization and formation of the elite in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, in Ivory Coast: The Challenge 
of Success, assesses data on sectoral progress during the 1970s. Jeanne 
Maddox Toungara's "The Changing Status of Women in Cote 
d'lvoire" summarizes the history of changes in legislation regard- 
ing women in Ivoirian society. 

Much of the more recent literature on Cote d'lvoire describes 
the role of the president in crafting this complex nation- state and 
controlling the direction of social and political change. The years 
leading up to independence and the context of the evolution of the 
president's status as "Le Vieux" are analyzed in Aristide Zolberg's 
One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. Claude E. Welch, Jr., in "Cote 
d'lvoire: Personal Rule and Civilian Control," assesses the presi- 
dent's role in maintaining the region's only long-standing civilian 
government. 

Robert J. Mundt's Historical Dictionary of the Ivory Coast compiles 
a wide range of historical, political, and sociological data, presented 
in concise entries with an extensive bibliography. Philippe David's 
La Cote dTvoire presents an overview of Ivoirian society, including 
historical, economic, and sociological background reading. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



89 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Brass weights, container, and spoon for carrying and measuring gold dust 



SINCE ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE from France in 1960, 
Cote d'lvoire's primary economic objective has been growth. Dur- 
ing the 1960s, growth was accomplished by expanding and diver- 
sifying agricultural production, improving infrastructure, and 
developing import substitution industries. Implicit in this strategy 
was the emergence of an expanding domestic market to support 
budding consumer goods industries. Income redistribution and 
Ivoirianization (replacement of expatriates with Ivoirian workers) 
were made subordinate to growth. Although these goals were po- 
litically desirable, redistribution and Ivoirianization would be im- 
possible without growth, according to policymakers. Using revenues 
generated from agricultural exports, the government financed im- 
provements to infrastructure — roads, ports, railroads, power gener- 
ation, and schools. To finance increased agricultural production 
and industrial development, the government turned to foreign in- 
vestment and imported technology. Much of the manual labor was 
supplied by non-Ivoirian Africans. 

Paramount in this planning was the maintenance of economic links 
to France that were almost as extensive as the preindependence ties. 
Before independence, French public and private capital helped to 
support the government, ensured the internal and external conver- 
tibility of the currency, financed most major commercial enterprises, 
and supported the country's banking and credit structure. French 
enterprises in Cote d'lvoire were a major employer of Ivoirian labor, 
and France purchased — often at rates higher than market value — 
most of the country's exports. In addition, French managers held 
most of the key positions in business, and French adviser? occupied 
important posts in many government ministries. 

Cote d'lvoire's ties to France grew even stronger after indepen- 
dence. Between 1960 and 1980, the total French population in Cote 
d'lvoire nearly doubled, from about 30,000 to close to 60,000, form- 
ing the largest French expatriate community. In the mid-1980s, 
four out of five resident French had lived in Cote d'lvoire for more 
than five years. French citizens filled technical and advisory posi- 
tions in the government (albeit in diminishing numbers) and were 
also evident throughout the private sector. Until 1985 Cote d'lvoire 
also had the highest number of French-controlled multinational 
businesses in all of Africa, had the largest percentage of French 
imports to and exports from Africa, and, along with Senegal, re- 
ceived the largest French aid package in Africa. 



93 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Economic development in Cote d'lvoire has passed through three 
phases. During the first phase, from 1965 to 1975, the economy 
grew at a remarkable pace as coffee, cocoa, and timber exports 
increased. Surpluses from exports speeded growth in the secon- 
dary (industrial) and tertiary (services, administration, and defense) 
sectors. Gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) grew at an 
average annual rate of 7.9 percent in real terms, well ahead of the 
average annual population growth rate of approximately 4 per- 
cent. 

During the second phase, from 1976 to 1980, external changes 
in the world economic system reverberated within Cote d'lvoire. 
Coffee and cocoa prices peaked in the 1976-77 period as a result 
of poor harvests in Latin America, but two years later prices 
declined rapidly. GDP continued to grow at an average rate of 7.6 
percent per year; within the period, however, the growth rate varied 
from 2 percent in 1979 to 11.5 percent one year later. The govern- 
ment, which had responded to the boom phase by vigorously ex- 
panding public investment, was by 1979 forced to rely on foreign 
borrowing to sustain growth. At the same time, the declining value 
of the United States dollar, the currency in which Cote d'lvoire's 
loans were denominated, and rising prices for imported oil adversely 
affected the country's current accounts balance. By the end of the 
second phase, Cote d'lvoire was at the brink of a financial crisis. 

During the third phase, from 1981 to 1987, the economy deteri- 
orated as terms of trade declined, interest rates increased, the 
prospects of new offshore oil development evaporated, and agricul- 
tural earnings dropped. Following a record 1985-86 cocoa harvest, 
the economy rebounded briefly; however, falling cocoa prices 
quickly eroded any gains the country had hoped to achieve, and 
by 1987 President Felix Houphouet-Boigny had halted further pay- 
ments on foreign debt. Subsequently, Cote d'lvoire was forced to 
adopt a structural adjustment program mandated by the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) that limited imports, 
subsidized exports, and reduced government spending. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

By the end of the first decade of independence, the government's 
strategy for economic growth and development appeared remark- 
ably successful (see table 2, Appendix). Agricultural output of cash 
crops expanded, and, as evidence of diversification, the relative 
importance of unprocessed coffee, cocoa, and timber diminished 
as that of bananas, cotton, rubber, palm oil, and sugar grew. Using 
revenues from commodity sales, the government upgraded roads, 
improved communications, and raised the educational level of 



94 



The Economy 



the work force. Local factories were replacing some imports by 
producing a wide variety of light consumer goods. 

During the 1970s, the government's economic objective of growth 
remained unchanged. Agriculture — coffee and cocoa in particular — 
remained the mainstay of the export economy and the largest com- 
ponent of GDP until it was overtaken by the service sector in 1978. 
But while agriculture provided about 75 percent of export earn- 
ings in 1965, that total had shrunk by 20 percent by 1975. Between 
1965 and 1975, agriculture's share of GDP also declined by almost 
20 percent. Industrial GDP, derived primarily from import sub- 
stitution manufacturing and agricultural processing, increased by 
275 percent from 1970 to 1975, while industry's share of export 
earnings increased from 20 percent in 1965 to 35 percent in 1975. 
The fastest-growing sector of the economy was services, which as 
a share of GDP increased by more than 325 percent from 1965 
to 1975. 

At the same time, problems that arose during the previous de- 
cade required adjustments. To reduce production costs of manufac- 
tured goods, the government encouraged local production of 
intermediate inputs, such as chemicals and textiles. The govern- 
ment also shifted some public investment from infrastructure to 
crop diversification and agricultural processing industries to im- 
prove export earnings. Meanwhile, work on such major projects 
as the Buyo hydroelectric generating station continued. Foreign 
donors, attracted by Cote d T voire 's stable political climate and 
profitable investment opportunities, provided capital for these en- 
deavors. Until 1979, when coffee and cocoa prices plummeted and 
the cost of petroleum products rose sharply a second time, virtually 
every economic indicator was favorable. 

Over the same twenty years, however, structural contradictions 
in Cote d'lvoire's economic strategy became apparent and presaged 
the serious problems that became manifest in the 1980s. First, the 
emergence of a domestic market large enough to allow manufac- 
turers of import substitutes to benefit from economies of scale re- 
quired a wage for agricultural workers — the largest segment of the 
labor force — that was high enough to support mass consumption. 
But because the government relied on agricultural exports to finance 
improvements to infrastructure, commodity prices and wages could 
not be allowed to rise too high. Second, the government's focus 
on import substitution increased demand for intermediate inputs, 
the cost of which often exceeded that of the previously imported 
consumer goods. Moreover, Cote d'lvoire's liberal investment code 
encouraged capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industrial 
development. Consequently, industrial growth contributed little 



95 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

to the growth of an industrial labor force or a domestic market, 
and prices for consumer goods remained high, reflecting the high 
costs of production and protection. The investment code also per- 
mitted vast funds to leave Cote d'lvoire in the form of tax-free 
profits, salary remittances, and repatriated capital. Decapitali- 
zation, or the outflow of capital, led to balance of payments 
problems and the need to export more commodities and limit 
agricultural wages. (As a result, the domestic market remained 
small, and consumer goods remained expensive.) By the start of 
the 1980s, as surpluses from commodity sales dwindled, the govern- 
ment continued to depend on foreign borrowing to stimulate the 
economy. Inexorably, the external debt and the burden of debt 
service grew. 

In the 1980s, a combination of drought, low commodity prices, 
and rapidly rising debt costs exacerbated the structural weakness 
of the Ivoirian economy. Between 1977 and 1981, both cocoa and 
coffee prices fell on world markets, the current accounts balance 
dropped precipitously, and debt servicing costs rose, compelling 
the government to implement stabilization policies imposed by the 
IMF (see table 3, Appendix). The economy sagged even more when 
a drought during the 1983-84 growing season cut agricultural and 
hydroelectric output at the same time that rising interest rates on 
international markets increased the debt burden. No sector of the 
economy was untouched. Between 1981 and 1984, GDP from in- 
dustry dropped by 33 percent, GDP from services dropped by 9 
percent, and GDP from agriculture dropped by 12.2 percent. 

Between 1984 and 1986, a surge in commodity prices and out- 
put, coupled with increased support from Western financial insti- 
tutions, provided a momentary economic boost. The record 1985 
cocoa crop of 580,000 tons, combined with improved prices for 
coffee and cotton, bolstered export earnings and confidence in the 
economy. Following both the 1984-85 and the 1985-86 growing 
seasons, the government again increased producer prices for cocoa 
and coffee, resumed hiring civil servants, and raised some sala- 
ries, all of which led to a rise in consumption. Food production 
also increased during this period, allowing food imports to drop. 
Similarly, a reduction in the cost of oil imports helped the country 
to attain a large commercial surplus by the end of 1986, thus con- 
siderably easing the balance of payments difficulties experienced 
earlier in the decade. These factors, combined with the reschedul- 
ing of foreign debt payments, gave the government some flexibil- 
ity in handling its debt crisis and allowed it to begin paying its 
arrears to domestic creditors, including major construction and pub- 
lic works firms, supply companies, and local banks. 



96 



Market at Treichville, in Abidjan 
Courtesy Eszti Votaw 

The economic resurgence turned out to be short lived, however. 
In 1987 the economy again declined. Compared with the first six 
months of the previous year, sales of raw cocoa fell by 33 percent, 
and coffee exports plummeted by 62 percent. GDP declined by 5.8 
per cent in real terms, reflecting the slide in local currency earn- 
ings from exports. The trade surplus fell by 49 percent, plunging 
the current account into deficit. Trade figures for the first half of 
1987 revealed a 35 percent drop in the value of exports in compar- 
ison with the same period in 1986. 

In May 1987, the government suspended payments on its mas- 
sive foreign debt and appealed to official government lenders 
(the Paris Club — see Glossary) and commercial lenders (the 
London Club — see Glossary) to reschedule debt payments. The 
Paris Club acceded in December 1987; the London Club, in March 
1988. 

As negotiations were proceeding, lenders pressured the govern- 
ment to introduce fiscal reforms. In January 1988, the government 
implemented a series of revenue-raising measures, which extended 
the value-added tax to the wholesale and retail trades and increased 
import tariffs, stamp duties, and tobacco taxes. In addition, the 
government initiated programs to privatize most state enterprises 
and parastatals (companies under joint government and private 
ownership) and to give a "new orientation" to industry. 



97 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Privatization was not a new measure. In 1980 the state made 
divestment an official policy and offered for sale many state cor- 
porations and the state's shares in jointly owned enterprises. Be- 
cause the response to divestment was sluggish, the government 
proposed innovative alternatives to outright denationalization, such 
as leasing arrangements and self-managing cooperatives. By 1987, 
however, only twenty-eight of the targeted enterprises (in agribus- 
iness, trading and distribution, public works, and tourism) had been 
sold. Moreover, the state still accounted for 55 percent of direct 
investment in the country. 

The structural adjustments required by the World Bank (see 
Glossary) in 1987 gave a new impetus to the divestment process. 
The government placed 103 industries in which it had holdings 
up for sale, although several companies considered to be of stra- 
tegic importance to the country were later taken off the market. 
Included in this category were the Commodity Marketing and Price 
Control Board (Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix de 
Production Agricole — CSSPPA), the Petroleum Operations Com- 
pany of Cote d'lvoire (Petrole de Cote d'lvoire— PETROCI), the 
Ivoirian Maritime Transport Company (Societe Ivoirienne de 
Transport Maritime — SITRAM), and the Ivoirian Mining Com- 
pany (Societe pour le Developpement Minier de Cote d'lvoire — 
SODEMI). 

Divestment was a mixed success at best. Although Ivoirians took 
over more than half of the companies, those enterprises in which 
Ivoirians held a majority of the capital were very small — three- 
quarters were capitalized at less than CFA F50 million (for value 
of the CFA F — see Glossary) — and their rate of return was sub- 
stantially lower than that of foreign-owned and state enterprises. 
In general, the larger the capital of an enterprise, the smaller the 
proportion owned by Ivoirians. 

Role of Government 

In spite of its reputation for having liberal, noninterventionist 
economic policies, the Ivoirian government played a pivotal role 
in the domestic economy. Acting primarily through the Ministry 
of Planning and the Ministry of Finance, the government directed 
fiscal and monetary strategies over the long term and intervened 
in the short term in response to changing market conditions. The 
Ministry of Planning was responsible for coordinating long-term 
development projects, while the Ministry of Finance was respon- 
sible for financing annual investment. The technical ministries, such 
as the Ministry of Mining, the Ministry of Trade, and the Minis- 
try of Industry, were responsible for preparing and implementing 



98 



The Economy 



projects. The Ministry of Planning played the central role. It medi- 
ated between the technical ministries and the public enterprises on 
the one hand and the Ministry of Finance and the government (in 
its role as the formulator of economic objectives) on the other hand. 
The Ministry of Finance translated the government's policy ob- 
jectives into a set of long-term output and investment targets and 
an aggregate investment package. The Ministry of Planning and 
the technical ministries then used the guidelines to undertake those 
projects that were deemed feasible and would most contribute to 
achieving the plan's output and investment targets. 

Beginning in 1960, the Ministry of Planning prepared a series 
of ten-year projections. Subsequendy, these were replaced by a ser- 
ies of five-year plans that had built into them a three-year "roll- 
ing" program called the Loi-Programme. The five-year plans 
formulated the overall objectives, set priorities, and provided a 
macroeconomic framework for the country's development. The 
three-year overlapping Lois-Programmes examined individual 
projects, taking into account progress toward implementation, an- 
nual changes in costs, and political impact. 

Public Investment 

In addition to its planning role, the government was the largest 
single investor in the economy. Following independence, the gov- 
ernment embarked on an ambitious capital spending program. 
Much of the capital for government intervention came from the 
CSSPPA, which fixed producer prices, operated a reserve price 
stabilization fund, and extracted profits for the state. Much of this 
investment went toward developing infrastructure and was one of 
the state's more positive economic contributions in the 1960s. 

By the 1970s, although there was no official change of economic 
policy, the state intervened more directly in the economy, primar- 
ily through the creation of parastatals. This surge in the number 
of parastatals reflected the government's desire to stimulate growth 
in those areas where the private sector was considered insufficiently 
active, to create employment for Ivoirians, and to encourage Ivoiri- 
ans to invest locally. In the case of agricultural parastatals, the state 
wanted to lessen income disparities between the north and the south, 
decrease food imports, provide rural employment, and diminish 
the importance of foreign investment in agriculture. In some in- 
stances, social or political objectives superseded the profit motive, 
as appears to have been the case with parastatals like the Bandama 
Valley Authority (Autorite de la Vallee du Bandama — AVB), which 
promoted regional development, and the Sugar Development Com- 
pany (Societe de Developpement Sucrier — SODESUCRE), which 



99 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

was also responsible for creating jobs and building schools and med- 
ical clinics in the savanna region. 

All of the parastatals enjoyed relative financial autonomy, 
although their technical and financial operations were in theory 
supervised by the government. In fact, there was often little super- 
vision by, or coordination of activities with, other government agen- 
cies, perhaps reflecting the fact that top-level managers of some 
parastatals were often politically well connected. In many instances, 
the parastatals withheld or otherwise could not produce crucial 
financial data for planners. Given the absence of governmental over- 
sight and the sometimes vague social and political objectives of the 
parastatals, they performed badly and in some cases — notably the 
housing sector — were rife with fraud. 

In spite of these shortcomings — or perhaps because of them — 
the government support of parastatals steadily increased. By 1974 
it amounted to more than half of the entire investment budget. Over 
the same fourteen years, the proportion of investment spending 
covered by net public savings fell to 37 percent. This imbalance 
forced the government to borrow extensively from foreign sources 
to maintain an even level of investment and growth. Between 1965 
and 1975, foreign loans rose from 41 percent to 65 percent of in- 
vestment in parastatals. Moreover, the outstanding debt figures 
of the public enterprises and the amount of foreign borrowing, 
which in theory should have been cleared by the National Amorti- 
zation Fund (Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement — CAA), were not 
disclosed until an end-of-year report. This process effectively 
precluded government attempts to control parastatal finances. 

Budget 

Public spending was handled under two different budgets: the 
Ordinary Budget (Budget Ordinaire) for current government 
expenditures, which were generally covered by domestic revenues, 
and the Special Investment and Capital Equipment Budget (Budget 
Special dTnvestissement et d'Equipement — BSIE), which partly 
depended on foreign investment. The BSIE had two parts: the 
BSIE-Treasury (BSIE-Tresor or BSIE-T), which was financed by 
surpluses from the Ordinary Budget, levies on business profits and 
farm incomes, and borrowing through bonds issued by the CAA; 
and the BSIE-CAA, which was funded by foreign borrowing. 

The size of each budget reflected the state of the economy. The 
Ordinary Budget grew by an average of more than 20 percent from 
1976 to 1980 and then by an average of about 11 percent per 
year in 1980, 1981, and 1982. By 1983, however, the deteriorat- 
ing economy and consequent decline in tax receipts prompted the 



100 



Hotel at Abidjan 
Courtesy Eszti Votaw 



government to implement a series of austerity measures. Cuts were 
initially limited to the BSIE, which fell from CFA F277.6 billion 
in 1980 to CFA F239.1 billion in 1984 and then fell dramatically 
to 101.8 billion in 1985. In 1984 the government cut the Ordinary 
Budget for the first time, by 1.5 percent from the previous year. 
The government reduced the number of foreign technical assis- 
tants, froze civil service salaries, and sold one-quarter of the offi- 
cial fleet of 12,000 automobiles. 

In 1986, after three years of severe austerity, higher commodity 
prices increased revenues and, in turn, allowed both budgets to 
expand. Budgeted expenses rose by 8.6 percent, with most of the 
increase in the BSIE, where allocations were increased by 13.7 per- 
cent. More than a third of these allocations went toward a road 
building plan cofinanced by the World Bank. Agricultural diver- 
sification was the second largest beneficiary. A 3.7 percent increase 
in the Ordinary Budget again permitted civil service promotions 
following a protracted wage and hiring freeze. 

The period of budgetary expansion, however, was brief. In 1987 
coffee and cocoa prices again dropped, resulting in a 5.2 percent 
cut in the 1987 BSIE and an additional 19.8 percent cut in the 1988 
BSIE. For the second year in a row, the BSIE did not receive any 
funds from the CSSPPA, the agency that marketed the bulk of Cote 
dTvoire's coffee and cocoa. In 1987 the largest share of BSIE 



101 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

funding, amounting to CFA F85.8 billion, came from multilateral 
donor agencies (CFA F44 billion). Bilateral creditors — including 
France, Japan, Britain, the United States, and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany) — provided CFA F16.2 billion, and 
commercial creditors provided CFA F25.6 billion. Meanwhile, 
domestically generated revenue for the BSIE was set to increase 
from the 1987 level of CFA F38.8 billion to CFA F 57.8 billion 
in 1988. The increase, however, represented only the inclusion of 
funds previously classified as extrabudgetary. 

The 1987 overall budget increased by a modest 4.8 percent and 
the 1988 budget by 2.6 percent. These increases were primarily 
the result of an increase in revenue from taxes on income, imports, 
fuel, agricultural products, and municipality receipts. But because 
of an annual inflation rate of approximately 7 percent, it was ex- 
pected that real spending in 1988 would fall. Debt rescheduling 
agreements did not affect the budget because the government con- 
sidered debt service to be outside the main budget calculation. 

Banking and Finance 

Cote dTvoire's banking system developed during the colonial 
period as an extension of the French financial and banking sys- 
tems. In 1962 Cote d'lvoire, along with seven other francophone 
nations, became a member of the West African Monetary Union 
(Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine — UMOA). The UMOA estab- 
lished the Central Bank of West African States (Banque Centrale 
des Etats de l'Afrique de F Ouest — BCEAO), which issued the Afri- 
can Financial Community (Communaute Financiere Africaine) 
franc (CFA F), the unit of currency for the member states, and 
established policies governing interest rates. Also in 1962, France 
and the members of the UMOA signed an agreement that guaran- 
teed the convertibility of the CFA F to French francs and estab- 
lished operations accounts for each country with the French treasury 
in order to centralize their reserves. The signatories also agreed 
to the free circulation of capital within the union. Since 1962 the 
UMOA has modified its system gradually to grant greater mone- 
tary autonomy to the African member states. For example, the 
UMOA reduced the share of French votes on the board of direc- 
tors from one-third to one- seventh, transferred the headquarters 
of the BCEAO from Paris to Dakar, Senegal, and in 1975 intro- 
duced changes to increase the managerial presence of Africans in 
their national economies and to help the member states make bet- 
ter use of their resources. 

Domestically, Cote d'lvoire had the second most sophisticated 
banking system in sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa. In 1988 



102 



The Economy 



it had twenty-one credit and loan banks (including fifteen com- 
mercial banks and six specialized credit banks), nine foreign bank 
offices with limited activity, sixteen registered credit or leasing in- 
stitutions, and seven organizations similar to credit unions. More 
than half of bank ownership remained in foreign control: six of 
the fifteen commercial banks were branches of foreign banks (in- 
cluding three American institutions) . Of the fifteen banks with some 
domestic ownership, Ivoirians (publicly or privately) owned no more 
than 48.4 percent. 

In the late 1980s, the banking system was especially hard hit by 
the fall in cocoa earnings and the subsequent liquidity crisis. In 
1987 the Ivoirian Bank for Construction and Public Works (Banque 
Ivoirienne de Construction et de Travaux Publics — BICT) and the 
National Savings and Loan Bank (Banque Nationale d'Epargne 
et de Credit — BNEC) were closed by authorities. In early 1988, 
the National Agricultural Development Bank (Banque Nationale 
pour le Developpement Agricole — BNDA), which provided credit 
to peasant farmers, and the Cote d'lvoire Credit Bank (Credit de 
la Cote d'lvoire — CCI), an industrial development bank, suspended 
operations. In the case of the BNDA, a politically well connected 
borrower who owed the bank as much as US$78.9 million was 
unable to account for the funds he had borrowed. 

Interest and Investment Policies 

Ivoirian investment policies reflected the dominant position in 
the local economy of expatriate capital and management. For 
example, in the early 1970s Ivoirian rates of interest were consider- 
ably lower than those in European countries, thus encouraging for- 
eign enterprises to borrow as much money as possible in Cote 
d'lvoire and to keep their liquid funds abroad. At one time dur- 
ing this period, an estimated 70 percent of the credits extended 
by the Ivoirian banking system went to foreign-owned companies. 
With little domestic capital to draw on, the government was forced 
to borrow — mostly from abroad — to finance domestic programs. 
To stem the outflow of capital (without offending foreign interests), 
the government initiated a series of banking reforms that set limits 
on the balances that commercial banks could have in foreign ex- 
change and increased interest rates to the level prevailing abroad. 
The measure also compelled foreign-owned enterprises to import 
foreign capital and to retain a larger portion of their profits for local 
investment. 

There were few incentives to encourage the average Ivoirian or 
small-scale entrepreneur to save. Before 1973, deposits of less than 
CFA F200,000 (US$800) earned no interest at all, and large deposits 



103 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



earned interest well below rates in Europe. In January of that year, 
small deposits began to earn 2.5 percent a year; this rate was raised 
to 3.25 percent two years later. As a result, demand deposits, which 
increased by 16 percent from 1962 to 1972, rose 19 percent be- 
tween 1973 and 1975. But by 1985, these highly mobile accounts 
were costing more to manage than they were worth to the banks, 
so the BCEAO suspended interest payments for two years. 

Regulations governing credit allocations also discouraged local 
investment. Banks preferred high liquidity, which meant that short- 
and medium-term loans (those with a payback period of between 
one and five years) were granted only against short and medium- 
term funds, effectively barring loans to local businesses, which 
lacked the funds. Thus, prior to new BCEAO regulations in 1975, 
the majority of short- and medium-term credit went to foreigners. 

Before 1975 and even afterward, instead of relying on commer- 
cial banks, small-scale farmers and business people relied on an 
informal parallel banking sector, the activities of which were not 
included in official statistics. The brokers who collected cash crops 
for export provided loans and sometimes imported goods for local 
farmers at what amounted to usurious interest rates. As much as 
half the country's savings may have circulated in the parallel bank- 
ing system. 

Efforts were made to rationalize the parallel system and exploit 
the accumulated savings. In 1968 the government established the 
National Agricultural Development Bank, a parastatal that helped 
small farmers who otherwise could obtain credit only from com- 
modity brokers in the parallel system. (In fact, many loans — and 
certainly its largest loans — went to wealthy agroindustrialists and 
commodity exporters.) In 1975 the government set up the National 
Savings and Loan Bank to fund long-term mortgages from local 
savings. 

The Stock Exchange 

The Abidjan Stock Exchange (Bourse de Valeurs d' Abidjan), 
one of only four in Africa, was created in 1976 to encourage domes- 
tic investment and to provide Ivoirian industries with access to the 
international financial market. It was only partially successful. Of 
an estimated 700 companies in Cote d'lvoire, the shares of only 
25 were quoted on the exchange. Most investors in the quoted com- 
panies were foreign residents or businesses; in 1986 Ivoirians owned 
only 30 percent of the shares. Trading activity tended to be slug- 
gish, particularly during the protracted recession in the early 1980s. 
For example, the value of snares traded fell from CFA F830 mil- 
lion in 1982 to CFA F400 million in 1984. 



104 



The Economy 



Labor 

Most Ivoirians were members of a traditional agrarian society, 
and virtually all able-bodied adults worked. Just over one- third were 
subsistence farmers who raised little beyond their immediate needs. 
In 1982 the economically active population numbered approximate- 
ly 4.3 million, of whom about 47 percent were women. Approxi- 
mately 85 percent of this population engaged in farming, herding, 
fishing, or forestry, as opposed to nearly 90 percent in 1962. At 
independence, agriculture accounted for 45 percent of all wage earn- 
ers; 40 percent were employed in industry, commerce, and serv- 
ices, and 15 percent were government employees. In 1960 unskilled 
workers constituted approximately 67 percent of the entire labor 
force; skilled workers and technicians, 19 percent; white-collar wor- 
kers, 11 percent; and executive and managerial positions, 3 per- 
cent. In 1982 unskilled workers made up about 80 percent of the 
work force; skilled workers, 17 percent; and managerial and profes- 
sional workers, 3 percent. According to a 1985 census, the largest 
employer was the government, which employed 110,670 people 
(not including the armed forces), or approximately 7 percent of 
the nonagricultural work force. Of these workers, 81,561 were in 
the civil service, and the rest were in state-owned companies. 

In 1968 the government created the Office for the Promotion 
of Ivoirian Enterprise (Office de Promotion de 1' Enterprise Ivoir- 
ienne — OPEI) to reduce — or appear to reduce — the country's de- 
pendence on foreign entrepreneurial expertise. The OPEI was to 
help develop or improve the efficiency of Ivoirian commercial, in- 
dustrial, and agricultural enterprises by providing studies, statis- 
tics, administrative assistance, and training for local entrepreneurs. 
In fact, the OPEI focused only on small-scale entrepreneurs, such 
as bakers, carpenters, tailors, plumbers, and electricians. These 
efforts could not — and apparendy were not intended to — produce 
the high-level managerial expertise that would reduce the coun- 
try's dependence on expatriate initiative, skills, and technology. 

Until the mid-1980s, non-Africans — mostly French — still domi- 
nated the managerial and professional cadres. In 1973 the gov- 
ernment set up the National Commission on Ivoirianization 
to encourage the appointment of Ivoirians to managerial posts 
throughout the economy. Although Ivoirianization of management 
was the announced purpose of the commission, Ivoirianization was 
not to be implemented at the expense of efficiency. Consequently, 
most Ivoirianization programs in commerce and industry were 
voluntary and produced only modest results. According to official 
figures, in 1979 Ivoirians held only 23 percent of senior management 



105 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

positions and 44 percent of junior management posts in all pri- 
vate, public, and parastatal enterprises. By 1982 the percentage 
of Ivoirians in senior management positions had actually dropped 
slightly to 21 percent; for junior-level management posts, the per- 
centage had risen to 52 percent. Among the country's 300 largest 
companies, Ivoirians still filled only 29 percent of top management 
posts, compared with 67.4 percent that were filled by non-Africans. 
The remaining 3.6 percent were filled by non-Ivoirian Africans. 
In addition, many Europeans worked as mechanics, technicians, 
and shop owners, underscoring Cote d'lvoire's continued reliance 
on foreign initiative and skills. 

The government also employed a large number of European 
teachers and technical experts known as cooperants (see Glossary). 
Most were recruited by the French Ministry of Cooperation, but 
others were hired directly by the Ivoirian government through pri- 
vate, usually French, firms on a contract basis. The Ivoirian govern- 
ment was responsible for 80 percent of the total cost of those hired 
under official cooperation agreements and for 100 percent of the 
cost of those hired under private contract. Pressures for Ivoiriani- 
zation and the economic recession of the early 1980s prompted a 
gradual reduction in the number of cooperants from a peak of 4,000 
in 1980 to 3,200 in 1984. Over the next two years, as economic 
conditions worsened and as more Ivoirian university graduates took 
over teaching jobs in secondary schools, this number fell by 1,000. 

The privately recruited foreign experts were employed mainly 
as technical advisers in government ministries and in state enter- 
prises. As part of a series of austerity measures, the IMF insisted 
that 585 of the 650 foreign experts on government payrolls be let 
go. Those foreign experts allowed to stay were in highly special- 
ized areas, such as the petroleum sector and computer technology. 
Despite the IMF dictum, by the end of 1987 there were still 425 
privately recruited foreign experts, costing the government CFA 
Fll billion annually. In November 1987, the government recom- 
mended that these experts be retained only if their presence was 
"indispensable in certain high technology areas not yet mastered 
by nationals." 

Cote d'lvoire also depended on foreigners for unskilled labor. 
Since the early twentieth century, poor migrants from Burkina Faso, 
Mali, and other parts of West Africa had worked in Cote d'lvoire 
as agricultural and construction laborers. Because immigration has 
been largely uncontrolled, estimates of the number of immigrants 
have varied by as much as 100 percent, ranging from 1 million 
to 2 million, and accounted for 70 percent to 80 percent of the un- 
skilled labor force in the rural sector. According to official figures 



106 



The Economy 



for 1974 (the most recent year for which they were available in 
1988), 81.8 percent of the salaried positions in the primary sector 
(agriculture and raw materials) were filled by non-Ivoirian Afri- 
cans, while only 16.9 percent were filled by Ivoirians. The figures, 
however, were skewed somewhat by the fact that most Ivoirians 
in the primary sector were self-employed or were working for family 
members. The labor force shifted easily between regions and occu- 
pational sectors. Surveys have shown that half the migrant farm 
laborers changed their employment every two months, and even 
the more permanent wage earners moved freely from job to job 
in search of higher pay and more attractive working conditions. 
The greatest movement occurred between the traditional and the 
modern sectors of the economy, as farmers from subsistence areas 
took temporary wage employment to meet specific cash needs. This 
mobility contributed to the lack of training and skills and the low 
productivity among nonagricultural workers. 

Wages and Income Distribution 

For several reasons, it is difficult to compare rural incomes with 
urban incomes. Agricultural workers earned income predominantiy 
from the production of goods, rather than from the sale of labor. 
Much of this production was not marketed, and cash crops that 
were marketed were sold at prices that were, in effect, taxed by 
the government because of its pricing policies (see Public Invest- 
ment, this ch.). By contrast, urban incomes were pretax incomes, 
and unadjusted comparisons exaggerate the difference between the 
two. In addition, urban workers often benefited from supplemen- 
tary nonmarket sources of income, such as subsidized housing, 
access to credit on favorable terms, and rental income. 

According to Ministry of Planning figures for 1974 (the most 
recent figures available in 1988), the group of workers whose sala- 
ries fell in the bottom 40 percent in the private sector received about 
14 of total salary payments; the middle 40 percent received about 
33 percent; and the top 20 percent received about 53 percent. 
Figures for workers in the public and parastatal enterprises (ex- 
cluding the civil service) were similar: the group of workers whose 
salaries fell in the bottom 40 percent received 12 percent, the mid- 
dle 40 percent received 32 percent, and the top 20 percent received 
56 percent. In both sectors, the highest salaries were paid to ex- 
patriates, and the lowest incomes went to non-Ivoirian Africans. 
For the civil service, the income distribution was considerably more 
balanced: the lowest 40 percent received 27 percent of income pay- 
ments, and the top 20 percent received 35 percent. Regionally, in- 
comes in the north lagged behind those in the south. 



107 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Salaries earned by non- Africans ranged from about twenty times 
the average African salary in the primary sector, to ten times the 
average in the secondary sector, to five times the average in the 
tertiary sector. In money terms, non- Africans usually received two 
to three times as much income as Africans in the same job classifi- 
cation; in addition, expatriates benefited from generous housing, 
travel, and educational allowances. 

Since 1932 minimum wage and other worker compensation stan- 
dards have been fixed. The Labor Code of 1952 established guaran- 
teed minimum wages and working conditions, and the Advisory 
Labor Committee, composed of an equal number of employers and 
workers chosen by their representative bodies, was set up to recom- 
mend appropriate standards. The committee based its recommen- 
dations on the cost of living and the minimum subsistence 
requirements of various segments of the population. The commit- 
tee then elaborated two minimum wage standards: the Guaran- 
teed Minimum Agricultural Wage (Salaire Minimum Agricole 
Garanti — SMAG) and the Guaranteed Minimum Interprofessional 
Wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti — SMIG). 

Minimum wages have increased faster for nonagricultural work- 
ers. The SMIG rose from CFA F40 per hour in 1962 to CFA F58 
per hour in 1970 and increased an additional 58 percent to CFA 
F93 per hour by 1974. In 1982 the SMIG was raised to CFA F191 .4 
per hour. By contrast, the SMAG rose only 20 percent to CFA 
F25 per hour between 1970 and 1974. In 1982 the SMAG was CFA 
F30 per hour. Most workers received wages substantially higher 
than the legal minimum based on scales determined by collective 
bargaining agreements or, in the absence of such agreements, by 
the government. 

The government also determined other work rules. In 1988 the 
maximum work period was 40 hours a week for nonagricultural 
labor and 2,400 hours a year for agricultural labor. By law, all em- 
ployers carried worker's compensation insurance. The labor code 
regulated labor practices, recruitment, contracts, the employment 
of women and children, and general working conditions such as 
paid holidays, sick leave, and medical care. The code also provided 
for collective agreements between employees and trade unions and 
for special courts to settle labor disputes. 

As in most developing countries, measuring employment and 
unemployment was difficult because relatively few people were em- 
ployed in the modern or formal economy, in which enumerating 
workers is easier; in the traditional economy, the concept of un- 
employment was almost meaningless. It was also difficult to de- 
termine the percentage of the population that was active in the labor 



108 



The Economy 



force. In spite of these methodological problems, the rate of un- 
employment in the early 1980s was calculated to be 9 percent, with 
the highest rates in the Abidjan area. 

By the end of 1987, the national unemployment rate was esti- 
mated to be 11 percent; the rate in urban areas was as high as 30 
percent. The actual number of unemployed persons was estimated 
to be 600,000, although only 86,000 were officially registered with 
the Employment Office of Cote d'lvoire (Office de la Main d'Oeuvre 
de Cote d'lvoire — OMOCI). Contributing to the high rates of un- 
employment were a sharp increase in the number of high school 
and university graduates with inappropriate skills, migration of 
young people from rural areas, a continued high rate of immigra- 
tion from neighboring countries, and reduced recruitment levels 
in the public, parastatal, and private sectors. Significantly, these 
problems were becoming more acute because the economically ac- 
tive population was growing 4 percent a year and was expected 
to reach 7.5 million by 1992. 

Labor Unions 

In the 1980s, approximately 100,000 full-time workers, mostly 
professionals, civil servants, and teachers, belonged to unions (see 
Interest Groups, ch. 4). Virtually all unions were under the um- 
brella of the General Federation of Ivoirian Workers (Union Gener- 
ale des Travailleurs de Cote d'lvoire — UGTCI), which was tightly 
controlled by the party and, by extension, the government. Con- 
sequently, the leadership of the UGTCI invariably supported the 
government in its efforts to promote unity and development, often 
at the expense of labor. As a political force, the UGTCI exercised 
little clout. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture was the foundation of the economy and its main 
source of growth. In 1987 the agricultural sector contributed 35 
percent of the country's GDP and 66 percent of its export revenues, 
provided employment for about two-thirds of the national work 
force, and generated substantial revenues despite the drop in coffee 
and cocoa prices. From 1965 to 1980, agricultural GDP grew by 
an average 4.6 percent per year. Growth of agricultural GDP from 
coffee, cocoa, and timber production, which totaled nearly 50 per- 
cent of Cote d T voire 's export revenues, averaged 7 percent a year 
from 1965 to 1980. Contributing to this impressive performance 
were an abundance of fertile land, cheap labor, the collective ef- 
forts of many farmers cultivating small plots, relatively favorable 
commodity prices, and a stable political environment. 



109 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Success in the 1960s and 1970s overshadowed major problems 
developing in the agricultural sector. By the late 1980s, despite ef- 
forts to diversify its crops, 55 percent of Cote d'lvoire's export earn- 
ings still came from cocoa and coffee. Moreover, highly volatile 
world markets for both commodities caused sharp fluctuations in 
government revenues and made development planning difficult. 
In addition, Cote d'lvoire was not yet self-sufficient in food produc- 
tion and imported substantial quantities of rice, wheat, fish, and 
red meat. Finally, despite an enormous increase in the volume of 
agricultural output since independence, there was little improve- 
ment in agricultural productivity. To achieve higher production 
figures, traditional farmers using traditional technologies simply 
cleared more and more land. 

To overcome Cote d'lvoire's excessive dependence on coffee and 
cocoa (the prices for which were set by consumers), on timber (the 
supply of which was nearly exhausted), and on imported food, the 
government in the mid-1970s embarked on a series of agricultural 
diversification and regional development projects with the hope of 
boosting agricultural production by 4 percent per year. The plan, 
estimated to cost CFA F100 billion per annum (with just over 50 
percent coming from foreign lenders) would allow the country to 
become self-sufficient in food (with the exception of wheat) and 
expand the production of rubber, cotton, sugar, bananas, pine- 
apples, and tropical oils. 

In spite of these efforts, the agricultural sector appeared unable 
to adapt to changing conditions. Distortions in the system of in- 
centives reduced the comparative advantage of alternative crops. 
The vast revenues collected by the CSSPPA were often spent on 
marginally profitable investments, like the costly sugar complexes 
or expensive land-clearing programs (see Diversification Crops, 
this ch.). Finally, some diversification crops, like coconut and palm 
oil, faced new threats as health-conscious consumers in the United 
States and Europe began turning away from tropical oils. Conse- 
quently, the future for Ivoirian agriculture remained cloudy. 

Land Use 

Resources 

Of the total land area of more than 322,000 square kilometers, 
52 percent was considered agricultural land, or slightly over 3.6 
hectares per capita. Total land area fell into one of two distinct 
agricultural regions: the forest region (about 140,000 square 
kilometers) in the south and the drier savanna region (about 180,000 
square kilometers) in the north, where economic growth has 



110 



The Economy 



generally been slower (see Climate, ch. 2). The forest region, which 
had higher and more reliable rainfall and better soils, produced 
most export crops. Rainfall in the savanna averaged about two- 
thirds of that in the forest region and was unreliable from year to 
year. In addition, the soils were generally light and ranged from 
medium to poor quality. As a result, agricultural yields were low 
and opportunities for using labor-saving technology were limited. 

The prevailing system of cultivation for both cereals and feculents 
(starchy foods) was known as shifting agriculture, or bush fallow. 
Fields were cultivated for three to four years, after which they were 
left fallow for periods of up to ten years to restore their fertility. 
To maximize their return on a given plot, farmers first cultivated 
a more exigent crop like yams, followed in subsequent years with 
less demanding crops like corn, and finally planted cassava, after 
which the plot was left untilled. In Cote dT voire, as elsewhere in 
Africa, population pressures forced farmers to reduce the fallow 
period, leading to diminished soil fertility and productivity. The 
use of chemical fertilizers was not common; annual consumption 
of fertilizers in 1982 was 51,800 tons, or only 8.5 kilograms per 
hectare. 

As in most of sub-Saharan Africa, farm labor was usually manual, 
without the aid of animals or mechanization. In 1982 there were 
3,200 tractors and 40 harvester-threshers in the country, nearly 
all of which were on large private or government-owned plantations. 
Nearly all agriculture relied on natural rainfall or, in the case of 
paddy rice, rudimentary, gravity-fed irrigation systems. Under the 
1976-78 development plan, the government constructed dams on 
the Bandama River at Taabo and on the Sassandra River at Buyo 
for irrigation. 

Tenure 

Land tenure systems differed among the various ethnic groups; 
nevertheless, most systems were based on the concept of communal 
ownership of land. At the same time, individual families were 
granted rights to cultivate a specific area (which included fallow 
areas), and these rights included some form of inheritance within 
the family. Unused lands reverted to the community. In 1902 the 
French introduced the concept that individuals or corporations could 
hold legal title to land with exclusive rights; this law, however, had 
little impact in the rural areas. After independence, Ivoirian law 
on landownership provided for surveys and registration of land, 
which then became the irrevocable property of the owner and his 
or her successors. 



Ill 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



Cocoa 

In 1988 Cote d'lvoire led the world in cocoa production with 
more than 500,000 tons (see table 4, Appendix). Cocoa was grown 
mainly on small family-owned farms with labor supplied principally 
by immigrants from other African countries. Production growth 
averaged 6 percent to 7 percent a year throughout the 1965-74 
period and accelerated as the plantings of the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s entered their prime. The total area of cocoa cultivation 
more than doubled from 1973 to 1983, from 611,000 hectares to 
1,398,900 hectares. 

In Cote d'lvoire, cocoa became a cash crop only in 1912, when 
colonial authorities forced Africans to cultivate it. Cocoa, like coffee, 
was a forest crop; it required ample rainfall, partial shade, and 
shelter from wind, all of which occurred only in the southern forest 
zone (see fig. 9). Cacao trees produced pods, which grew on the 
trunk and older branches, beginning at four or five years, and con- 
tinued producing for twenty to thirty years. The pods were har- 
vested from June through August and from November through 
January, although some pods ripened throughout the year. After 
harvest, the beans and pulp were extracted from the pods and al- 
lowed to ferment for six or seven days and then dried. Yields aver- 
aged 220 kilograms per hectare. The bulk of the crop was produced 
on small plots of one or two hectares. 

Cote d'lvoire' s success as a cocoa producer has been a mixed 
blessing. In September 1987, cocoa prices fell to their lowest levels 
since 1983. In December prices were even lower following fore- 
casts that the world surplus for the 1987-88 season would be sub- 
stantially higher than the previous season's, marking the fourth 
successive year of a world cocoa surplus. In September 1987, talks 
aimed at restoring the price support mechanisms of the Inter- 
national Cocoa Organization ended in failure when producers 
and consumers were unable to agree on the price level to be 
defended. 

Coffee 

Cote d'lvoire ranked third in world coffee production after Brazil 
and Colombia. Introduced as a cash crop during the colonial period, 
coffee was cultivated throughout the forest zone, with the heaviest 
production in the denser forests of the east and along the margin 
of the forest moving westward from Dimbokro to Man. The bulk 
of the crop consisted of robusta varieties, which were more bitter 
and less expensive than arabica varieties and therefore were used 
in blends to reduce costs. 



112 



The Economy 



Coffee trees were started in nurseries. After about a year, be- 
fore the rains in May, they were transplanted to permanent sites. 
After two years they were pruned to a maximum height of two 
meters to make harvesting easier, and they were kept pruned to 
improve yields. Trees began bearing at above five years and con- 
tinued to produce for ten to twenty years. Trees flowered several 
times throughout the year; however, the main harvests took place 
in August and November through January. Yields averaged 250 
kilograms per hectare, or about 25 percent of the yields in Colom- 
bia and Brazil, where trees received better care. Following the har- 
vest, the berries were hulled, peeled, dried, and sorted before being 
shipped or processed locally. 

Prior to independence, production grew at a rate of 10 percent 
per year. By the late 1950s, however, expansion slowed, and be- 
tween 1965 and 1984 annual coffee production averaged 252,000 
tons. By the mid-1980s, 60 percent of the coffee trees in the coun- 
try were more than fifteen years old and producing well below aver- 
age yields. Attempts by the government to encourage the planting 
of new coffee trees were largely unsuccessful, and production in 
the aging plantations continued to drop. 

Timber 

Timber exports ranked third in importance behind cocoa and 
coffee; but by 1980 this industry was declining because of over- 
cutting. From 1965 to 1975, the period of peak timber exploita- 
tion, log and sawed wood exports contributed an average of 23 
percent of foreign exchange earnings annually. In the early 1980s, 
timber exploitation averaged an annual 4 million cubic meters of 
logs and accounted for 9 percent of the agricultural GDP (see 
fig. 10). By contrast, in 1984 exports of logs and sawed wood had 
declined to 2 . 1 million cubic meters and represented only 1 2 per- 
cent of exports. 

Overexploitation through the 1960s and mid-1970s almost de- 
pleted forest resources. Cote dTvoire's forest shrank from 15 mil- 
lion hectares in 1960 to less than 3 million in 1987. Deforestation 
continued at a rate of 300,000 to 500,000 hectares a year, while 
annual plantings averaged only 5,000 hectares. The government's 
response to this ecological disaster was halfhearted: in 1985 the 
government-owned Forest Development Company (Societe pour 
le Developpement des Forets — SODEFOR) initiated an industrial 
reforestation program designed to produce some 6.6 million cubic 
meters of wood in thirty-five years. The SODEFOR program will 
have little impact on timber production through at least the year 
2000, however, and until then, producers will continue to exploit 



113 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Source: Based on information from J. -N. Loucou, "Histoire," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 39-45. 

Figure 9. Cocoa, Coffee, and Timber Producing Areas 



shrinking natural forests. As a follow-up on the SODEFOR pro- 
gram, the government declared 1988 "the year of the Ivoirian 
forest" and approved a CFA F1.3 billion tree-planting program 
to plant a total of 25,000 hectares. This represented only 0.2 per- 
cent of the forest land lost since 1960. Finally, the government an- 
nounced a novel scheme to create agricultural belts around the 
remaining wooded areas, making those who were allocated plots 
responsible for policing the forests. Despite these gestures, the 



114 



The Economy 



government insisted in 1985 that timber exports would cease only 
when the country's financial situation stabilized or when substi- 
tute exports could be found, neither of which had occurred by 
1988. 

Diversification Crops 

In the mid-1970s, the government undertook major efforts to 
diversify export crops and end its dependence on cocoa and coffee. 
In the forest zone, diversification products were palm oil, coconut 
oil, and rubber, all of which enjoyed a comparative advantage on 
the international market. In the 1980s, Cote d'lvoire had become 
the largest palm oil exporter in Africa, and the 1987 harvest of 
215,000 tons made Cote d'lvoire one of the world's largest 
producers. In 1985 an expansion program called for planting 65,000 
additional hectares of oil palms and constructing four new indus- 
trial plantations. With some 15,000 hectares of new plantings each 
year, production was expected to continue its rise. At the same 
time, production costs in Cote d'lvoire were high, perhaps reflecting 
the fact that individual holdings were small and often located on 
less productive land. 

In 1987 Cote d'lvoire's rubber production totaled 38,700 tons, 
and there were plans to increase production to 80,000 tons a year 
by 1990. This increase would place the country ahead of Liberia, 
then the largest African producer of natural rubber. The number 
of hectares under rubber cultivation increased sixfold from 1960 
to 1984, from 7,243 to 43,634 hectares. 

In the north, or savanna zone, cotton and sugar were the chief 
diversification crops. Cotton was first introduced during the 
colonial period by the French Textile Development Company 
(Compagnie Francaise de Developpement des Textiles — CFDT), 
which at independence became the Ivoirian Textile Development 
Company (Compagnie Ivoirienne de Developpement des Textiles — 
CIDT). Cotton became economically important only after indepen- 
dence. In 1965 there were some 12,000 hectares of cotton, and by 
1979, there were 123,000 hectares. Production leveled off in the 
early 1980s but picked up again between 1981 and 1984. Cotton 
(fiber and cottonseed) production in 1986-87 set a new record of 
213,506 tons, compared with the previous season's 190,000 tons 
and the country's previous record of 205,000 tons in 1984-85, mak- 
ing Cote d'lvoire the third largest cotton producer in Africa, after 
Egypt and Sudan. Cotton fiber production over the same period 
amounted to 91,000 tons (1987), 75,000 ton (1986), and 88,000 
tons (1985). Cote d'lvoire exported about 80 percent of its crop. 



115 



Cote dTvoire: A Country Study 



THOUSANDS 



6000 



5000 



4000 



3000 



2000 



1000 





1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 1987 

YEAR 



Source: Based on information from J. -N. Loucou, "Histoire," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 52-55. 

Figure 10. Timber Production, Selected Years, 1961-87 

Cote d'lvoire was Africa's eighth largest sugar producer, with 
a yield of nearly 144,000 tons in 1987, more than half of which was 
exported. Industrial sugar production began only in the early 1970s 
with the creation of SODESUCRE, a parastatal that constructed 
and operated six large industrial sugar refineries located at Ferkes- 
sedougou (Ferke I and Ferke II) and four smaller towns in the savanna 
region (By 1987 two of the factories had been closed.) In 1982 these 
complexes contributed about 3 percent of the agricultural GDP. 

The colonial government introduced bananas for export in 1931, 
and by 1961 the fruit was the second largest earner of foreign 
exchange. The principal production areas lay between Aboisso and 
Divo. Exported varieties, which are larger and sweeter than native 
fruits, were harvested year round. French settlers owned the first 
plantations; by 1961 holdings by Africans amounted to about one- 
third of the 6,500 hectares under cultivation for export. By the 
mid-1980s, the fraction in land or in corporations held by foreigners 
dropped to less than 10 percent. Production for 1985 came to 
163,000 tons, of which only 105,000 tons were exportable. In the 
mid-1980s, Cote d'lvoire routinely fell short of its allotted export 
quota to Europe, in part because labor shortages adversely affected 
the quality of the fruit. 



116 



The Economy 



Pineapples have been raised commercially only since 1950. In 
1961 fewer than 600 hectares were cultivated; Africans owned 
approximately one-half the area. By 1986, under the impetus of 
government encouragement and support, 438,000 hectares were 
under cultivation. Production amounted to approximately 250,000 
tons, up from 195,000 tons a year earlier, of which 180,000 tons 
were exported as fresh fruit. The remainder of the harvest was 
canned locally. The major producing area was near Abidjan. 

Food Crops 

In 1987 the staple food crops made up about 38 percent of the 
value of agricultural production. The principal food crops in Cote 
dTvoire were the feculents, or starches (yams, plantains, cassava, 
and taro), which made up 76 percent of the value and 60 percent 
of the bulk of staples output. Gross production per annum amounted 
to approximately 4.5 million tons. Gross production of cereals 
(paddy rice, maize, sorghum, and millet) amounted to about 1 mil- 
lion tons per year; however, cereals, which occupied a larger cul- 
tivated area than did the feculents, had a higher total protein value. 
Food crop production increased by approximately 3.4 percent per 
annum between 1965 and 1984, with cereals having a slighdy higher 
rate of growth. At the same time, food crop productivity per rural 
family increased by about 1 percent per year, well under the rate 
of population growth. This shortfall, along with a preference on 
the part of much of the population for imported rice and bread 
over indigenous foodstuffs, increased rice and wheat imports to a 
high of 590,000 tons in 1983, or about 40 percent of national cereals 
consumption. Cereal imports dropped to 150,000 tons in 1985 after 
prices for imported foodstuffs had increased, good rains had ended 
the drought, and the government had inaugurated a food self- 
sufficiency campaign. In 1987 imported cereals amounted to about 
14 percent of the national diet, as compared with 20 percent earlier 
in the decade. 

Measured by area cultivated and tonnage, yams were the lead- 
ing food crop, especially in the region east of the Bandama River. 
A number of varieties of yams grew in Cote dTvoire, differing by 
size of tubers, moisture requirements, and length of growing 
season. Yams had stringent soil needs, however, and demanded 
far more labor to plant and harvest than did the other root crops. 
In addition, roughly one-quarter of the crop had to be reserved 
to seed the next crop. Seed yams were planted near the top of 
conical mounds, usually % to 1 l A meters high and 1 to 1 X A meters 
apart, and formed from finely cultivated soil. Usually other crops 
such as maize, beans, tomatoes, or peas were planted on the sides 



117 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

of the mounds. Providing support for the yam vines (which could 
reach as high as seven meters) were either stakes or liana — long, 
climbing vines — which hung from dead, leafless trees purposely 
left standing in the yam fields in the forest zone. Depending on 
the variety, the yam tubers, which varied in weight from a kilo- 
gram or less to as much as forty kilograms, were ready for harvest 
after about eight months. The best yields in the Bouake region were 
about 12.4 tons per hectare. In the more humid south, the yield 
was higher, and farther north it was lower. The heaviest yam- 
producing areas were around Bouake, Seguela, and Korhogo. 

West of the Bandama River, rice was the principal food crop 
although rice cultivation was spreading across Cote d'lvoire wherever 
conditions were suitable. Local farmers had cultivated a native variety 
of rice for centuries. In the twentieth century, however, French 
colonial administrators introduced more prolific Oriental species of 
both upland (dry) rice and paddy rice. Dry rice predominated, prob- 
ably because it required less technology, matured more quickly, and 
could be interplanted with other crops. Dry rice matured in about 
three months and yielded about 560 kilograms per hectare, com- 
pared with a five- to six-month maturation period for wet rice and 
yields averaging 786 kilograms per hectare. 

Among cereals, maize followed rice in tonnage harvested. It was 
planted throughout the country; however, except in the northwest 
where most maize was produced, it was subsidiary to other crops. 
Local varieties of maize matured in as little as two months, mak- 
ing it particularly suited to the north, where it could be planted 
after the first rains in May and harvested during the period when 
old yam stocks were depleted and the new yams were not yet ma- 
ture. In the south, two crops per year were common. Because maize 
depletes the soil, farmers often interplanted it with other crops such 
as yams, beans, and gourds or cultivated it in fertilized household 
gardens. Yields, which were low by Western standards, averaged 
nearly 1.3 tons per hectare, reflecting the absence of both ferti- 
lizers and mechanized farming practices. As was true for other 
crops, insects, rodents, and, in the south, moisture, made maize 
storage difficult. 

Other important food crops were plantains and cassava or manioc. 
The plantain, which is of the same genus as the banana, followed 
yams in annual tonnage harvested. Because it required sustained 
rainfall, production was limited to the south, where it was often in- 
terplanted with cacao. Plantains were raised from shoots removed 
from the base of a mature tree. The shoot formed a stalk (about 
three meters high) that bore a single cluster of fruit ready for har- 
vest after twelve to fifteen months. After the plantains were harvested, 



118 



Log carriers waiting to unload at the port 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 

the stalk was cut off at ground level, and a new shoot was allowed 
to sprout. After five or six years, the old root system was removed, 
and a new tree was planted. Harvesting continued throughout the 
year; yields varied with soil conditions but averaged just under five 
tons per hectare. 

Cassava, which served as a hedge against famine, was third in 
importance after yams and plantains. Cassava was also a root crop 
that was easy to cultivate, resisted pests and drought, and took lit- 
tle from the soil, yet still produced fair yields. Because cassava was 
propagated by stem cuttings, the entire crop could be used for food. 
The growing period was from six to fifteen months, but even after 
the roots matured, they could be left in the ground for several years 
without damage. In the south, where two plantings per year were 
common, cassava was often interplanted with other crops and held 
in reserve or planted as a final crop before a field was abandoned 
for fallow. In the north, only a single planting per year was possi- 
ble. Estimates of yields ranged from about five tons to just under 
ten tons per hectare. These figures were unreliable, however, 
because roots were harvested only when needed. 

Other food crops included taro (in the south) and varieties of 
millet and sorghum (in the north). Individual households raised 
garden vegetables, including okra, tomatoes, peanuts, and eggplant, 
in small plots near dwellings or interplanted among field crops. 



119 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Tropical fruit trees, both wild and domestic, produced sweet 
bananas, avocados, oranges, papayas, mangoes, coconuts, lemons, 
and limes. Oil palms and shea trees provided cooking oils. 

Even in the best of years, Cote d'lvoire imported vast quanti- 
ties of wheat, rice, meat, and milk. To achieve food self-sufficiency, 
the agricultural recovery program proposed by the Council of 
Ministers sought to increase production of rice, maize, peanuts, 
and the newly introduced soybeans, all of which were grown primar- 
ily in the northern savanna zone. In addition, the government in- 
tended to revamp the Food Marketing Bureau (Office pour la 
Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers — OCPV) to streamline 
the marketing of such food crops as yams, plantains, and cassava. 
Finally, the Council of Ministers also inaugurated a project to 
achieve self-sufficiency in animal proteins. 

Animal Husbandry 

With some exceptions, tsetse fly infestation limited livestock 
production in savanna regions as did the absence of forage in the 
forest zone. Consequently, there were few pastoral groups in Cote 
d'lvoire, and the country's livestock population was unable to meet 
domestic needs. In 1985 there were approximately 843,000 cattle, 
most of which were of the small, humpless N'dama breed. There 
were also 1.5 million sheep, 430,000 swine, 1.5 million goats, and 
16 million poultry. 

In 1987 the livestock sector contributed about 6 percent of agricul- 
tural output. About half of that total came from poultry and egg 
production, about one-quarter came from cattle, and the remainder 
came from sheep and goats. Although virtually all poultry consumed 
in Cote d'lvoire was produced locally, domestic beef production 
met only about 40 percent of demand. The remainder entered as 
live cattle from Mali and Burkina Faso or as slaughtered meat from 
Western Europe, Argentina, or southern Africa. In the 1980s, the 
government sought to strengthen livestock production by provid- 
ing education and training in modern animal husbandry and by 
introducing large-scale cattle fattening centers near Bouake and 
Abidjan. 

Fisheries 

In 1987 combined fish production in Cote d'lvoire was estimated 
to be worth CFA F15 billion, and its share in net agricultural value 
added was 1 .6 percent. Contributing about equally to the total were 
the tuna industry; low-technology coastal and freshwater fishing, 
including a large smoked fish industry; and a fleet of privately owned 
trawling, sardine seining, and shrimping vessels. In the 1980s, 



120 



The Economy 



canned fish was the country's seventh largest export commodity 
in revenue generated (behind cocoa, coffee, fuels and chemicals, 
timber, cotton, and palm oil), amounting to about 20,000 tons a 
year (see table 5, Appendix). Nevertheless, export revenues from 
fish exports only slightly exceeded foreign exchange payouts for 
the approximately 100,000 tons of frozen fish imported each year. 
The imports supplemented the canoe and fleet catches, which met 
about half of domestic demand. 

Insofar as Ivoirian coastal waters had probably reached their 
maximum sustained yield in 1988, possibilities for growth in the 
fishing "sector were limited without costly research and develop- 
ment, which the country could ill afford. The areas offering the 
greatest potential for growth were the tuna industry and domestic 
freshwater production in artificial lakes and ponds. After comple- 
tion of the Kossou Dam on the Bandama River, freshwater catches 
increased (see Electricity, this ch.). Malian fishermen from the Niger 
River region moved into the area, set up fishing villages, and earned 
a comfortable livelihood from the carefully stocked lake. 

Manufacturing 

At independence, Cote d'lvoire manufactured little more than 
timber by-products, textiles, and food processed from local agricul- 
tural products. Little was exported. The lack of an indigenous, 
skilled labor force, inexperienced management, and low domestic 
demand limited industrial growth. 

At that time, there was little direct state involvement in manu- 
facturing. Nearly all industrial companies were financed by pri- 
vate — mainly foreign — capital. On the strength of its growing and 
protected domestic market and, in the 1960s and 1970s, the de- 
velopment of regional markets under the aegis of the West Afri- 
can Economic Community (Communaute Economique de l'Afrique 
Occidentale — CEAO), Ivoirian industrialization flourished. 

Following independence, light industry became one of the most 
rapidly growing sectors in the economy. Between 1960 and 1980, 
manufacturing grew at the rate of 13 percent per year, and its con- 
tribution to GDP rose from 4 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1984. 
The number of firms rose from 50 at independence to more than 
600 in 1986. Expanding most rapidly were import substitution in- 
dustries like textiles, shoes, construction materials (such as cement, 
plywood, lumber, ceramics, and sheet and corrugated metal), and 
industries processing local agricultural raw materials (such as palm 
oil, coffee, cocoa, and fruits). 

Although agricultural processing plants used locally produced 
inputs, import substitution industries — as well as firms manufac- 
turing or providing chemicals, plastics, fertilizers, and engineering 



121 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

services — imported their raw materials (50 percent of intermediate 
inputs were imported). In many instances, these costiy intermediate 
inputs raised the price of completed products far above the price 
of comparable imported goods. Consequently, the government 
promoted and protected local industry by imposing tariffs and in- 
centives. 

The system of industrial tariffs and incentives, however, proved 
to be shortsighted. These measures avoided quantitative import 
restrictions and included a tariff schedule that protected all indus- 
trial activities, whether threatened by imports or not. By assign- 
ing tariffs according to the degree of processing and by exempting 
some inputs that could be produced locally and less expensively, 
the government discouraged domestic production of intermediate 
inputs. 

Additional efforts to promote industry, and particularly small - 
and medium- scale enterprises, were equally inadequate. Manage- 
ment personnel often lacked skills and experience, political con- 
nections often influenced policy, and there was little coordination 
among state bureaucracies responsible for assisting the struggling 
firms. In response, the government promulgated a new investment 
code in 1984 (subsequently altered in 1985) by providing bonuses 
for exports and by reforming tariffs, which served to shelter ele- 
ments of an already overprotected and inefficient industrial sector. 

In 1987 the government adopted additional measures originally 
proposed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organi- 
zation (UNIDO) to expand exports and make industry more 
efficient. This new policy proposed modernizing import substitu- 
tion industries, manufacturing new products with high added value 
for export, and expanding the existing range of agriculture-based, 
export-oriented industries. The new exportable agricultural prod- 
ucts were to include processed food (maize, cottonseed, fruits, 
vegetables, manioc, yams, and coconuts), textiles (spinning and 
weaving, ready-to-wear clothing, and hosiery), and wood (paper 
and cardboard). The new, nonagricultural exports were to include 
building materials, such as glass and ceramics; chemicals, such as 
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals; rubber; agricultural and cold storage 
machinery; and electronics, such as computers (see fig. 11). As part 
of the reform package, UNIDO also insisted that credit restrictions 
be eased, domestic savings potential be tapped, and funds held 
abroad by Ivoirians be repatriated. Under pressure from the World 
Bank, the government cut its levy on pretax bank transactions from 
25 to 15 percent. 

The process of modernizing import substitution industries and 
increasing exports included measures to reduce the high level of 



122 



ABI Foundry, Abidjan 
Courtesy World Bank Photo Library 

customs protection accorded local industries and to extend export 
subsidies. In November 1987, the government began a five-year 
program to reduce import duties and surcharges progressively to 
an eventual 40 percent of value added for the entire industrial sec- 
tor. In addition, the government extended export subsidies to the 
entire manufacturing sector in order to compensate for compara- 
tively high local production costs in the agroindustrial sector (oils 
and fats, processed meat, fish, chocolate, fruits, and vegetables) 
and for such industrial goods as textiles, carpets, shoes, chemicals, 
cardboard, construction materials, and mechanical and electrical 
goods. As of early 1988, the reforms had not yet yielded the desired 
results, partly because export subsidies were granted on an ad hoc 
basis with no assurance that they would be renewed and partly be- 
cause the reforms were financed from customs receipts, which, 
under the government's pledge to reduce tariff protection, were 
diminishing. 

Energy 
Electricity 

In the late 1980s, electrical production in Cote d'lvoire surpassed 
that of most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Its five hydro- 
electric stations and the large thermal station at Vridi provided 
electricity for the central and southern portions of the country, where 



123 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

most industrial activity took place. In addition, a number of smaller 
thermal facilities provided electricity for urban areas scattered 
throughout the country. The number of urban centers with elec- 
trical service increased rapidly from 292 in 1975 to 620 in 1984, 
with 740 predicted for 1990. In 1986 total generating capacity 
amounted to 1.08 gigawatts. The industrial sector consumed 1,026 
gigawatt-hours of high- voltage electricity; the remaining capac- 
ity was consumed by more than 350,000 low-voltage subscrib- 
ers. 

After independence, Electrical Energy of Ivory Coast (Energie 
Electrique de Cote d'lvoire — EECI), the Ivoirian power company, 
had sought to replace costly thermal units with hydroelectric power. 
The first two dams, Ayame I and Ayame II at Ayame, began gener- 
ating in 1962 and 1965, respectively. Following the rise of oil prices 
on the world market in the early 1970s, the government embarked 
upon a major program to tap its considerable hydroelectric poten- 
tial. In 1973 the government commissioned a 176-megawatt hydro- 
electric facility on the Bandama River at Kossou. The Kossou Dam 
project was by far the most expensive of Cote d'lvoire's hydro- 
electric facilities; construction cost billions of CFA francs, as did 
the relocation of 85,000 Baoule farmers from the region that was 
to have been flooded (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). 
Lake Kossou (Lac de Kossou) was expected to cover a surface three 
times the size of Lake Geneva and to double the country's electri- 
cal generation. In fact, poor rainfall during the mid-1970s prevented 
Lake Kossou from filling to its maximum capacity, and Kossou 's 
output was far less than anticipated. With the return of normal 
rainfall levels in 1979, hydroelectric power generation rose signifi- 
cantly and permitted a cutback in oil-fired thermal output. 

A second dam, with a capacity of 210 megawatts, was constructed 
downriver at Taabo and was brought into production in 1979. In 
the west of the country on the Sassandra River, the 165-megawatt 
Buyo Dam was completed in 1980, bringing the country's total 
hydroelectric capacity to 600 megawatts. By 1982 about 90 per- 
cent of the country's electrical energy came from hydroelectric 
sources, thus reducing significantly the amount of fuel the coun- 
try needed to import. 

A serious drought in 1983 and 1984, however, nearly dried up 
the lakes behind all five dams. Turbines were shut down, and the 
country was obliged to rely once again on the thermal power 
produced by its original 210-megawatt facility at Vridi and to reac- 
tivate two smaller thermal units in the north and west of the coun- 
try. Electrical production fell by 18.3 percent, causing blackouts 



124 



The Economy 



in Abidjan and productivity losses amounting to 35 percent in the 
industrial sector. 

To help alleviate the crisis, the government installed four thermal 
generators at Vridi, financed by the European Investment Bank and 
the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (Caisse Centrale pour 
la Cooperation Economique — CCCE). The four turbogenerators 
had a total capacity of 100 megawatts and were able to run on na- 
tural gas as well as fuel oil, enabling EEC I to tap offshore gas sources 
as they became available. The government also agreed to purchase 
178 gigawatt-hours of power from neighboring Ghana in 1983-84 
and 322 gigawatt-hours in 1984-85. Good rains in 1984 replenished 
the lakes and allowed EEC I to reactivate the hydroelectric genera- 
tors; accordingly, thermal production decreased from 78.1 percent 
of the total in 1983-84 to 30.5 percent in 1984-85. 

Other Energy Sources 

In the rural areas, most of which were not serviced by electricity, 
wood, in both its natural state and as charcoal, and kerosene were 
the most important source of household energy. At the same time, 
the government encouraged small-scale attempts to exploit solar and 
wind energy. The French-owned Energy Management Agency used 
solar energy to power a community health clinic, and in the north 
of the country, wind-operated pumps raised subsurface water for 
drinking and irrigation. 

Extractive Industries 
Petroleum 

By far the most important mineral in Cote dT voire was petro- 
leum. Petroleum was first discovered in the early 1970s on the con- 
tinental shelf off the coast of Jacqueville, west of Abidjan. A short 
time later, a second field was discovered off Grand-Bassam, east 
of Abidjan. The discovery and development of the two fields coin- 
cided with the collapse of world cocoa and coffee prices in the late 
1970s and was seen by many as the means by which the country 
could continue moving toward prosperity, although the fields, named 
Espoir and Belier, were relatively small, geologically complex, and 
located in deep water. The Espoir field was developed by United 
States-based Phillips Petroleum. (PETROCI had a 10 percent share.) 
Espoir began operations in August 1982 with an output of 18,000 
to 20,000 barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary). Because of techni- 
cal problems, output declined the following year to 15,000 bpd. By 
1988 production had fallen to 10,000 bpd. 

The Belier field, developed by Exxon, did not begin producing 
oil until 1980 because of technical difficulties. Output reached 10,000 



125 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



rv.f 
.0 



•7 

/' 



• Samatigla 

• 6dienn6 



Korhogo^ \ ^ 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



A 



Ferk6ss6dougou 



♦ 

"Toriiya 



) ' ^Touba 

■"I ^ <$ § 

^ S6gu6la + 

= *Biankouma 



Ni 



S *Danan6 ^ 



Bangolom 




Bondoukou w 



BouakS 

Si ( 
Agnibil6krou\ ,' 
f 

< Yamoussoukro Abe ^ rou y v 

T 1 \ 5 • 

£<jc(k Dimbokro Bongouanou \ 



6 

i 

♦ 



Construction, public works, 
and building materials 

Dam and hydro- 
generating station 

Diesel thermal 
generating station 

Food Processing 

Diamonds 
Gold 



® 

Q 

i 



Machine construction 
and sheet metal 
Nickel 

Petrochemicals 

Offshore petroleum 
deposit 

Textiles, leather, shoes 

Wood Processing 



International 
boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 



Source: Based on information from J. -N. Loucou, "Histoire," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 56-58. 



Figure 11. Economic Activity, 1983 



bpd in 1981 and then fell to 6,000 bpd by 1986 in spite of a US$50 
million investment by Exxon on a water injection program to main- 
tain output and prolong the field's life. 

Agip of Italy and Tenneco of the United States drilled explora- 
tory wells elsewhere along the coast, but neither found sufficient 
reserves to continue exploration. By 1985, as world oil prices 



126 



The Economy 



dropped and projected yields from Cote d'lvoire's fields were 
reduced to more realistic levels, both Phillips and Exxon had halted 
exploratory and development drilling in their oil fields. Moreover, 
production in the existing fields failed to attain projected output, 
and the government's target of achieving self-sufficiency in oil 
production was never reached. Total oil production declined a fur- 
ther 5 percent in 1986 to less than 20,000 bpd, while national con- 
sumption exceeded 30,000 bpd. By the end of 1988, Exxon had 
halted production from the Belier field and capped its wells. 

In 1965 the Ivoirian Refining Company (Societe Ivoirienne de 
Raffinage — SIR) completed construction on a refinery at Vridi with 
a capacity of 1 1 ,000 bpd per year. When petroleum prices surged 
in 1979, demand dropped substantially, and output fell to only 50 
percent of capacity. Contracts with Chevron Oil of the United States 
to process crude oil from other African countries (primarily Nigeria) 
raised output to near capacity and, along with a financial recov- 
ery plan, led to a net improvement in the profitability of SIR. In 
1986 capacity was increased to 50,000 bpd, making SIR the major 
source of refined petroleum products for West Africa. It also be- 
came Cote d'lvoire's leading industrial plant and the third-ranking 
enterprise in French-speaking Africa, with revenues surpassing CFA 
F200 billion in 1986. 

Natural Gas 

The exploratory oil wells revealed large reserves of natural gas, 
some of which were associated with the oil fields. In 1987 estimates 
of the Espoir and Foxtrot gas reserves off the coast of Abidjan 
amounted to 3.5 billion cubic feet, or enough to produce 55 mil- 
lion cubic feet a day for twenty years. Apart from reducing the 
country's dependence on fuel oil, the government sought to use 
the gas to generate electricity — thus justifying its purchase of four 
large gas-powered turbines during the drought of 1983-84 — and 
to produce fertilizer. In late 1987, the government and Phillips 
Petroleum were still trying to negotiate an acceptable price for the 
gas. Start-up costs for drilling two producer wells and construct- 
ing a sixty-kilometer gas pipeline to the thermal power station at 
Vridi were estimated at US$150 million in 1986. 

Other Minerals 

Although the subsoil of Cote d'lvoire contained many other 
minerals, none existed in commercially exploitable amounts, given 
the high costs of extraction. Mining contributed only 1 percent of 
GDP in 1986. 



127 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

During the precolonial era, gold was extracted from small shafts 
dug into the earth or from river and streambeds and was traded 
at the coast or across the Sahara Desert. Efforts under the colo- 
nial administration to exploit gold deposits at Kokoumbo in the 
center of the country and at small mines in the southeast proved 
unprofitable. In 1984 the state-owned SODEMI and a French min- 
ing company formed the Ity Mining Company (Societe Miniere 
d'lty — SMI) to exploit a deposit discovered thirty years earlier at 
Ity near Danane. Total investment in this period was estimated at 
CFA Fl .2 billion. The gold ore was of medium quality, with a ratio 
of gold to ore in the range of 8.5 grams per ton. Extraction was 
to begin in 1987, with output anticipated at 700 kilograms of gold 
metal during the first two years of operation. Ity estimated an ad- 
ditional investment of CFA F2.3 billion to expand output to 700 
kilograms of gold metal a year. SODEMI also located gold deposits 
in the region of Issia and in the Lobo River bed, with anticipated 
annual yields of 100 kilograms and 25 kilograms, respectively. 

In the mid-1970s, low-grade deposits (less than 50 percent) of 
iron ore estimated at 585 million tons were assayed at Bangolo near 
the Liberian border. A consortium representing Japanese, French, 
British, American, Dutch, and Ivoirian interests was formed to 
exploit the deposits; however, depressed world prices for iron ore 
forced the participants to postpone the project indefinitely. 

Following World War II, diamond mining seemed promising, 
but by the mid-1980s expectations had waned. The Tortiya dia- 
mond mine, operating since 1948, peaked in 1972 when 260,000 
carats were mined. In 1980, however, the mine was closed. The 
Bobi mine near Seguela produced 270,000 carats per year until 
the late 1970s; it was closed in 1979. Remaining reserves for Tortiya 
were estimated at 450,000 carats; for Bobi, 150,000 carats. 

Between 1960 and 1966, manganese mines in the region of 
Grand-Lahou on the coast yielded 180,000 tons of ore per year. 
In 1970, after world market prices had dropped and production 
costs had risen, the mines were closed. There were additional un- 
exploited managanese deposits near Odienne. Cote dTvoire also 
had small deposits of Colombo- tantalite, ilmenite, cobalt, copper, 
nickel, and bauxite. 

Transportation and Communications 

Following independence, the government invested heavily in 
infrastructure to transport the country's major export products. 
The relatively well-developed transport infrastructure was believed 
to be instrumental in the spectacular growth of the country's 
economy between 1960 and 1979. In 1986 the transport network 



128 




Dam on the Biya at Ayame 
Courtesy Eszti Votaw 

included more than 53,736 kilometers of roads, of which some 3,765 
kilometers were paved; 660 kilometers of railroads; two major 
seaports; 980 kilometers of navigable inland waterways (primarily 
lagoons because the country's rivers were not navigable); 3 inter- 
national airports; 13 major domestic airfields; 17 smaller regional 
airfields; and 50 private airfields (see fig. 12). 

Railroads 

Construction on the Abidjan-Niger Railroad (Regie du Chemin 
de Fer Abidjan-Niger — RAN) began in 1905 and continued through 
1954. The single, one-meter- gauge track extended northward from 
Abidjan through Ferkessedougou into Burkina Faso and terminated 
at Ouagadougou. Its total length, including the portion in Burkina 
Faso, was 1,180 kilometers. Through the early post-World War II 
period, the RAN contributed significantly to the development of 
agriculture and forestry in the southeast and central regions of the 
country. Following the opening of the Abidjan port in 1950 and the 
upgrading and expansion of the road network, the RAN became 
primarily a long-distance hauler. Except for points located directly 
on the rail route and for bulk transport, rail transport was no longer 
important to the south and to the center of the country. Neverthe- 
less, the RAN was still considered crucial to economic development 
in the north; accordingly, new industries were situated along the 
rail line. 



129 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



The RAN was also important to the landlocked countries to the 
north. At one time, it carried 90 percent of Burkina Faso's foreign 
trade and half of the 50 percent of Mali's foreign trade that passed 
(via Bobo Dioulasso in Burkina Faso) through the seaport of 
Abidjan. 

In the 1980s, economic recession in Cote d'lvoire and Burkina 
Faso, and political instability in the latter, confronted the RAN with 
financial and administrative problems, deteriorating equipment, and 
debt. These problems were caused in part because Burkina Faso 
did not pay its bills for five years, accumulating arrears amounting 
to CFA F17 billion. For political and economic reasons, the two 
countries agreed to liquidate the RAN and divide its assets, esti- 
mated in 1987 to be CFA F78 billion in rolling stock, railroad sta- 
tions, buildings, and land. 

Cote d'lvoire had planned to construct a 350-kilometer railroad 
to link the port city of San-Pedro with iron ore deposits near Bongolo 
in the west-central region of the country. But because prices in the 
1980s for iron ore were low, the government scrapped plans to ex- 
ploit the deposits and build the railroad, which would have cost 
an estimated CFA F80 billion in 1986. 

Roads 

As the demand for Cote d'lvoire's exports increased in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the government improved the road network dramati- 
cally. From 25,000 kilometers of roads in 1961, the network ex- 
panded by 1986 to 53,765 kilometers, of which 3,765 were paved, 
including 141 kilometers of divided highway. Paved roads linked 
Abidjan with all major population centers in the country, and 
although they constituted only 7 percent of the total road network, 
they carried approximately 70 percent of the traffic. Roads were 
the principal mode of domestic transport, carrying about 78 per- 
cent of interurban passenger traffic and 70 percent of freight traffic. 
In Abidjan, as elsewhere in the country, traffic growth was rapid, 
expanding 10 percent per year for passenger traffic and 7 percent 
per year for freight traffic from 1970 to 1980. In 1986 a daily average 
of 14,000 vehicles entered and left Abidjan, as opposed to an average 
of 4,800 vehicles in 1969. 

A 1969 World Bank transportation survey strongly recommended 
improvements to the primary road network during the 1970s. Over 
the first five years of the plan, inadequate planning and a lack of 
overall policy coordination and evaluation resulted in gross over- 
spending. Although 75 percent of the road projects originally 
proposed were implemented, they cost 123 percent more than the 
amount earmarked to pay for the entire program. Nevertheless, 



130 



The Economy 



highway construction did not abate. In 1986 the World Bank ap- 
proved a US$40 million loan as part of a US$230 million highway 
construction and improvement program, described as the "quickest 
way to inject money into the economy and affect all sectors." For 
the same year, the BSIE earmarked CFA F39.4 billion for high- 
way construction and improvement. 

Ports and Maritime Shipping 

Cote d'lvoire has no natural, sheltered deep water harbors. Until 
1950 all imports had to be offloaded at sea onto lighters that either 
crossed the surf and landed on a beach or, as at Grand-Bassam 
and Sassandra, unloaded at a wharf that extended beyond the surf. 
In 1950 the 2. 7 -kilometer Vridi Canal, which cut through the bar- 
rier island south of Abidjan, was completed, linking the Gulf of 
Guinea with the Ebrie Lagoon. Until port facilities at Abidjan were 
completed, lighters were still required to unload cargo, but by 1955 
all port operations were handled at dockside. 

By the 1970s, Abidjan was the largest port in West Africa. The 
amount of cargo handled grew from 5 million tons in 1970 to 9.5 
million tons in 1986, a large proportion of which was container- 
ized. Abidjan had 5,485 meters of quays representing 35 berths, 
105,000 square meters of warehouse space, a quay with refrigera- 
tion installations for the fishing industry, and twelve specialized 
quays for bananas, fish, timber, cement, hydrocarbons, tankers, 
and roll-on roll-off cargo operations. In 1987 the government en- 
larged the Abidjan port, adding two new quays in Locodjo across 
the lagoon from the city. 

To stimulate development in the southwest and reduce the cost 
of transporting raw materials to Abidjan, the government con- 
structed a second deepwater port at San-Pedro. The San-Pedro 
project, which represented a major governmental effort to exploit 
the timber, cocoa, coffee, rubber, and palm oil production planned 
for the southwest and the iron ore mines farther north, included 
road building and development of an urban infrastructure. The 
port with two large quays began operating in 1971, but because 
the iron ore project was dropped and timber production for the 
region was less than the amount anticipated, the San-Pedro port 
handled far less than its planned capacity. In 1984 cargo amounted 
to approximately 1.3 million tons, or 14 percent of all maritime 
commerce. In 1984 Abidjan and San-Pedro handled a total of 9.7 
million tons of cargo. 

Cote dT voire had two merchant marine companies flying the 
national flag: SITRAM and the Ivoirian Maritime Navigation 



131 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



MALI 



BURKINA 
FASO 



GUINEA > 



Odiennt 



Korhogo 



Bounajk- v _J> 



\ 



r 



.Seguela 



*^ Danane 

m 

LIBERIA 



, Man 



Yamoussoukro 



IGagnoa 



Abengourou 



lAdzope 




Sassandra 
-^San-Pedro 



(julf of guinea 



A 



Atlantic Ocean 

Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary _ 

® National capital 
• Populated place 
50 100 Kilometers 

50 100 Miles 



Road 

" Railroad 
4* Airport 
J, Major port 



Source: Based on information from J. -N. Loucou, "Histoire," in Pierre Vennetier (ed.), 
Atlas de la Cote d'lvoire (2d ed.), Paris, 1983, 59-61. 



Figure 12. Transportation System, 1988 



Company (Societe Ivoirienne de Navigation Maritime — 
SIVOMAR), with a combined total of twenty cargo ships. The 
former company was state owned; the latter was privately owned. 

Air Transport 

In the 1980s, the Abidjan-Port Bouet International Airport, situ- 
ated on the outskirts of Abidjan, was one of the most active in Africa, 
handling more than 1 million passengers each year. It had two 



132 



The Economy 



runways more than 3,000 meters in length and could handle all 
large carriers, as could the airports at Bouake and Yamoussoukro. 
There were also thirty public airports serving the major towns and 
approximately fifty private airfields. Air I voire, the state airline, 
also known as Ivoirian Air Transport and Liaison (Groupement 
Aerien de Transport et de Liaison — GATL), handled air traffic 
within the country and also flew to neighboring countries. Air 
Afrique, a multinational consortium formed by ten francophone 
African countries and headquartered in Abidjan, was the major 
carrier for international traffic serving Cote dT voire. Air Afrique 's 
major competitors were Air France and the Air Transport Union 
(Union des Transports Aeriens — UTA), a private French-owned 
carrier. Other carriers from Europe and the United States also 
provided regular service. 

Telecommunications 

Telecommunications, like so many other areas, reflected Cote 
dTvoire's colonial heritage. Thus, 251 telephone circuits linked Cote 
dTvoire with France, and 29 linked it with Senegal, the former 
colonial seat for French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Fran- 
chise — OAF; see Glossary). No circuits linked Cote d'lvoire directly 
with its immediate neighbors. An INTELSAT ground satellite sta- 
tion located east of Abidjan provided links to the United States, 
Europe, and other African countries. In addition, the government 
planned by 1990 to lay a submarine cable linking Cote dTvoire 
with Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, and Gambia. 

In 1984 there were 87,700 installed telephone lines in the coun- 
try, or 1.3 telephones per 100 people. Only 45 percent of the tele- 
phones were working at any one time because of technical problems, 
however, so actual users of telephone service numbered 59,247. 
In 1986 Abidjan had 67.9 percent of the total number of telephone 
lines in the country, or one telephone per 50 inhabitants compared 
with one telephone per 430 inhabitants in the interior of the coun- 
try. At the end of 1986, outside of Abidjan 115 cities had telephone 
service, of which 44 were equipped with automatic installations. 
The government intended to construct a network of satellite earth 
stations in the interior in early 1990; the network would improve 
rural telephone service dramatically. Meanwhile, the military, 
government offices, and some businesses used radio commu- 
nications, which were the responsibility of the National Tele- 
communications Bureau (Office National de Telecommunications — 
ONT). 

As of the mid-1980s, ONT was beset with problems in spite 
of its new US$35 million headquarters. It suffered from traffic 



133 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



congestion, a poor call-completion rate (as few as 50 percent, 30 
percent, and 20 percent for urban, interurban, and international 
call attempts, respectively); poor billing and collections (accounts 
receivable amounted to twelve months' receipts, or CFA F31 bil- 
lion); an inadequate tariff structure; and lack of oversight. 
Moreover, the ONT often bought sophisticated technology that 
ended up increasing rather than reducing maintenance costs. 

In 1982 the postal service handled 59,861 ,000 pieces of mail and 
581,000 telegrams, or approximately 6 pieces per capita. There 
were 1,181 telex subscriber lines. 

Foreign Trade and Commerce 

At independence, Cote d'lvoire had strong economic and politi- 
cal ties with France. In contrast with nearly all other former French 
colonies in Africa, the government of Cote d'lvoire continued to 
cultivate these links into the late 1980s, some twenty years after 
France had suspended tariff preferences for major Ivoirian exports. 
By the 1980s, however, Cote d'lvoire had found supplemen- 
tary trading partners and sources of foreign investment, primarily 
among France's neighbors in the European Economic Commu- 
nity (EEC). 

Between 1960 and 1974, the value of Cote d'lvoire's exports to 
EEC countries more than doubled, while the value of its exports 
to France was halved. Although this trend continued into the 1980s, 
French exports to Cote d'lvoire remained important because most 
of the Ivoirian import substitution industries were either linked to, 
or otherwise dependent on, French parent companies. 

In 1986 Cote d'lvoire's principal markets for exports were France 
and the United States, which together purchased approximately 
one- third of its total exports (see table 6, Appendix). West Ger- 
many was the third largest export market, having overtaken Italy 
in 1985. France, which provided one-third of Cote d'lvoire's im- 
ports, was by far the largest supplier. The United States and the 
Netherlands each supplied about 5 percent of the country's im- 
ports. 

After cocoa and coffee, Cote d'lvoire's principal exports were 
timber and processed wood, cotton and textiles, sugar, rubber, palm 
oil, pineapple, and other agricultural and manufactured goods. Its 
principal imports were manufactured goods, food, petroleum prod- 
ucts, machinery, and transport equipment. 

Balance of Payments and Foreign Assistance 

Between 1950 and 1975, Cote d'lvoire had far fewer problems 
with its balance of payments than did most other African states 



134 




Crossing the Comoe River 
Courtesy Robert Handloff 

(see table 7, Appendix). Exports increased at a faster rate than the 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), with real expansion 
averaging 9 percent per year from 1962 to 1975. Until 1978 the 
balance of trade was invariably positive. Export earnings from coffee 
and cocoa rose consistendy as production grew, and earnings surged 
when world market prices for coffee and cocoa increased. In the 
boom period from 1974 to 1977, export earnings soared, peaking 
in 1977 with a record trade surplus of almost CFA F100 billion. 

In 1979 lower prices for coffee and cocoa, coupled with higher 
prices for imports, especially crude oil, sharply cut the trade sur- 
plus to what was then an unprecedented CFA F1.880 billion. In 
subsequent years, as the volume of exports rose (notwithstanding 
weaker coffee and cocoa prices) and as government-iimposed 
austerity measures cut imports, trade surplus figures stabilized at 
about CFA F30 billion a year. 

National Debt 

To finance its development projects — given the paucity of domes- 
tic capital — Cote dT voire borrowed substantial amounts abroad, 
especially during the mid-1970s. At that time, high prices for coffee 
and cocoa led Ivoirian planners to overestimate the potential of 
the economy and, consequently, undertake overly ambitious capital 
investment programs. By 1976 Cote d'lvoire's high debt payments, 



135 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



together with repatriated profits and foreign worker remittances, 
produced a negative net reserve position for the first time in its 
history, despite continuing trade surpluses. 

Following the drought and recession of the early 1980s, exter- 
nal debt rose even more sharply, reaching US$9.8 billion in 
1985 — about triple the level of five years earlier and more than 
three-quarters of the annual GNP (see table 8, Appendix). By 1981 
total debt service amounted to about US$1 billion. Between 1978 
and 1983, the ratio of debt service to export earnings rose from 
13 percent to 31 percent. 

Since the early 1980s, Cote d'lvoire had engaged in a series of 
foreign debt rescheduling exercises with both private and public 
creditors. Faced with falling commodity prices and recession, Cote 
d'lvoire asked to reschedule its debt with Paris Club donors; the 
request was granted in May 1984. By the terms of the reschedul- 
ing agreement, all payments on principal and half the interest pay- 
ments due that year would be spread over nine years, with a 
four-year grace period. The London Club of commercial creditors 
also rescheduled the US$775 million in interest and principal due 
in 1984 and US$420 million due in 1985. In addition, the country 
obtained new credits equivalent to US$176 million, contingent upon 
enactment of a retrenchment program approved by the IMF that 
limited government spending and foreign borrowing. 

As economic conditions improved in early 1985, the government 
signaled its intent to assume its full debt service burden in 1986 
rather than negotiate a second London Club rescheduling agree- 
ment. At World Bank and IMF urging, however, Cote d'lvoire 
in August 1985 arranged a multiyear rescheduling package with 
its foreign creditors that would allow the country renewed access 
to commercial capital markets while phasing in debt rescheduling 
over the next five years. The IMF approved a US$66.2 million 
standby agreement loan that was followed in September by a US$30 
million World Bank loan to finance technical assistance in support 
of an industrial reform program. Earlier, Cote d'lvoire had adopted 
a World Bank industrial sector reform plan, resulting in strong 
World Bank support for the country in its negotiations with pri- 
vate and bilateral creditors. This multiyear debt rescheduling exer- 
cise was the first of its kind in Africa and was intended to allow 
the country to "grow out of" its debt crisis. 

By 1987, when Cote d'lvoire was to start payments on the first 
installment on the debt that it rescheduled in 1984 and that then 
totaled approximately US$8 billion, the economy had not improved. 
The continuing decline in coffee and cocoa prices, which Houphouet- 
Boigny blamed on American and European speculators, cut export 



136 



The Economy 



earnings by an estimated CFA F180 billion. At the time, the IMF 
projected a US$81 1 million current accounts deficit for 1987. The 
IMF also projected debt servicing costs for 1988 of US$1.4 billion — 
roughly two-thirds of the national budget — as compared with the 
1987 cost of US$1.5 billion. Payment was clearly out of reach. In 
May 1987, the government announced that it would suspend pay- 
ment on its foreign debt. 

The May 1987 decision to suspend foreign debt payments placed 
Cote dT voire in the high-risk category for some trading partners 
and potential investors, even though the move was explained by 
Ivoirian officials as simply a political maneuver to win a fairer deal 
for Cote dT voire and other African debtors. Nevertheless, by the 
end of 1987 the Paris Club, the IMF, and the government had 
negotiated a new economic recovery and structural adjustment pro- 
gram. The new package granted Cote dT voire a six-year grace 
period and rescheduled all principal due in 1987-88 plus 80 per- 
cent of interest due (approximately US$500 million). Earlier, the 
World Bank had agreed to release the second US$150 million in- 
stallment of a US$250 million structural adjustment loan originally 
approved by its board in mid-1986. Finally, disbursement of an 
IMF structural adjustment credit and a compensatory financing 
facility worth approximately US$235.8 million awaited the out- 
come of the London Club negotiations. 

The IMF further warned the government that unless it lowered 
producer prices, it would face severe and persistent budget deficits 
for the foreseeable future. Although Houphouet-Boigny had de- 
clared that producer prices would not be reduced, CSSPPA offi- 
cials conceded that some modification of producer prices was under 
consideration. The pricing formula being studied was similar to 
that applied in Cameroon, where prices reflected both the quality 
of a producer's crop and the previous year's commodity earnings. 

For its part, the government reduced by 20 percent the 1988 cap- 
ital spending budget from about CFA F179 billion in 1987 to CFA 
F144 billion to satisfy the IMF's recommendation for a more rigor- 
ous selection of investment projects. At the same time, the govern- 
ment rejected IMF demands to increase income taxes, limit family 
allowances, and cut guaranteed prices to farmers, claiming that 
such measures would jeopardize political and social stability. 

Foreign Assistance 

As a middle-income developing country, Cote d'lvoire found 
it easier to borrow from private commercial sources than from multi- 
lateral and bilateral financial institutions, which lent primarily to 
the poorest countries. More than two-thirds of its foreign debt was 



137 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

owed to commercial lending agencies. Nevertheless, the govern- 
ment borrowed substantial sums from Paris Club donors. From 
1981 to 1984, net official development assistance from Western 
countries and from multilateral agencies averaged US$136.4 mil- 
lion per year. This figure increased in the mid-1980s as multilateral 
donors, particularly the World Bank, financed the various struc- 
tural readjustment programs. In 1986 the World Bank financed 
five programs amounting to US$340. 1 million, and by the end of 
that year it had loaned Cote d'lvoire about US$1.8 billion in a 
series of forty-nine operations, including three structural adjust- 
ment loans that totaled US$600 million. Other sources of multi- 
lateral aid in 1985 were the African Development Bank (US$124.4 
million), the European Development Fund (US$15.5 million), and 
the Council of the Entente (Conseil de l'Entente; US$375 million). 

France was the most important bilateral aid donor. French 
assistance was channeled through the CCCE and the Aid and Co- 
operation Fund (Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation — FAC). After 
France, Canada and West Germany were the largest donors, pro- 
viding US$7.7 million and US$8.7 million, respectively, in 1985. 

Future of the Economy 

The debt rescheduling and structural adjustment program nego- 
tiated in 1988 afforded Cote d'lvoire a respite from burdensome 
debt repayment. Nevertheless, the country's economic future re- 
mained cloudy. Timber production, which at other times sustained 
the economy when coffee and cocoa prices were weak, was manifest- 
ing the stark effects of overcutting. Houphouet-Boigny's refusal 
to cut producer prices for cocoa guaranteed continuing high levels 
of production and low prices on world markets because Cote 
d'lvoire was the world's leading cocoa producer. To diversify its 
economy, the country turned to other agricultural products like 
palm and coconut oils, tropical fruits, sugar, cotton, and rubber. 
In none of these products, however, did the country have as com- 
manding position as it did with coffee or cocoa. Moreover, the mar- 
ket in tropical oils faced a potential threat as health-conscious 
consumers in the United States demanded substitutes thought to 
be lower in saturated fats than were palm and coconut oils. For 
many of the other diversification crops, particularly sugar, world 
supply already surpassed demand, and Cote d'lvoire would be com- 
peting with other Third World tropical countries similarly seek- 
ing to diversify economies heretofore dependent on coffee and cocoa. 
Finally, although the retrenchments mandated by the IMF affected 
all income groups in Cote d'lvoire, they most visibly affected the 
young and poor, giving rise to crime, drug problems, and other 



138 



The Economy 



manifestations of social dislocation, all of which demanded addi- 
tional expenditures from the government. In 1987 government 
revenue losses from customs fraud alone, especially in the textiles 
sector, were estimated at approximately CFA F200 billion (US$701 
million) per year — or about one-third of the national budget. The 
path out of this downward spiral had yet to be discovered. 

* * * 

Because of its apparently remarkable performance, especially 
in comparison to the economies of nearly all other sub-Saharan 
African countries, the economy of Cote dT voire has a rich bib- 
liography. General reference works like Europa's4/^£0 South of the 
Sahara, African Contemporary Record, and Encyclopedia of the Third World 
provide important guidance. Articles and monographs by schol- 
ars such as Samir Amin, Bonnie Campbell, Michael A. Cohen, 
Lawrence R. Alschuler, I. William Zartman, and Y.-A. Faure pro- 
vide insightful, relevant, and sometimes highly critical analyses of 
Ivoirian economic growth. More detailed information has appeared 
in publications of international development organizations like the 
World Bank and various agencies of the United Nations. Publica- 
tions of the government of Cote dT voire and its agencies are also 
helpful. Several periodicals provide current information, particu- 
larly on debt negotiations. These include Africa Research Bulletin, 
Africa Economic Digest, Bulletin de VAfrique noire, Marches tropicaux et 
mediterraneens, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report, West 
Africa, and Jeune Afrique. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography.) 



139 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Akan chief with his official regalia 



THE FIRST POSTINDEPENDENCE regimes of sub-Saharan 
Africa were characterized by some form of personal rule. In the- 
ory, such regimes would govern during the transition period fol- 
lowing independence but preceding the full development of the 
governing institutions of the newly independent states. In reality, 
however, the leaders of the various independence movements, who 
subsequently had become government officials, often manipulated 
public resources, acquired vast wealth and status, and generally 
consolidated their hold on power. Where the transitional systems 
acquired legitimacy, as in Cote d'lvoire, it was almost entirely the 
result of the ability of the leader-politician, in the absence of strong 
governing institutions, to provide adequate material and political 
rewards to a broader constituency. 

In 1988 governance in Cote d'lvoire remained the province of 
one man: President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, affectionately called 
le vieux (the old man). He had ruled since independence and had 
dominated Ivoirian politics since the stirrings of nationalism in the 
mid- 1940s. From the onset of his tenure in 1960, debate was vir- 
tually suspended as Houphouet-Boigny subjected the polity to his 
paternalistic yet stern control. He wielded executive power as head 
of state, head of government, head of the ruling party, and com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces. In his role as head of govern- 
ment, he appointed his cabinet (Council of Ministers), named the 
chief justice of the Supreme Court, and selected the heads of all 
extragovernmental commissions and councils. As head of state, he 
formulated and conducted foreign policy. As head of the party, 
he set policy directions and appointed the entire membership of 
all policy-making boards. Although there were occasions when 
popular sentiment as expressed through party organs or the Na- 
tional Assembly forced the president to alter a policy decision, he 
was without question the dominant political force. 

Houphouet-Boigny' s charisma contributed to the myth of 
Houphouetism, as his ruling style was labeled, enabling him to 
convert the skeptics and awe the faithful. In spite of his power, 
Houphouet-Boigny' s style of rule was by choice paternalistic. 
Houphouet-Boigny became a transcendent symbol of unity to the 
disparate groups in Cote d'lvoire, and his charismatic author- 
ity supplanted the traditional authority of the local chiefs. Al- 
though Houphouet-Boigny' s hold on the national imagination was 



143 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



weakening by the late 1980s, many Ivoirians continued to reject 
out of hand any reports of the president's avarice or violations of 
trust. 

To repay his supporters with adequate material rewards, 
Houphouet-Boigny developed economic policies that combined free 
enterprise and state capitalism with liberal foreign investment and 
continued economic dependence on France. Houphouet-Boigny' s 
strategy for development also led to a broad gap in wealth and power 
between the urban elite — the rulers — and the rest of the population. 

As a measure of Houphouet-Boigny' s success, liberal economic 
theorists and conservative students of African politics cited Cote 
d'lvoire as an economic and political miracle. Indeed, through 1979 
Cote d'lvoire posted one of the highest rates of economic growth 
among all developing countries, and the highest per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) of any nonpetroleum- 
exporting African country. Coupled with the rapid rate of growth 
was a political stability unparalleled in sub-Saharan Africa. Un- 
like most of his counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa, Houphouet- 
Boigny resisted pressures to sever ties with the colonizing power 
(France) or to Africanize the bureaucracy, two steps that, when 
taken in other former colonies, usually meant reduced funds for 
investment and expanded opportunities for corruption. He also 
resisted pressure to subsidize large industrial projects with revenues 
from cash crops. Instead, he relied on foreign — mostly French — 
investment, technology, and support to develop the country's eco- 
nomic base and administrative infrastructure. 

Under Houphouet-Boigny' s administration, Cote dTvoire's for- 
eign policy was consistently pro- Western. Its fundamental objec- 
tive was to promote economic development at home by promising 
peace and security within West Africa. Cote d'lvoire also main- 
tained extensive economic and military ties with France, even 
though this meant bearing the neocolonialist label. Diplomatic re- 
lations with the United States, if less substantial, were also warm. 
For instance, Cote d'lvoire was sub-Saharan Africa's staunchest 
supporter of the United States in the United Nations. Matching 
the strength of its support for the West was Cote dTvoire's dis- 
trust of the Soviet Union. Cote d'lvoire did not establish diplo- 
matic relations with the Soviet Union until 1967, severed them in 
early 1969 amid accusations of Soviet subversion, and did not 
reestablish them until 1986, as part of Houphouet-Boigny 's quest 
for international stature. Houphouet-Boigny also broke with most 
other African leaders by attempting to establish a dialogue with 
South Africa and, in 1986, by reestablishing diplomatic relations, 
which had been broken following the October 1973 War, with Israel. 



144 




Mural honoring President Felix Houphou'et-Boigny 

Courtesy Eszti Votaw 

Formal Power 
The Constitution 

On October 31, 1960, the National Assembly of Cote d'lvoire 
adopted the Constitution establishing an independent republic. The 
1960 Constitution calls for a strong, centralized presidential sys- 
tem with an independent judiciary and a national legislature. 

As in much of the Ivoirian political system, French influence 
weighed heavily in the preparation of the Constitution. Houphouet- 
Boigny and its other authors had received much of their formal 
political education and experience in France, and Houphouet- 
Boigny himself had served in successive French governments in 
the 1950s. Not unexpectedly, the 1960 Constitution was largely 
taken (often verbatim) from the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic of France. Like its French counterpart, the Ivoirian Con- 
stitution declares that all power derives from the people and is ex- 
pressed through universal suffrage. It also mandates the separation 
of executive and legislative authority with limits on the power of 
the former. 

In its preamble, the Constitution proclaims its dedication to lib- 
eral democratic principles and inalienable human rights as expressed 
in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Under the 



145 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

rubric "Of the State and Sovereignty," the initial articles of the 
Constitution describe the symbols of the state — the flag, the motto, 
and the national anthem — and name French the official language. 
Articles 3 through 7 delineate the fundamental rights and princi- 
ples pertaining to Ivoirian citizenship: universal suffrage, popular 
sovereignty, and equality before the law. Significantly, in light of 
the government's subsequent coercive support of a single political 
party, Article 7 of the 1960 Constitution formally allows a multi- 
party system. 

The first chapter of the Constitution directs that the government 
consist of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The three 
subsequent chapters of the Constitution list the powers accruing 
to each. The Ivoirian Constitution provides for a strong executive, 
although it couches the language of power in democratic terms. 
For example, in keeping with the articulated principle of popular 
sovereignty, the Constitution provides that the National Assem- 
bly shall vote laws and consent to taxes but then limits the assem- 
bly's power by specifying exactly the matters on which the legislature 
may act. Matters constitutionally excluded from the legislature's 
purview automatically fall within that of the executive and are dealt 
with either by decree or by regulation. The Constitution also stipu- 
lates that the executive and the National Assembly share the power 
to initiate legislation, but the pertinent article appears in the chapter 
dealing with executive — not legislative —responsibilities. In fact, 
for most of Cote d'lvoire's brief history as an independent repub- 
lic, nearly all legislative programs have originated with the presi- 
dent and have been rubber-stamped by the assembly. 

The Constitution also calls for a separate judiciary. As with the 
legislature, however, the Constitution makes the judiciary sub- 
ordinate to the individual who guarantees its independence, that 
is, the president. The Constitution neither establishes nor protects 
a judiciary independent of or opposed to the government. The Con- 
stitution does provide for the Supreme Court and a subordinate court 
system; nevertheless, it does not stipulate the exact structure of the 
judiciary, a task that officially was to be done by the National As- 
sembly. In fact, the assembly simply approved the president's plan. 

The ninth chapter of the Constitution establishes the Economic 
and Social Council (Conseil Economique et Social), the purpose 
of which is to advise the president on matters pertaining to eco- 
nomic development and social change. The final two chapters pro- 
vide procedures for amending and adopting the Constitution. 

Civil Rights 

The Constitution lists and defines protected civil rights in the 
initial articles and in a few brief references elsewhere. Like the 



146 



Government and Politics 



French Constitution, it promises equality before the law without 
respect to place of origin, race, sex, or religion. It also specifically 
mandates religious freedom and prohibits any manifestations of 
racial discrimination. The Constitution also guarantees freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to representation at 
a trial, and the principle of innocence until guilt is proven. However, 
the Constitution does not guarantee bail; thus, suspects are rou- 
tinely incarcerated from the time of arrest until either acquitted 
in a trial or sentenced. The Constitution does not guarantee a free 
press or freedom of assembly, thereby virtually eliminating the 
means by which opposing political parties might develop. Other- 
wise, the Constitution leaves more explicit guarantees of individual 
liberties to the legislature. 

In practice, the government generally respected the civil rights 
provisions of the Constitution, preferring co-optation instead of 
coercion to enforce its will. The United States Department of State 
described human rights as generally satisfactory, in contrast to con- 
ditions in most other sub-Saharan countries (see Human Rights, 
ch. 5). At the same time, the government was not timid about violat- 
ing the spirit of the Constitution when dealing with political oppo- 
nents. For example, youthful political opponents were routinely 
conscripted into the armed forces, which was one of Houphouet- 
Boigny's favorite ploys to silence opponents while still being able 
to boast of holding no political prisoners. Also, all local news media 
were state owned and therefore expected to support the govern- 
ment and its policies. In October 1986, in the face of a budding 
movement for a more independent press, Minister of Information 
Laurent Dona Fologo threatened to fire ' 'black sheep" journalists 
who did not sufficiendy assume the role of public servants. Although 
major European and American newspapers and magazines were 
generally available and interested Ivoirians routinely heard French 
radio broadcasts, government leaders did not hesitate to ban the 
circulation of a publication deemed offensive. In November 1987, 
for example, the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Cote 
dTvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote dTvoire — PDCI) asked the 
government to ban the sale of Jeune Afrique following its allegations 
that Houphouet-Boigny was involved in the October 1987 coup 
in neighboring Burkina Faso. 

The Executive 

The executive branch was headed by the president and included 
cabinet ministers and their administrations. The Ivoirian Consti- 
tution augments presidential power by combining with it the func- 
tions of prime minister while subordinating the role of the National 



147 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Assembly. Under the Constitution, the president has authority to 
appoint and dismiss ministers, military officers, and members of 
the judiciary. The president promulgates laws and ensures their 
execution, negotiates and ratifies treaties (subject in some cases to 
the National Assembly's approval), and sets national policy. 

As a coinitiator of laws, the president was able to exercise effec- 
tive control over legislation. Moreover, constitutional mandates 
coupled with enabling legislation ratified by the National Assem- 
bly gave the president what amounted to government by decree. 
Bills were not always passed unanimously, but that was the prac- 
tical effect. 

The president is elected to a five-year term by universal suffrage 
and can be reelected indefinitely. To be elected, a candidate must 
be at least forty years old; other qualifications were fixed by legis- 
lation. 

The Constitution also provides for the Council of Ministers, 
whose members are appointed by the president (see fig. 13). 
Although ministers served at the will of the president, he accorded 
them considerable freedom of action to propose policies and projects 
within their respective areas of competence. The proposals were 
then debated by the Council of Ministers. 

In the 1980s, Houphouet-Boigny selected his ministers from the 
growing pool of younger, educated technocrats who had replaced 
the political militants of an earlier generation. Selected at least in 
part on the basis of merit, the new men came to government without 
independent constituencies and were therefore indebted to the presi- 
dent, which was consistent with Houphouet-Boigny' s view that 
government in immature states should be personal rather than in- 
stitutional. Government, then, became Houphouet-Boigny 's ad- 
ministrative agency and not a forum for setding political differences. 

The National Assembly 

Under the Constitution, legislative responsibilities theoretically 
belong to a unicameral National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale). 
In 1985 it was enlarged from 147 to 175 members, who were known 
as deputies {deputes). Qualifications for candidates to the Assem- 
bly were established by the government. Like the president, deputies 
were elected by universal suffrage within a constituency for five- 
year terms. Until 1980, Houphouet-Boigny had handpicked the 
deputies, who were automatically elected to the assembly as part 
of a single slate. Consequendy, the National Assembly was a passive 
body that almost automatically consented to executive instructions. 
The assembly did have power to delay legislation by means of ex- 
tended debate. Deputies, however, rarely challenged the president's 



148 



Government and Politics 



policy decisions, and little debate occurred. Starting with the 1980 
election, Houphouet-Boigny opened the process so that any quali- 
fied citizen could be a candidate. Moreover, the constitutional 
amendment of October 1985 stipulating that the president of the 
National Assembly would become interim president of the repub- 
lic, should the presidency be vacated, conferred greater importance 
on the workings of the assembly. 

Pursuant to the Constitution, each legislative term lasted five 
years, during which the National Assembly sat for two sessions per 
year. The first term began on the last Wednesday in April and lasted 
no more than three months. The second opened on the first Wed- 
nesday of October and ended on the third Friday in December. 
The president or a majority of the deputies could request an extra- 
ordinary session to consider a specific issue. Meetings of the as- 
sembly were open unless otherwise requested by the president or 
one-third of the deputies. 

The National Assembly elected its own president, who served 
for the duration of the legislative term. In 1988 this position was 
second only to the president of the republic in the table of prece- 
dence. It was held by Henri Konan Bedie for the 1985-90 term. 
The assembly president's staff was also elected by the assembly. 
A member of this staff would preside over the National Assembly 
whenever the president of the assembly was not present. 

Legislation was proposed within three standing committees: the 
Committee for General and Institutional Affairs, which covered 
interior matters, the civil service, information, national defense, 
foreign affairs, and justice; the Committee for Economic and Finan- 
cial Affairs, which covered financial and economic affairs, plan- 
ning, land, public works, mines, transportation, postal service, and 
telecommunications; and the Committee for Social and Cultural 
Affairs, which covered education, youth and sports, public health 
and population, labor, and social affairs. The assembly could also 
form special standing committees for specific purposes. Each com- 
mittee presented to the full assembly legislative proposals pertain- 
ing to affairs within its area of expertise. Determining the legislative 
agenda was the responsibility of the president of the National As- 
sembly, his staff, and the committee heads. 

The Economic and Social Council 

The Constitution also provides for the establishment of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, which advises the president on issues 
of an "economic or social character." In 1988 the council had forty- 
five members, all of whom were selected by the president for five- 
year terms from among those members of the elite most concerned 



149 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



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150 



Government and Politics 



with economic development and social change. By the late 1970s, 
membership included the leaders of the growing commercial and 
industrial sector. With the exception of its president, who was 
named by the president of the republic, the council elected officers 
and distributed its members among various standing committees 
with discrete areas of responsibility. In 1986 Houphouet-Boigny 
named Philippe Yace to head the council. Although the president 
was obligated to consult with the council on all matters within its 
competence, the council could also offer unsolicited opinions per- 
taining to economic development on all laws, ordinances, and 
decrees. Moreover, on its own initiative, the council could direct 
the president's attention to any economic or social issue. 

Judicial System 

The 1960 Constitution entitles all Ivoirians to a fair public trial. 
That mandate was generally respected in urban areas; in rural vil- 
lages, traditional institutions more commonly administered justice. 
Indigent defendants were also entitled to legal counsel by court- 
appointed attorneys. In practice, public defenders were often un- 
available, and there was a vast difference between the representation 
accorded rich and poor clients. According to the Constitution, 
judges are subject only to the law, and the president, with the as- 
sistance of the Superior Council of Magistrates, is charged with 
ensuring the independence of the judiciary. Because the president 
of the republic controlled appointments to the courts, the judiciary 
seldom, if ever, opposed the president. 

The judicial system bore the imprint of both the French legal 
and judicial traditions and, to a lesser extent, customary law. It 
consisted of two levels. The lower courts, all of which were created 
by presidential decree and exercised limited jurisdiction, included 
the courts of appeals, the courts of first instance, the courts of assize, 
and the justice of the peace courts. The five courts of first instance, 
which handled the bulk of trials, heard misdemeanor and minor 
criminal cases (with a maximum sentence of three months or less), 
juvenile cases, and civil cases. The courts consisted of a president, 
one or more vice-presidents, and one or more examining magis- 
trates and trial judges, all of whom were appointed by the presi- 
dent of the republic. The courts were located in Abidjan, Bouake, 
Daloa, Korhogo, and Man. Each had two or more delegated sec- 
tions in larger towns within their respective jurisdictions. The courts 
of assize, which were paired with courts of first instance, handled 
only major criminal cases. At the lowest level were justice of the 
peace courts, presided over by justices of the peace who handled 
petty cases in civil, criminal, and customary law. The two courts 



151 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

of appeals, located in Abidjan and Bouake, heard appeals from 
courts of first instance and courts of assize. The Abidjan court heard 
appeals from the Abidjan court of first instance and its delegated 
sections; the Bouake court handled referrals from the other four 
courts of first instance. 

The superior courts are mandated by the Constitution and have 
nationwide jurisdiction. They include the Supreme Court, the High 
Court of Justice and the State Security Court. The Supreme Court 
is separated into four sections handling, respectively, constitution- 
ality of laws, administrative appeal, criminal appeal, and finan- 
cial control of government services. The Constitution directs that 
the court include one president, three vice-presidents (one for each 
section except the constitutional), nine associate justices, one secre- 
tary general, and four secretaries. The Constitutional Section, which 
always met in closed session, reviewed laws that had been passed 
by the National Assembly but not yet promulgated. The section 
had fifteen days to complete its consideration of a bill. The presi- 
dent of the republic or the president of the assembly could forward 
requests for a constitutional review. The president of the republic 
could also submit government bills to the section for a constitu- 
tional hearing before they were submitted to the Council of 
Ministers. The Constitutional Section also supervised referenda 
as called for in the Constitution and ruled on the eligibility of can- 
didates for the National Assembly. The president of the Supreme 
Court presided over sessions of the section, which also included 
the vice-presidents of the court and four persons noted for their 
juridical and administrative competence. These four could also be 
members of the court. Two of the four were appointed by the presi- 
dent of the assembly, and two were appointed by the president of 
the republic. The term of office was four years, and there was no 
provision for removal from office. 

The Judicial Section was the highest court of appeals in crimi- 
nal cases. The section consisted of one vice-president, four associ- 
ate justices, and two secretaries. It was organized into civil and 
criminal divisions with three additional magistrates in each. The 
Administrative Section handled cases of alleged abuse of adminis- 
trative power involving individuals in public administration. This 
section consisted of a vice-president and two associate judges. Un- 
like the judges in other sections, those in the administrative sec- 
tion were magistrates, but not necessarily members of the bench. 
Another section of the Supreme Court, the Audit and Control Sec- 
tion, monitored public expenditures and annually audited accounts 
of the state and its agencies. This section consisted of a vice- 
president, three associate justices, and one secretary. 



152 



Government and Politics 



The two other superior courts included the High Court of Justice 
and the State Security Court. The High Court of Justice was com- 
posed of members of the National Assembly who were elected to 
the court every five years, following each general election. The court 
was empowered to impeach the president of the republic for trea- 
son and to judge other members of the government for crimes or 
misdemeanors committed in the exercise of their official duties. 
Cases concerning crimes against state security were heard in the 
State Security Court. 

All judges, as well as all employees of the Central Administra- 
tion of the Ministry of Justice, comprised the professional judiciary. 
They were required to have obtained a bachelor of law degree and 
could not concurrently hold an elected office. A Superior Council 
of the Judiciary was responsible for assisting the president in the 
task of guaranteeing an independent judiciary. The council advised 
the president on nominations to the Supreme Court, on cases con- 
cerning judicial independence, and on disciplinary problems. It 
also advised the minister of justice on nominations to magistrate 
positions. The council's membership included members of the Con- 
stitutional Section of the Supreme Court and three magistrates, 
each appointed to two-year terms by the president from a list pre- 
pared by the minister of justice. 

Local Government 

As of 1987, the country was divided into forty-nine prefectures 
(see fig. 1). The prefectural administration, headed by a prefect 
(prefet), represented executive authority within the prefecture. Con- 
stitutionally, the prefects responded to the local interests of their 
respective constituents and directed and coordinated the adminis- 
trative services represented in their respective constituencies. As 
representatives of each ministry within their prefectures, the prefects 
issued directives to the heads of services and ensured their compli- 
ance, presided over all state organizations and commissions within 
the prefecture, periodically met with service heads at the prefec- 
tural level, and acted as trustees for public enterprises and activi- 
ties in the prefectures. Prefects also were responsible for maintaining 
public order and security in their respective prefectures. In that 
capacity, they supervised local police and oversaw the execution 
of laws, statutes, and executive orders. To deal with civil unrest 
or other emergencies, they were also empowered to issue binding 
orders or decrees, detain suspects for up to forty-eight hours, and 
request assistance from the armed forces (see Internal Security 
Organization and Forces, ch. 5). 



153 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



The prefectural administration included a secretary general, a 
chief of cabinet, and two division chiefs, one of whom was respon- 
sible for administrative and general affairs such as elections, 
supervision of the police, administration of subprefectures (sous- 
prefectures), and civil affairs. The other division chief was responsi- 
ble for economic, financial, and social affairs, including the bud- 
get, accounts, public works, health, education, and the supervision 
of markets and price controls. The secretary general, besides sub- 
stituting for the prefect during the latter' s absence, supervised and 
coordinated all departmental services. The chief of cabinet, in ef- 
fect an administrative aide, was responsible for intradepartmental 
affairs (mail, inspection visits, and liaison with ministerial depart- 
ments and personnel in Abidjan). 

According to enabling legislation passed in 1961 , the prefectures 
were to be decentralized, autonomous units competent to deal with 
local issues. Governing the prefecture was to be a general council 
whose members, representing local interests, were to be elected by 
slates for five-year terms by universal suffrage within the prefec- 
ture. The general council was to pass a budget and act on local 
issues. Its decisions were then to be passed on to the prefect for 
execution. In reality, as of 1988 the central government in Abi- 
djan had not passed the enabling measures establishing the general 
councils; hence, the prefectures were exclusively administrative 
structures. 

Every prefecture was segmented into subprefectures, each headed 
by a subprefect (sous-prefet) . Subprefectures were the lowest adminis- 
trative unit of government and the unit with which most people 
interacted. Unlike the prefectures, the subprefectures had neither 
autonomy nor deliberative responsibilities; their function was purely 
administrative. The subprefects acted under the delegated authority 
of the prefects but also had other responsibilities. First and fore- 
most, the subprefect was responsible for maintaining public order 
and could, in emergencies, request aid from the prefect or the armed 
forces. The subprefect also submitted a public works and civil action 
program as well as a budget to the prefect. As an officer of the 
state, the subprefect supervised the census and elections within the 
subprefecture and officiated at civil ceremonies. He also monitored, 
albeit loosely, the behavior of chiefs of villages and cantons (see 
Glossary) within the boundaries of the subprefecture and repre- 
sented the authority of the central government to local populations. 
Finally, the subprefect elicited from notables living within the sub- 
prefecture a list of grievances or suggestions that was passed on 
to the prefect. 



154 



Government and Politics 



Administration at the subprefecture level included a secretariat 
consisting of the various administrative services and divisions in 
the subprefecture. Assisting the subprefect was the Subprefectural 
Council, which replaced the council of notables, an artifact of the 
colonial era. This council was composed of the subprefect, the heads 
of public services represented in the subprefecture, local party offi- 
cials, and twelve to sixteen private citizens, all residing in the sub- 
prefecture and known for their active participation in affairs 
pertaining to politics, commerce, and social change. The councils 
met twice yearly in open sessions under the direction of the sub- 
prefect. The council's responsibilities were solely consultative. At 
the first meeting of the year, the subprefect was obligated to present 
to the council the budget and accounts of the past year. By law 
the council had to be consulted on expenditures allocated to the 
subprefecture by the government or collected in the form of mar- 
ket, parking, or other fees. The council also submitted a program 
of public works or other public projects of local interest to be 
financed with the allocated funds. 

The council had no decision-making authority and no direct po- 
litical role. However, its opinions carried some weight. The citizen- 
members represented wealth and influence that often transcended 
the physical boundaries of the subprefecture. These citizens often 
understood the needs and customs of the local community better 
than the subprefect, who in most instances was not from the region. 

Modern and traditional governance merged at the level of vil- 
lage and canton. Using criteria based on traditions, villages selected 
their own leaders, who were subsequently proposed to and formally 
invested by the prefect. The ceremony granted formal legitimacy 
to the village leader while at the same time confirming his status 
as subordinate to the subprefect. In the formal bureaucratic sec- 
tor, village chiefs served simply as conduits between the subprefect 
and the villagers. Informally, village chiefs filled a multitude of 
roles, many of which paralleled the obligations and responsibili- 
ties of the modern bureaucratic administration. Under the colo- 
nial regime, groups of villages linked by common ethnicity and 
encompassing a relatively large area were designated a canton; this 
designation continued into the modern period. Canton chiefs, whose 
authority was also rooted in tradition, were selected according to 
traditional norms and formally appointed by the minister of in- 
terior. Because their responsibilities in the formal sector were never 
resolved, the canton chiefs remained largely symbolic figures. 

By the 1980s, thirty- seven cities had been designated autono- 
mous communities {communes en plein exercice), a legal status that dates 
from 1884 and applied originally to the Senegalese cities of Saint 



155 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Louis and Dakar. Governing structures in autonomous commu- 
nities included a municipal council and a mayor. A council would 
be composed of eleven to thirty-seven members, depending on the 
population of the city. All were elected by universal suffrage and, 
until 1980, as part of a slate. In the 1985 elections, council mem- 
bers ran independentiy. The legal status of the municipal councils 
was ambiguous. According to law, they enjoyed broad powers which 
were to be exercised independently of the granting authority in 
Abidjan. For example, the enabling legislation of 1955 instructed 
the councils, through their deliberative processes, to "direct the 
affairs of the community," which included voting on budgets. In 
fact, most of the decisions taken by councils first had to be approved 
by the minister of interior, who could veto them. Moreover, the 
Council of Ministers could dissolve an excessively independent 
municipal council by a simple decree. Consequently, the council 
members routinely accepted guidelines proposed by authorities in 
Abidjan. 

The councils also elected mayors, whose functions were identi- 
cal to those of subprefects. Like the municipal councils, mayors 
routinely submitted to the authority of the minister of interior. 

In practice, municipal administration was not an outgrowth of 
a preexisting social and political institution. The label "autono- 
mous communities" was, instead, the creation of a state bureau- 
cracy that was not inclined toward sharing power. Consequently, 
from 1956 until the late 1970s, councils shrank in size and impor- 
tance as council members died. For example, the Abidjan coun- 
cil, which at one point consisted of thirty- seven members, had only 
seventeen in 1974. As the central government loosened its grip on 
politics prior to the 1985 elections, potential candidates saw the 
position of municipal council member as a first step toward higher 
political office, and interest in the institution grew. In the 1985 
election, more than 840 candidates ran for 235 places on municipal 
councils. 

Actual Power 
The Party 

The trappings of political power were concentrated in a single 
party, the PDCI, to which all adult citizens were required to be- 
long. The principal goal of the party was stability, and compared 
with parties in other sub-Saharan states, it had achieved its objec- 
tive. By and large, political conflict took place within constitutional 
bounds. To continue that tradition in the 1980s, the government 
expanded political participation and discouraged political — and 



156 



Government and Politics 



especially ideological — competition. The party embraced what it 
defined as centrist policies, and although Ivoirian citizens did not 
enjoy democratic freedoms in the Western tradition, foreign ob- 
servers considered Ivoirian society among the freest in Africa. 

Party membership was synonymous with citizenship. At its in- 
ception and during the late stages of colonial rule, the party was 
a broad coalition, less nationalist than nativist, and calling itself 
populist, consultative, and representative. At that time, the PDCI 
enjoyed considerable grass-roots support, especially on issues per- 
taining to forced labor and the indigenat (see Glossary; Colonial 
Administration, ch. 1). After independence, however, the party 
came under increasingly tight presidential control. Instead of 
political mobilization, the government demanded of the citizenry 
what Philippe Yace called i 'active acquiescence." The party leaders 
closest to the president, almost all of whom had been plantation 
owners, wielded great power in their home (ethnic) constituencies, 
where they were able to influence the distribution of patronage in 
the form of public and party offices, contracts, public works, and 
other benefits. This enabled them to increase their own wealth and 
further secure their positions in the political system. Over time, 
patronage supplanted political organization, and many local PDCI 
committees in rural areas withered. 

In the 1980s, with the anticolonialist struggles long over and the 
era of Houphouet-Boigny and his fellow political militants wan- 
ing, the party continued to lose its vitality. The party's dated preoc- 
cupation with unity deflected attention from the pressing issues in 
Cote dT voire. Economic development demanded greater techno- 
logical sophistication and gave rise to conflicts pitting cities against 
the rural periphery and young against old. Incrementally, tech- 
nocrats and developmentalists with modern Western values replaced 
party militants in the government bureaucracy. The new elite did 
not challenge the militants, who continued to dole out party offices, 
nor did they insist that the government become more democratic 
or less authoritarian. The new elite simply had different concerns: 
government rather than the party and bureaucratic rationality 
rather than party mobilization. 

Without the infusion of competing ideas, the party atrophied as 
a creative political force. To be sure, the governing elite remained 
members of the party; however, as the state became more com- 
plex and bureaucratized, the distinction between party and state 
blurred. The government and not the party assumed responsibil- 
ity for national integration. By the late 1980s, the party served 
primarily as a sinecure for old party stalwarts, and the PDCI 
administration became a vehicle for self- advancement and the 



157 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

protection of narrow interests. That situation was not entirely true 
in the case of party activities at village levels where, reversing an 
earlier trend, the position of party secretary (the local party 
representative) became an openly contested electoral office. Increas- 
ingly, political neophytes viewed the office as an initial step to higher 
office, and so they invested resources in campaigns and tried to 
fulfill their campaign obligations. 

Party Organization 

In the late 1980s, power lay in the Political Bureau and Com- 
mittee Directorate. Like the National Assembly, both were ex- 
panded in the mid-1980s in an attempt to broaden the PDCI's 
representation among educated people between the ages of thirty- 
five and forty-five. The Political Bureau was expanded from 35 
to 58 members, and the Committee Directorate grew from 100 to 
208. 

The members of the Political Bureau included the cabinet 
ministers, plus other members of the political, military, and busi- 
ness elite. Heading the Political Bureau was a thirteen-member 
Executive Committee, which in 1980 replaced the party secretary 
general at the apex of the party. (The transition from a single leader 
to a committee in fact appeared to constitute a calculated rebuff 
to Philippe Yace, who was PDCI secretary general at the time.) 
By the mid-1980s, the Executive Committee was composed exclu- 
sively of younger cabinet ministers, thereby excluding many long- 
time political allies of the president. 

Major policy decisions affecting the party and state originated 
in the Political Bureau. (The Political Bureau would probably be 
responsible for nominating a successor should the president, as 
seemed to be the case in 1988, decline to do so prior to leaving 
office.) Political divisions and alliances within the Political Bureau 
thus assumed great importance. The most apparent division was 
a generational one pitting old party stalwarts such as Mathieu Ekra, 
Auguste Denise, Camille Alliali, and Philippe Yace against ambi- 
tious young technocrats such as Henri Konan Bedie, Jean Jacques 
Bechio, Balla Keita, and Alphonse Djedje Mady. Within the sec- 
ond group were equally significant divisions between the aforemen- 
tioned Young Turks and other well-educated specialists such as 
Laurent Dona Fologo and Donwahi Charles, who were known as 
team players. 

The Committee Directorate represented a further attempt to 
incorporate — some would say co-opt — larger segments of the popu- 
lation, especially potential foci of opposition, into the political 
process. Another purpose of the directorate was to invigorate the 



158 




President Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
Courtesy Embassy of Cote d'lvoire, Washington 



159 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



party by expanding its representation. Accordingly, the Commit- 
tee Directorate included members of the judicial, executive, and 
legislative branches of the government, current and former mili- 
tary officers, leaders of government-backed unions, women, busi- 
ness leaders, and members of the professions, including university 
professors. It functioned by advising the president through a ser- 
ies of ad hoc committees addressing particular issues. 

In the smaller cities, towns, and villages, the party official with 
whom most Ivoirians dealt was the local secretary general. As their 
principal task, all secretaries general sold party membership cards, 
the revenues from which funded local political operations. In larger 
constituencies, the secretary general served as a spokesperson and 
propagandist for the government by placing the symbols and slo- 
gans of governance before the voting public. In rural constituen- 
cies, the local secretary general settled disputes generally involving 
land tenure and land use. 

Orientation Toward the Political System 

Starting with independence, the Ivoirian polity experienced an 
unusual reorientation of political and moral values not found else- 
where in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Strong economic growth (at 
least through the mid-1970s) and relatively high rates of urbani- 
zation and literacy, in combination with a pervasive media, have 
exposed the polity to Western cultural values and the politics of 
consumption. In few other countries was materialism as open and 
avowed an ideology as in Cote d'lvoire. Consequently, the salient 
divisions in the Ivoirian polity were economic rather than ethnic 
or religious. Stratification by class was congruent with the fun- 
damental difference between rulers and ruled. In many instances, 
class differences also coincided with ethnic divisions, which tended 
to exaggerate the importance of ethnicity while permitting some 
observers to diminish the importance of class membership. This 
was no new phenomenon — the same stratification characterized 
most precolonial societies in Cote d'lvoire. Nevertheless, the ex- 
panded opportunities for material consumption and the manifest 
extremes of wealth and poverty that subsequently emerged were 
new. Members of the elite translated the struggle for independence 
into a quest for privilege. They insisted that the interests of all Ivoiri- 
ans were in harmony, a supposition that allowed them to rationa- 
lize the use of public policy on their behalf. For their part, the 
have-nots not only envied the elite for its material attainments but 
also knew how the elite, using the political system, attained them. 
So while rich and poor — the rulers and the ruled — nurtured vastly 



160 



Government and Politics 



different expectations of the political system, they shared a clear 
understanding of its ultimate purpose. 

Historically, the political elite included the wealthiest 10 percent 
of the plantation owners. By the late 1980s, however, with the bu- 
reaucratization of the state, the nature of the elite had changed 
markedly. Most often its members were high-level bureaucrats and 
party officials. Simultaneously, and as a direct consequence of their 
political connections, many held directorships in locally based cor- 
porations or were minority shareholders in multinational corpo- 
rations. Characteristically, the businesses in which members of the 
elite invested required relatively small investments in comparison 
with anticipated returns. That situation was especially common 
in real estate, where investors typically sought a full return on in- 
vestment within three years. Another industry favored by the elite 
was transportation. Finally, some members of the elite invested 
in agriculture, exporting bananas and pineapples, the prices of 
which, unlike the prices of coffee and cocoa, were not regulated 
by the government. 

Significantly, the elite was not a true entrepreneurial class; that 
is, its members, with few exceptions, did not save and invest capi- 
tal. Rather, they created a favorable environment for schemes in- 
itiated by foreigners and subsequently mediated (for a fee) among 
bureaucracy, business, and politicians. Instead of investing, the 
elite consumed. Its members sent their offspring to France for at 
least part of their education. They became accustomed to import- 
ed food, clothing, and high-technology consumer goods. Perhaps 
most important, the elite nurtured — and in turn sought — legitimacy 
in an ethos that openly elevated materialism to the level of politi- 
cal and moral ideology. According to one observer, the elite be- 
came, in effect, a class that could not afford to lose power. 

To sustain its position of privilege, the elite formulated a politi- 
cal strategy based on limited participation and the politics of co- 
optation to vent the pressures linked to rapid change. Thus, with 
independence the government banned any opposition political par- 
ties or voices, incorporated nearly all unions into the party, and 
handpicked National Assembly candidates who then ran on a slate 
presented to voters who either cast a "yea" ballot or did not vote. 
Even after the government permitted contested elections for the 
assembly, the party, acting as surrogate for the government, passed 
on the acceptability of all candidates. Similarly, the indigenous pri- 
vate sector was unable to compete with the vast resources that the 
elite-dominated public sector could marshall and effectively was 
excluded from participating in economic transformation. 



161 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Appreciative of the importance of political stability, the govern- 
ment ostensibly compromised by permitting small changes for the 
sake of order. Nevertheless, none of the demands for change, which 
in the past may have included pay raises, better working condi- 
tions, scholarship aid, or improved relations between groups, re- 
quired a substantial change in governing institutions or procedures, 
and they were generally co-opted by Houphouet-Boigny's expres- 
sions of concern and the appointment of a commission to study 
the problem. Finally, the government bought compliance from its 
more articulate and therefore more serious critics by offering them 
resources such as land, licenses, forestry rights, or positions in the 
party and government. 

Counterpoised to the modern elite were the peasantry, students, 
middle- and lower-level civil servants, and a growing urban under- 
class. Because of explicit public policy decisions, few members of 
that group benefited directiy from Cote d'lvoire 's vaunted economic 
growth. This group was no less politicized than the elite, but it 
lacked avenues of expression. Accordingly, this underclass re- 
sponded to restrictions either by refusing to participate in the po- 
litical process or by challenging public policy. Nonparticipation was 
generally a rural phenomenon, and in some areas less than 40 per- 
cent of eligible voters cast ballots in the 1985 elections, in which 
Houphouet-Boigny boasted of having received more than 99 per- 
cent of the vote. Challenges to public policy took the form of riots 
against unemployment, student protests, and demonstrations 
against high prices, shrinking subsidies, land confiscation, foreign- 
ers, and high taxes (see Internal Dissent and Further Consolida- 
tion of Power, ch. 1; Internal Security, ch. 5). The government 
customarily responded to conflict with force followed by a demand 
for loyalty to the ruling regime. Groups demonstrating their polit- 
ical support received benefits in the form of clinics, schools, in- 
vestment in infrastructure, markets, and other public facilities. 
Conversely, those withholding support were simply denied any 
resources for economic development. 

Interest Groups and National Politics 
Political Issues 

The party- government in the mid-1980s most closely resembled 
an old-fashioned political machine. Although it called itself a one- 
party democracy, Cote d'lvoire was not a political democracy in 
the Western sense. There was no institutionalized opposition, 
although by the 1980s National Assembly elections were being 
contested. As under the French, civil liberties remained limited. 



162 



Government and Politics 



Although Cote d'lvoire appeared to be a country of laws, those 
laws were tailored to suit a set of rulers who could easily alter the 
laws at their discretion. 

By the end of the 1980s, the Ivoirian political system was facing 
serious problems. Because the structure, form, tone, and policies 
of the government were the personal creations of the president, 
who was said to be in his late eighties, the succession question had 
substantial implications. Moreover, no candidate enjoyed the cha- 
risma or stature of Houphouet-Boigny. In 1988 rivals seeking to 
succeed Houphouet-Boigny barely maintained any pretense of 
unity. No plausible candidate — with the possible exception of 
Yace — had the experience or preparation necessary to assume the 
office. 

By the late 1980s, two decades of rapid economic growth fol- 
lowed by serious economic setbacks had transformed social mores 
and altered civil society. Students and teachers were protesting the 
continuing control of government by a small number of party lead- 
ers for the benefit of a privileged class of landowners and 
bureaucrats. Corruption in the business community was becom- 
ing embarrassingly obvious, particularly among textile importers. 
Uncontrolled urbanization had weakened family ties and had 
prompted sharp increases in unemployment, underemployment, 
drug use, and violent crime, (see Crime and Punishment, ch. 5). 
On a different plane, economic austerity had abruptly curtailed 
the rising expectations of the middle class and pitted ethnic groups 
against one another in the competition for scarce resources. 

Economic austerity also exacerbated tensions between Ivoirians 
and resident foreign nationals. Students and members of the po- 
litical elite expressed resentment over the continuing presence of 
French nationals in important government positions. Ivoirian wage 
laborers resented competition from immigrants from Cote d'lvoire's 
poorer neighbors. Dramatic increases in violent crime were at- 
tributed to Ghanaians and business corruption to the Lebanese. 

Perhaps more important, the governing institutions created by 
Houphouet-Boigny to mediate conflict were weak and unrespon- 
sive. That was especially true of the state-owned media, which care- 
fully managed information by releasing only what it deemed 
harmless. Consequentiy, rumors often passed for news on the streets 
of Abidjan. 

Single-Party Democracy 

Since independence, Ivoirian leaders had insisted that the PDCI 
have no opposition, although Article 7 of the Ivoirian Constitu- 
tion specifically guarantees freedom of expression to "parties and 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



political groups" as long as they respect the principles of "demo- 
cracy and national sovereignty." At one time, some political lead- 
ers had argued for a legal — but constrained — opposition to generate 
enthusiasm for elections and to vent political pressures that might 
otherwise threaten the position of the governing elite. A recognized 
opposition, it was argued, would also provide Cote d'lvoire with 
some of the forms — as opposed to the pretenses already in place — of 
democracy. However, the ruling elite and even some dissidents con- 
tinued to believe that a single-party system was best for a develop- 
ing country like Cote d'lvoire, where class and regional cleavages 
threatened unity. 

Houphouet-Boigny himself had always considered forging a na- 
tional constituency out of Cote d'lvoire's more than sixty ethnic 
groups to be his greatest responsibility if his economic agenda was 
to be achieved. If unchecked, he said, rivalry among ethnic groups 
or geographical regions would erode nationalism and dissipate valu- 
able resources that would be better spent on economic develop- 
ment. Left unstated was the concern that this rivalry also would 
threaten the ruling elite's control over crucial aspects of political 
life. National unity therefore came to mean party unity. There was 
room for opposition, Houphouet-Boigny insisted, but only within 
the party. Thus, in the early years of independence Houphouet- 
Boigny promulgated laws that severely sanctioned individuals who 
published, disseminated, divulged, or reproduced false news or 
documents that, in good or bad faith, "undermined" the morale 
of the population, discredited political institutions, or led others 
to disobey laws. With virtually all avenues for criticism closed, plati- 
tudes replaced political debate. 

Although generally successful at co-opting political foes, 
Houphouet-Boigny was not averse to bullying his opponents when 
he felt they threatened stability. He stated on several occasions that 
if forced to choose between disorder and injustice, he would not 
hesitate to choose injustice. He added that "When there is disorder, 
the lives of people and a regime are at stake, but an injustice can 
always be corrected." Nonetheless, he resorted to force only rare- 
ly (see Consolidation of Power, ch. 1). Cote d'lvoire had no preven- 
tive detention laws and, by its own definition, no political prisoners, 
although the army, under instructions from Houphouet-Boigny, 
commonly conscripted political foes into the military for what he 
called "judicious training." 

Succession 

By early 1988, Houphouet-Boigny had given no indication of 
when he might resign. However, there were increasingly clear signs 



164 



Government and Politics 



that his control, like his health, was slipping. To avoid the kind 
of damaging and embarrassing circumstances that surrounded the 
political demise of Tunisian leader Habib Bourguiba, who in 1987 
was declared unfit to govern, senior members of the PDCI pressed 
Houphouet-Boigny to step down. In early 1988, observers reported 
that Houphouet-Boigny might heed their advice to retire by year's 
end, although he intended to remain as head of the PDCI. Presuma- 
bly, he would then be able to lend his authority to his successor 
and thereby prevent an acrimonious struggle among potential con- 
tenders in the presidential election that, according to the Consti- 
tution, would shortly follow. 

Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution, amended on October 12, 
1985, states that if the office of the presidency is vacated by death, 
resignation, or incapacitation as attested by the Supreme Court, 
the functions of the president shall be performed on a provisional 
basis by the president of the National Assembly. After at least forty- 
five but no more than sixty days, elections will determine the new 
leader, who may also have been the provisional president. As presi- 
dent of the Assembly, Henri Konan Bedie appeared to have an 
advantage over his potential rivals, including Yace. At the same 
time, Yace appeared to have a larger following in the PDCI Polit- 
ical Bureau, where the ultimate decision would be made if there 
was to be a single, unanimous choice by the party. Much of Yace' s 
popularity derived from his years of faithful service to state and 
party. As younger Ivoirians replaced older party stalwarts in the 
government and party, Yace's support would diminish and that 
of Bedie, his chief rival, would grow. 

By mid- 1988 Houphouet-Boigny had avoided naming or even 
suggesting a successor, reportedly believing that were he to do so, 
party loyalty would split between the heir apparent and other can- 
didates, his own power would shrink, and the successor he selected 
would immediately become the target of political criticism. Con- 
sequently, the president allowed the political process to take its 
course, which led to a standoff between Bedie and Yace, the two 
leading candidates. Houphouet-Boigny 's decision to allow politics 
to determine the choice also demonstrated his belief that the Ivoirian 
polity was sufficiently mature to pursue its own interests without 
recklessly endangering the system. 

Meanwhile, the succession debate continued. Many Ivoirians 
stressed the importance of choosing a member of a minority eth- 
nic group as a compromise acceptable to the Baoule, Bete, Krou, 
Senoufo, and Mande groups (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, 
ch. 2). Others stressed the importance of choosing an elder states- 
man, thus avoiding a possible crisis of confidence should a younger, 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



less experienced leader be named. Still others insisted that choos- 
ing a young, educated technocrat was the only way to resolve the 
country's daunting economic and social problems. 

Equity Issues and Ethnic Tensions 

Houphouet-Boigny inherited the political apparatus of the nation- 
state but by 1988 had not yet forged bonds uniting citizens of diverse 
ethnicity to one another or to their leaders. Houphouet-Boigny had 
dealt with ethnic conflict by denouncing ethnocentrism as a legiti- 
mate issue and by the time-tested strategy of co-opting the leader- 
ship of potentially dissident ethnic groups by incorporating them 
in the party or governmental bureaucracy. Thus, for example, from 
the mid-1970s the Senoufo in the north were overrepresented in 
the army, and southern peoples were overrepresented in the police 
and National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale). Meanwhile, 
Houphouet-Boigny invariably appointed as his minister of defense 
a member of the Baoule, who were also overrepresented in the Na- 
tional Security Police (Surete Nationale), and appointed a Bete chief 
of staff of the army. 

Ivoirianization 

From time to time, the replacement of French workers with Ivoiri- 
ans became a political issue. Popular resentment of the French 
presence, particularly as the competence of Ivoirians increased, 
emerged periodically in the form of student strikes and anonymous 
political tracts. Especially irksome to many Ivoirians were the highly 
paid French counterparts to Ivoirian cabinet ministers; however, 
in the late 1980s most of the approximately 30,000 French work- 
ers were in the private sector, where they held the majority of all 
jobs requiring postsecondary education. Some also worked in 
middle-level white-collar and blue-collar jobs. There were, for ex- 
ample, French citizens working at tasks for which their qualifica- 
tions in no way distinguished them from Ivoirian employees but 
who nonetheless received substantially higher salaries. Through- 
out the country, there were French mechanics, foremen, planta- 
tion owners, storekeepers, clerical workers, and supervisors. French 
women filled many of the top secretarial positions and thus became 
special targets of nationalist resentment (see The French, this ch.). 

Most controversial in the 1980s was Houphouet-Boigny 's ap- 
pointment of Antoine Cesareo to head a newly created superagency 
to control government waste. Cesareo was a French national with 
a reputation as an incorruptible and efficient public servant. The 
Public Works Authority (Direction et Controle des Grands Trav- 
aux — DCGTX), which Cesareo headed under the direct control 



166 



The Abidjan skyline 
Courtesy Eszti Votaw 



of Houphouet-Boigny, supervised virtually all government contracts 
and construction projects. By 1987 Cesareo claimed that he had 
overseen some US$3.3 billion in contracts and, by avoiding de- 
lays and overruns, had saved the Ivoirian government US$2.6 bil- 
lion. However, he also irritated many within the Ivoirian political 
establishment, one of whom anonymously pointed out that Cote 
d'lvoire was the only country in Africa to accord a foreigner a 
stranglehold over local finances. 

Government Responses 

As serious as these challenges appeared, processes were in place 
to lessen their impact. For example, the political system loosened 
perceptibly as opponents of Houphouet-Boigny were co-opted and 
as the ruling elite's interests in the status quo became more deeply 
entrenched. By the late 1980s, there were mechanisms — if only 
rudimentary — for publicly registering disagreement. In 1980, for 
the first time, Houphouet-Boigny permitted open elections to the 
National Assembly. Voters promptly replaced sixty- three of the 
ninety incumbents seeking reelection. In 1985 open elections were 
expanded to include local party and municipal offices as well as 
assembly seats. (That time, voters rejected 90 of 117 candidates 
seeking reelection to the National Assembly.) Other avenues for 
expressing dissent also opened. In 1987 the state began broadcasting 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



two controversial and popular shows: one featured political debate, 
albeit over carefully limited questions; and the other, political sa- 
tire. Observers construed those measures as part of a continuing 
if cautious process leading to a more mature, democratic political 
culture. Moreover, the government appeared at least to have the 
support of important opinion makers. In contrast to the popula- 
tions of all of its West African neighbors who, in a mid-1970s poll 
taken of its readers by Jeune Afrique, preferred an ambiguous so- 
cialism for their economic future, almost 50 percent of the maga- 
zine's Ivoirian readers — who were probably on the left of the 
political spectrum — favored an equally ambiguous capitalism. 

Interest Groups 

Labor 

In the 1980s, approximately 100,000 full-time workers in the 
regulated sectors belonged to trade unions. Union membership was 
highest among white-collar workers, professionals, civil servants, 
and teachers. All unions except the National Union of Secondary 
School Teachers of Cote d'lvoire (Syndicat National des Enseig- 
nants du Secondaire de Cote d'lvoire — SYNESCI) were part of a 
government-controlled federation, the General Federation of Ivoir- 
ian Workers (Union Generale des Travailleurs de Cote d'lvoire — 
UGTCI), which counted approximately 190 affiliates. Its sec- 
retary general from its founding until 1984 was Joseph Coffie, 
a veteran of the PDCI and trusted companion of President 
Houphouet-Boigny. In 1988 the secretary general was Hyacinthe 
Adiko Niamkey. 

From its inception, the UGTCI saw itself as a participant in de- 
velopment rather than a combatant on behalf of labor. In that role, 
the UGTCI supported government efforts to promote unity and 
development, justifying its stance as helping to continue the struggle 
for independence. The UGTCI did not object to the state's de- 
velopment policies, and its leaders participated in government policy 
debates, thereby becoming, in effect, instruments of economic de- 
velopment. 

Not surprisingly, the UGTCI exercised little political or economic 
clout. Strikes were legal, but principals first had to complete a 
lengthy process of negotiation, during which any work stoppage 
was illegal. Moreover, demands on its members by UGTCI leader- 
ship seeking more efficient production counted more than workers' 
complaints. At the same time, the UGTCI exercised a modicum 
of autonomy in protests over wages and the pace of Ivoirianization. 
In response, the guaranteed urban minimum wage had been raised 



168 



Government and Politics 



several times since the mid-1970s. However, wages were not keep- 
ing pace with inflation. 

Wildcat strikes or other unsanctioned job actions were not much 
more productive. In dealing with job actions, the government first 
exploited the media to gain sympathy for its position and then con- 
fronted strike leaders with overwhelming force. Usually the govern- 
ment softened its position by rehiring most of the workers previously 
dismissed and by compromising on peripheral matters. Underlying 
problems remained unresolved or were settled in accordance with 
government intentions. In 1985, after 16,892 parastatal workers, 
many of whom were highly paid professionals, staged a job action 
to protest deep wage cuts, the government threatened to fire all 
workers who refused to honor the government's deadline and to 
replace them with unemployed university graduates. Eventually 
the government fired 342 holdouts. At other times, the govern- 
ment dissolved the refractory union, thus depriving any strike of 
legitimacy and the union of any recourse. 

Military 

The Ivoirian armed forces consisted of three services, all small 
and lightly equipped (see Constitutional, Legal, and Administra- 
tive Structure, ch. 5). With the exception of military training exer- 
cises and a small, regional revolt in 1970, as of mid- 1988 the military 
had remained in its barracks. It played no role in domestic peace- 
keeping, in the drive for modernization, or in mobilizing the popu- 
lation. Unlike its counterpart in neighboring states, the Ivoirian 
officer corps viewed itself as a distinct profession under civilian con- 
trol. The presence of a French battalion based near Port Bouet rein- 
forced the importance of maintaining professional norms of service. 
Moreover, Houphouet-Boigny kept military salaries attractive and 
named officers to high positions in the PDCI, in effect assimilat- 
ing the military elite. Greater contact between the civilian elite 
and military officers led to social integration and completed the 
co-optation of the military. With a solid stake in the "Ivoirian mira- 
cle," the senior officer corps had little interest in altering the sta- 
tus quo. With the passage of time, psychological inertia further 
institutionalized civilian control, and the civil bureaucracy gained 
experience, expertise, and confidence. 

Many events had the potential to precipitate future military 
intervention in domestic politics. These would include a stalemate 
in the Political Bureau of the PDCI over a successor to Houphouet- 
Boigny, the emergence of an incompetent administration, extreme 
economic austerity coupled with a declining franc, and widespread 



169 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

unrest led or supported by students, unions, or the urban unem- 
ployed. As an institution with an untainted past, the military could, 
in any of these cases, be called upon to lead a movement promis- 
ing a return to stability and greater access to economic resources 
for less favored groups. Nevertheless, given the broadening base 
of the party, the politics of co-optation, the as yet inchoate class 
struggle, and the division of peacekeeping responsibility among the 
Surete Nationale and the armed forces, most observers agreed that 
government control over the military would probably continue. 

The French 

Cote d'lvoire's ties to France had grown stronger since indepen- 
dence in 1960. Although the number of French advisers continued 
to shrink, between 1960 and 1980 the total French population in 
Cote d'lvoire nearly doubled, from about 30,000 to close to 60,000, 
forming the largest French expatriate community. By 1988, as Cote 
d'lvoire's economy continued to contract, about half of the French 
either returned to France or moved elsewhere in Africa. In the 
mid-1980s, four out of five resident French had lived in Cote 
d'lvoire for more than five years. French citizens filled technical 
and advisory positions in the government, albeit in diminishing 
numbers, but were also evident throughout the private sector. Until 
1985 Cote d'lvoire also had the highest number of teaching and 
nonteaching French cooperants (see Glossary) in Africa, the highest 
number of students in French universities, the highest number of 
French multinationals in all of Africa, the largest percentage of 
French imports and exports in Africa, the highest number of non- 
routine French diplomatic visitors of all African countries, and, 
with Senegal, was the recipient of the largest French aid package 
in Africa. Cote d'lvoire also hosted the highest average number 
of visits by the French head of state per year. 

On a formal level, a series of agreements and treaties have en- 
sured the continuation and extension of French influence in diplo- 
matic, military, legal, commercial, monetary, political, and cultural 
affairs, although most of these agreements were modified over the 
years to accommodate the sensitivities and growing political sophisti- 
cation of Ivoirians. Perhaps most significant for the future were 
joint defense treaties and the permanent basing of the French ma- 
rine battalion at Port Bouet. Although it had never interceded in 
Ivoirian politics, the battalion's presence provided an implicit warn- 
ing against political or military action that might create instability 
and jeopardize French interests. The colonial heritage and con- 
temporary realities suggested that France would remain Cote 



170 



Government and Politics 



d'lvoire's principal commercial partner, albeit in increasing com- 
petition with other states. 

The Levantine Community 

In the late 1980s, reportedly 60,000 to 120,000 Lebanese and 
Syrians lived in Cote d'lvoire, although some observers gave a 
figure as high as 300,000. Many descended from families that had 
been established in Cote d'lvoire for more than a century. Along 
with the French, they were the most easily identifiable foreign 
group. They generally resided in enclaves, married within their 
community, and resisted integration. At the same time, many held 
Ivoirian citizenship. Although they were concentrated in Abidjan, 
there was a Lebanese or Syrian family or two in virtually every 
community of more than 5,000 people. Some members of the 
Levantine community were Christian; of the Muslims, most were 
Shia. Significantly, the waves of Lebanese emigres who arrived 
in Cote d'lvoire after the Lebanese civil war began in 1975 brought 
with them the same political beliefs that divided groups in Leba- 
non. As of the mid-1980s, violence among Lebanese had not erupted 
in Cote d'lvoire; nevertheless, the government considered sectar- 
ian violence a distinct possibility. 

The Arab community was known for its entrepreneurial skills 
and had long played a leading role in certain intermediate sectors 
of the economy, especially commerce. The Arabs dominated in 
areas such as textiles, shoes, petroleum distribution, and coffee and 
cocoa brokering. The Lebanese had also invested heavily in urban 
real estate and were among the first to develop hotels and restau- 
rants in previously less accessible areas of the interior. For the most 
part, Houphouet-Boigny ardently defended the presence of the 
Lebanese community, citing its contributions to the Ivoirian econ- 
omy. The Lebanese community, in turn, sought to assure the 
Ivoirian leadership of its loyalty and its commitment to national 
goals by public declarations and by charitable contributions in sup- 
port of cultural and sporting events. 

The jump in the Levantine population since 1975, coupled with 
its growing domination of commerce, made it a target of increas- 
ing protest. In the mid-1980s, Houphouet-Boigny began issuing 
warnings to merchants — unmistakably Lebanese — who were al- 
legedly guilty of customs fraud and monopolistic practices. Thus, 
the unconditional welcome that the Lebanese community had en- 
joyed appeared to be wearing out. 

Students and Intellectuals 

Student radicalism has had a long history in francophone Africa. 
It originated in post-World War II France, where most students 



171 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

from the colonies studied. Students favored independence long be- 
fore Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI lobbied for it, and neither 
the president nor the party escaped student criticism. In 1988 stu- 
dents were generally concerned with scholarships, student aid, and 
housing, although they were also the most outspoken group in the 
nation on the issues of succession, Ivoirianization, and one-party 
democracy. 

The PDCI sought to control student dissent by co-optation or out- 
right repression. It placed the Movement of Primary and Second- 
ary School Students of Cote d'lvoire (Mouvement des Etudiants et 
Eleves de Cote d'lvoire — MEECI), the official student organization, 
under the umbrella of the PDCI, and, when necessary, the govern- 
ment impressed student leaders into the army. Typically, however, 
the government followed repression with clemency, and then sought 
to co-opt student leaders. In 1988 no fewer than four former MEECI 
presidents were members of the PDCI Executive Committee. 

In the 1980s, Laurent Gbagbo gained recognition as the intellec- 
tual leader of an incipient movement seeking a more open politi- 
cal system. A historian living in exile, Gbagbo was Cote d T voire 's 
best known opposition figure. In two books, which were banned 
in Cote d'lvoire, Gbagbo attacked the PDCI regime as conspira- 
torial, opportunistic, and corrupt. He was involved in disturbances 
at the National University of Cote d'lvoire (formerly the Univer- 
sity of Abidjan) in 1982, after which he fled to Paris. There he 
founded an opposition party, the Ivoirian People's Front (Front 
Populaire Ivoirien — FPI), which called for a multiparty democracy. 
Although the FPI had no formal membership, it gained a small 
following in Abidjan among students, intellectuals, civil servants, 
and some unions. 

Foreign Relations 

Houphouet-Boigny treated foreign policy as his personal domain. 
Following independence, his long-term foreign policy objective had 
been to enhance economic development and political stability in 
Cote d'lvoire. That objective was manifested in foreign policies 
that sought, first, to maintain an organic relationship with France, 
Cote d'lvoire's principal and most consistent donor and, second, 
to control the regional environment in order to guarantee access 
to cheap labor from Mali and Burkina Faso. 

Although Cote d'lvoire eschewed close links with the Soviet 
Union and its allies, Ivoirian policymakers were nominally disposed 
toward treating all foreign powers equally. One former minister 
of foreign affairs insisted that Cote d'lvoire was the foe of no ideol- 
ogy or any regime. Nevertheless, Cote d'lvoire had no diplomatic 



172 



Government and Politics 



ties with the Soviet Union from 1969, when relations with Moscow 
were severed, until February 1986. Only a month earlier, the cabi- 
net had approved a measure to reestablish ties with Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Albania, the German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). Relations with Romania and Poland had already been re- 
established several years earlier. 

Closer to its borders, Cote d'lvoire alternatively befriended or 
attempted to isolate the rulers of the five states that surrounded 
it: Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana. Recogniz- 
ing that "the oasis never encroaches upon the desert," Houphouet- 
Boigny sought to cultivate mutually beneficial ties with these five 
states, while allowing economic and political differences to persist. 
Military leaders in the neighboring states allowed their nationals 
to enter the Ivoirian labor pool, which eased a serious unemploy- 
ment problem in their respective countries. Through the Council 
of the Entente (Conseil de l'Entente), in which Cote d'lvoire is 
by far the dominant power and largest contributor, the Ivoirians 
aided Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Togo. Houphouet-Boigny 
also scored a diplomatic triumph in 1985 when he brokered a peace 
agreement ending the border conflict between Burkina Faso and 
Mali. Houphouet-Boigny also facilitated Guinea's return to the 
franc zone. 

Foreign Relations and the Council of the Entente 

The Council of the Entente was established on May 29, 1959, 
by the heads of state of Cote d'lvoire, Upper Volta (present-day 
Burkina Faso), Dahomey (present-day Benin), and Niger. (Togo 
became a member in 1966.) Ostensibly, the Council of the En- 
tente coordinated the regulations and statutes of member states 
governing finance, justice, labor, public service, health, and com- 
munications. The Council of the Entente also initiated steps toward 
forming a customs union, integrating development plans, and creat- 
ing a development fund, the Solidarity Fund (later known as the 
Loan Guaranty Fund). Each member state was to contribute 10 
percent of government revenues to the fund. Cote d'lvoire, the 
leader of the Council of the Entente and by far the wealthiest mem- 
ber state, was to receive only a small portion of the redistributed 
funds; other members were entitled to larger shares. In fact, by 
1988 Cote d'lvoire had never touched its share. 

The Council of the Entente helped Houphouet-Boigny achieve 
his long-term regional foreign policy objectives. First, by allying 
himself with three desperately poor countries that could be expected 
to maintain close ties with France for years to come, he built a 



173 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



broader base to counter Senegal's attempts to isolate Cote d'lvoire 
and reestablish some sort of federation of West African francophone 
states that would presumably be centered at Dakar. The demise 
of the Mali Federation in 1960 appeared to vindicate Houphouet- 
Boigny's strategy (see Reform and the French Community, ch. 1). 
He subsequently enlisted the Council of the Entente states to iso- 
late the government of Ghana, which had supported a massive anti- 
government protest in the Sanwi area of Cote d'lvoire and was 
linked to a plot to overthrow Niger's President Hamani Diori. After 
Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah was ousted in a 1966 coup, 
Houphouet-Boigny sought diplomatic support from the Council 
of the Entente states in his feud with President Ahmed Sekou Toure 
of Guinea. Sekou Toure routinely accused Houphouet-Boigny of 
harboring Guinean exiles; he also threatened to send troops across 
Cote d'lvoire to Ghana to restore Nkrumah, by then a refugee in 
Guinea, to power. 

By the mid-1980s, populist and nationalist sentiments surging 
within the Council of the Entente member states threatened Cote 
d'lvoire 's staid leadership of the alliance. Togo, which was sur- 
rounded by radical states, remained a staunch ally; however, 
Burkina Faso and Benin increasingly criticized Houphouet-Boigny 's 
conservativism and strengthened their ties with Libya and Ghana. 
As a result, the Council of the Entente's value as an instrument 
of Ivoirian foreign policy diminished. 

Relations with Ghana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali 

The tone of Ivoirian-Ghanaian relations had varied widely since 
independence. Cote d'lvoire regarded the government of Flight 
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who overthrew a civilian regime in 
1983, with a mixture of disdain, contempt, and wariness. Rela- 
tions with Ghana declined in the mid-1980s after Rawlings and 
Burkina Faso's leader Thomas Sankara appeared to ally themselves 
with Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi. In November 1987, 
Ghana condemned Cote d'lvoire for granting landing rights to 
South African military and commercial aircraft, championing the 
Zionist cause in Africa, undermining Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) resolutions, isolating Burkina Faso in West African coun- 
cils, and permitting Abidjan to become a haven for hostile South 
African, Israeli, and Western intelligence services. At the same time, 
the two states worked together harmoniously to end smuggling in 
both directions across their common border. 

Relations with Burkina Faso, a traditional source of agricultural 
labor, were historically cordial, but they degenerated sharply in 
the wake of the coup that brought Thomas Sankara to power in 



174 



Government and Politics 



August 1983. Sankara soon made common cause with the Raw- 
lings government in Ghana, further raising suspicions in Abidjan. 
Following Libyan deliveries of military equipment to Burkina Faso, 
Ivoirian authorities investigated alleged arms trafficking between 
Burkina Faso and Cote d'lvoire. 

Tensions between Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso increased 
sharply in early 1985 following the alleged mistreatment of Bur- 
kinabe immigrants in Cote d'lvoire and the assassination of a 
prominent Burkinabe businessman in Abidjan. In September 1985, 
hours before Sankara was to arrive in Cote d'lvoire for a Council 
of the Entente summit meeting, a bomb exploded in a hotel room 
he was to occupy. Sankara blamed forces in Cote d'lvoire, although 
no one claimed responsibility and no one was arrested. In defi- 
ance of other Council of the Entente members, Sankara refused 
to sign the summit communique, rejected the expansion of the En- 
tente charter to include security cooperation, indirecdy accused Cote 
d'lvoire and Togo of victimizing resident Burkinabe and shelter- 
ing opponents to his regime, and called for the creation of an inter- 
nationalist and populist "Revolutionary Entente Council." Two 
years later, in October 1987, Sankara was killed during a coup led 
by his second in command, Captain Blaise Compaore. Compaore 
immediately reassured Cote d'lvoire that he wanted warmer rela- 
tions and later pledged to strengthen ties with the Council of the 
Entente countries. For its part, Cote d'lvoire reaffirmed its "readi- 
ness to engage in trustworthy, brotherly, and lasting cooperation 
with this neighboring and brotherly country." 

Following Guinea's abrupt break with and estrangement from 
France in 1958, Sekou Toure adopted a socialist domestic policy, 
supported Nkrumah's pan- African ideology, and sought close re- 
lations with communist, socialist, and radical Third World states. 
Not unexpectedly, ties with Abidjan became strained. Following 
Sekou Toure 's death in 1984 and the advent of a moderate, re- 
formist military regime in Conakry, Ivoirian relations with Guinea 
improved considerably. 

Ivoirian relations with Mali and Liberia, although far from warm, 
were decidedly less confrontational than those with Guinea, Bur- 
kina Faso, and Ghana. Abidjan and Bamako maintained a rela- 
tively stable relationship that varied between cordial and correct, 
despite Mali's flirtations with Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Likewise, the peculiar conservatism of the Liberian regimes both 
before and after the April 1980 coup posed no inherent threat to 
Cote d'lvoire. However, the unexpected and shockingly bloody 
Liberian coup greatly alarmed Abidjan and prompted fears of a 
coup plot in Cote d'lvoire. 



175 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Relations with Other African States 

Cote d'lvoire maintained diplomatic relations with all the states 
of West Africa and nearly all francophone countries on the conti- 
nent. It supported — and was most strongly supported by — the most 
conservative of African francophone countries, such as Zaire, 
Gabon, and Niger. Nigeria, which had vast oil deposits and the 
largest population in Africa, presented a special challenge to Ivoirian 
leaders, who feared the radical Marxism and militant Islam that 
stirred different segments of the Nigerian polity. Consequentiy, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s Houphouet-Boigny adopted policies 
intended to weaken Nigeria. Cote d'lvoire supported Biafra in the 
Nigerian Civil War (1966-70), and in 1973, with its francophone 
neighbors, organized the Economic Community of West Africa 
(Communaute Economique de l'Afrique Occidentale — CEAO) to 
counter the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). 

Cote d'lvoire' s policy toward South Africa contrasted sharply 
with the antiapartheid stance common across the continent. In keep- 
ing with his antirevolutionary fervor, Houphouet-Boigny insisted 
that opening a dialogue with South Africa was far more effective 
than posturing and calls for sanctions. In 1970 he sponsored an 
exchange of visits at the ministerial level. Although trade with South 
Africa was officially banned in Cote d'lvoire, some South African 
produce was freely available in Ivoirian markets. In late 1987, Cote 
d'lvoire further distanced itself from its African counterparts by 
granting South African Airways landing rights for flights between 
Johannesburg and Europe. Again, Houphouet-Boigny justified the 
decision as a positive effort to pressure South Africa. 

Relations with France 

Time and again, the president has reminded fellow Ivoirians that 
their closest and best friend was France and that France made daily 
sacrifices for Cote d'lvoire by offering protected markets and mili- 
tary assistance. He insisted that France maintained troops near 
Abidjan as a favor to ensure Cote d T voire 's security without im- 
pinging on its larger development plans. 

A treaty of cooperation (the Franco-Ivoirian Technical Military 
Assistance Accord — Accord d'Assistance Militaire Technique) 
signed on April 24, 1961, outlined the salient aspects of Franco- 
Ivoirian ties. It provided for the exchange of ambassadors between 
the two countries, named the French ambassador to Abidjan the 
dean of the diplomatic corps, and reserved a "privileged position" 
among diplomats in Paris for the Ivoirian ambassador. The treaty 



176 



Government and Politics 



also called for regular consultations between the two countries on 
foreign policy matters. France agreed to protect and represent Ivoir- 
ian interests in any country or international organization where 
there was no Ivoirian representation. Additional cooperation 
agreements signed at the same time covered economic matters, edu- 
cation, civil aviation, judicial affairs, telecommunications, and tech- 
nical and military assistance. 

The French government agreed to continue providing aid to Cote 
dT voire for a period of five years, with a provision for five-year 
extensions. By encouraging such long-range commitments, the 
agreement enhanced French economic influence in Cote d'lvoire. 

Concomitantly, Houphouet-Boigny began implementing poli- 
cies that diverged albeit in several minor respects from French pol- 
icy. In 1972 he had Cote d'lvoire vote against admitting China 
to the United Nations, and until 1985, in contradistinction to 
France, he labeled China and the Soviet Union as threats to Africa. 
In the Middle East, Cote d'lvoire had been a staunch supporter 
of Israel since 1967, although during much of this time France regu- 
larly took positions more favorable to the Arabs. 

Houphouet-Boigny' s reliance on French private investment and 
government loans, coupled with his devotion to French culture, 
determined his stand on virtually every foreign policy issue. In the 
early 1960s, for example, he urged negotiations to resolve the 
Algerian Revolution and, unlike many of his African counterparts, 
refused to condemn France as the responsible party and refused 
to provide Algeria with any material assistance. Meanwhile, 
Houphouet-Boigny also supported French nuclear testing in the 
Sahara. Houphouet-Boigny also defended French military inter- 
vention in Africa. 

Relations with the United States 

Relations between Washington and Abidjan were cordial if less 
intimate than the ties with Paris. Through the mid-1980s, Cote 
d'lvoire was Africa's most loyal supporter of the United States in 
the United Nations General Assembly. It supported the larger 
United States agenda on Chad, the Western Sahara, southern 
Africa, and Israel. The government strongly approved of moves 
by the United States against Libyan head of state Qadhafi, espe- 
cially in light of rumors that Libyans in Burkina Faso were recruit- 
ing and training agents to infiltrate Cote d'lvoire. United States 
secretary of state George Shultz visited Abidjan in 1986 following 
Houphouet-Boigny' s visit to Washington in 1983. 

The United States continued to be Cote d T voire 's leading trad- 
ing partner after France. Foreign policymakers in Washington 



177 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



continued to point to Cote d'lvoire as an exemplar of successful 
capitalism, even as Cote d'lvoire's debt mounted out of control. 
While enjoying a favorable image in the United States, Houphouet- 
Boigny has indirectly criticized the United States by attacking the 
system of international trade, which the United States supported 
unequivocally, but which Houphouet-Boigny claimed was respon- 
sible for his country's economic ills. 

Relations with the Soviet Union and China 

Since independence, Houphouet-Boigny has considered the 
Soviet Union and China malevolent influences throughout the 
Third World. Cote d'lvoire did not establish diplomatic relations 
with Moscow until 1967, and then severed them in 1969 following 
allegations of direct Soviet support for a 1968 student protest at 
the National University of Cote d'lvoire. The two countries did 
not restore ties until February 1986, by which time Houphouet- 
Boigny had embraced a more active foreign policy reflecting a more 
pragmatic view of the Soviet Union and his quest for greater inter- 
national recognition. 

Houphouet-Boigny was even more outspoken in his criticism of 
China. He voiced fears of an "invasion" by the Chinese and their 
subsequent colonization of Africa. He was especially concerned that 
Africans would see the problems of development in China as analo- 
gous to those of Africa, and China's solutions as appropriate to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, Cote d'lvoire did not normal- 
ize relations with China until 1983, becoming one of the last Afri- 
can countries to do so. 

Relations with Israel 

From the early 1960s, Houphouet-Boigny openly admired Is- 
rael's application of technology to economic development. In 1962 
the two countries signed a cooperation agreement and exchanged 
ambassadors. For its part, Israel provided aid, primarily in the form 
of technical expertise, to the Ivoirian military and to the agricul- 
tural, tourism, and banking sectors. 

In spite of the close ties between the two countries, Houphouet- 
Boigny supported the OAU decision to sever ties with Israel fol- 
lowing the October 1973 War. Nonetheless, the two countries main- 
tained close if informal links that enabled Israel to continue to 
participate in the Ivoirian economy. In February 1986, Houphouet- 
Boigny announced the long-awaited resumption of diplomatic re- 
lations. Moreover, the Ivoirian embassy was again to be located 
in Jerusalem, in defiance of a 1980 United Nations (UN) Security 
Council resolution calling on all countries to withdraw their 



178 



Government and Politics 

embassies from that city. The PDCI, presumably with Houphouet- 
Boigny's authorization, however, subsequently voted to honor the 
UN resolution and moved the embassy to Tel Aviv. 

In its diplomacy at the UN and other multinational forums, Cote 
dT voire remained firmly committed to the West. That commit- 
ment did not change through 1988 — nor was it expected to — espe- 
cially since the Ivoirian economy required continuing support from 
Western sources of funding. Nor were there expected to be sig- 
nificant foreign policy changes under a successor to the aging 
Houphouet-Boigny, since the consensus among the elite on domestic 
and foreign policy issues was holding, even as the political maneu- 
vering and skirmishing among possible replacements intensified. 

* * * 

Because of its regional importance, its close identification with 
the West, and its spectacular economic growth through the 1960s 
and 1970s, the literature on government and politics in Cote 
dT voire is rich and accessible. The principal sources of background 
material for this study include the following texts: One-Party Govern- 
ment in the Ivory Coast by Aristide R. Zolberg; The Political Economy 
of Ivory Coast, edited by I. William Zartman and Christopher 
Delgado; Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote dTvoire, edited by Y. A. Faure 
and J.-F. Medard; and Michael A. Cohen's Urban Policy and Polit- 
ical Conflict in Africa. Especially useful for their critical perspective 
are Marcel Amondji's Cote dTvoire: Le PDCI et la vie politique de 1944 
a 1985 and Laurent Gbagbo's Cote dTvoire: Pour une alternative democra- 
tique, as well as several articles by Bonnie Campbell. Two small 
but valuable texts on Ivoirian political institutions are Albert 
Aggrey's Guide des institutions politiques et administratives and Hugues 
Tay's L } Administration ivoirienne. Sources for contemporary repor- 
tage include Africa South of the Sahara, Africa Contemporary Record, the 
Country Reports published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and 
the periodicals Africa Confidential, Africa Research Bulletin, Fraternite 
matin, Jeune Afrique, and Marches tropicaux et mediterraneens. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



179 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Gold leaf over wooden sculpture of a leopard, a symbol of power among 
Akan 



ITS ADMIRERS HAVE lauded Cote dTvoire's international 
security policy as moderate, pragmatic, flexible, realistic, conser- 
vative, and responsible; its critics have derided it as reactionary 
and neocolonialism Its principal objective, according to President 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, was to maintain regional peace and 
security in order to promote economic development at home. 
Diplomacy — rather than the threat of military intervention — was 
the vehicle he employed to achieve this objective. 

Cote dT voire does not have a long or distinguished national mili- 
tary history. Even after the country gained independence in 1960, 
the Ivoirian military continued to rely on French advisers, troops, 
and military aid. The military structure and the culture of French 
colonial rule remained virtually intact in the nascent Ivoirian na- 
tion, preserved by Houphouet-Boigny' s deliberate reliance on the 
former colonial power for security guarantees and assistance. Con- 
sequently, the Franco-Ivoirian relationship had a profound impact 
on the organization, mission, materiel, and political behavior of 
the armed forces. Whereas at least half of the countries in Africa 
were under military rule in the mid-1980s, and all but a few had 
experienced at least one successful military coup d'etat, the Ivoir- 
ian army was notably quiescent. The armed forces of Cote dT voire 
were not actively involved in the independence movement. They 
had not fought in any foreign wars, executed any coups, or had to 
defend the country from external aggression. In early 1988, they 
remained a relatively small, lightly armed, and politically mute force, 
heavily influenced by French doctrine, equipment, and advisers. 

In the late 1980s, the central mission of the Ivoirian armed forces 
was self-defense. The military was not prepared by doctrine or avail- 
able resources for offensive operations. The armed forces had 
modest overland mobility, some light weaponry, and limited armor 
and air defense capabilities; the navy was suited only for coastal 
defense missions; and the air force, with its small fleet of aircraft, 
could carry out only token air defense, interdiction, transport, and 
support operations. The air force had no helicopters for tactical 
mobility or attack. With the establishment in 1984 of a radar net- 
work linking Bouake and Yamoussoukro, some territorial surveil- 
lance was possible, but the military had no long-range ground or 
maritime surveillance capability. 

These limited resources were consistent with the national defense 
policy and mission and appeared adequate and appropriate in the 



183 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

context of Cote d'lvoire's regional security needs. Cote d'lvoire 
had a larger military establishment than any of its immediate neigh- 
bors. Although in 1987 the armies of Ghana and Guinea — with 
9,000 and 8,500 troops, respectively — were technically larger than 
Cote d'lvoire's armed forces, their equipment was neither numeri- 
cally nor qualitatively superior. Until the mid-1980s, Ghana had 
a substantially larger navy (numbering 1,200 personnel), but it had 
no offensive capability. Only the Malian air force, with twenty- 
seven combat aircraft, posed a potential threat. 

Armed Forces 

In the 1980s, the Ivoirian armed forces had a dual mission: to 
defend the nation from attack and internal subversion and to par- 
ticipate in the socioeconomic development of the country. They 
had no overt political role, although it was understood that they 
were to support the regime. To avoid diverting resources from na- 
tional economic development, Houphouet-Boigny kept the armed 
forces relatively small and lightly armed. Compensating for the 
limited capacity of the armed forces was a strategic doctrine that 
relied on external military support from France. The government 
consciously sought to avoid conflicts or arms races with its neigh- 
bors and eschewed pan- African defense missions. 

Early Development 

Cote d'lvoire's armed forces developed from the colonial mili- 
tary forces organized by France after the formal establishment of 
the colony in 1893. Although Cote d'lvoire was a separate colony, 
France set up a regional military command structure for all of 
French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise — AOF; see 
Glossary). The command headquarters was located at Dakar, 
Senegal, and Cote d'lvoire was integrated into a regional defense 
structure. Its African forces were organized into regiments of 
Senegalese Irregulars (Tirailleurs Senegalais), whose name revealed 
the centralized character of the colonial administration and the 
subordinate status of the vast expanses of the AOF beyond the 
Senegalese hinterland. This externalization and regionalization of 
Ivoirian defense persisted after independence in the form of the 
Council of the Entente (Conseil de 1' Entente), the security of whose 
member states continued to be guaranteed by France. 

Between 1908 and 1912, when four-year conscription was in- 
troduced by the governor general of the AOF, the number of Afri- 
cans serving in the Tirailleurs Senegalais grew from 13,600 to 
22,600. At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, of the 
nearly 31,000 black troops under French arms, about half were 



184 



National Security 



deployed outside of the AOF and French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise — AEF), underpinning French imperialism 
in Morocco, Algeria, and Madagascar. During World War I, about 
164,000 black soldiers were recruited into the AOF for service in 
Europe and elsewhere. 

In Cote d'lvoire, pacification and conscription continued even 
as France was fighting for its survival. Between October 1914 and 
February 1916, approximately 13,500 Ivoirians were trained for 
military service. All told, about 20,000 Ivoirian soldiers fought for 
France during the war. Many others resisted recruitment, which 
was widely regarded as the heaviest of the colonial exactions. A 
major wartime revolt had to be put down by force. The colony 
suffered a sharp decrease in its standard of living because of the 
various war- related levies. 

During World War II, France again called upon its colonies to 
fulfill manpower levies. Before France fell in 1940, over 100,000 
men had been recruited from French West Africa alone, includ- 
ing 30,000 from Cote d'lvoire. After the armistice, the Vichy 
government increased the size of its peacetime army by recruiting 
an additional 50,000 Africans, while another 100,000 Africans 
served under the Free French between 1943 and 1945. Thus, over 
200,000 Africans fought on behalf of France during the war. 

Although the Vichy government further intensified the burdens 
of colonialism, in the aftermath of the war the colonial regime was 
gradually dismantied to make way for independent nations. By 1950 
the essential defense and internal security apparatus that would 
be bequeathed to Cote d'lvoire after independence was in place. 
Defense was entrusted to a single army battalion with four com- 
panies: three were based at Bouake, and the fourth was at Man, 
with an armored reconnaissance unit at Abidjan. Internal secu- 
rity was the responsibility of the National Security Police (Surete 
Nationale). This division of the Ministry of Internal Security copied 
French organization and had a headquarters element, four mobile 
brigades, a security service, and a central, colonial police force. 
These units were reinforced by a local constabulary {gardes cercles) 
organized by the army and a local detachment of the regional 
gendarmerie. During the 1950s, administrative powers devolved 
to the colonies of the AOF. Defense and foreign affairs remained 
the responsibility of the colonial authorities. Even at independence 
in 1960, no provision was made for an Ivoirian national armed 
force. 

Not until after the April 1961 Franco-Ivoirian Technical Mili- 
tary Assistance Accord (Accord d 'Assistance Militaire Technique), 
more than a year after independence, was a national army formed 



185 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

from indigenous members of the French colonial marines. These 
troops formed a single, undermanned battalion and used equip- 
ment donated by France. By the end of 1962, the armed forces 
had expanded rapidly to about 5,000 soldiers organized into four 
battalions. For the new military establishment, independence was 
more formal than functional: French influence remained para- 
mount, delaying the emergence of an autonomous Ivoirian identity. 

Constitutional, Legal, and Administrative Structure 

Like its French model, the Cote dTvoire Constitution of 1960 
provides for a highly centralized form of government that vests enor- 
mous power in the office of the president, particularly in the areas 
of national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and mili- 
tary and security affairs (see The Constitution, ch. 4). Article 17 
empowers the president to appoint the civil and military officers 
of the state, and Article 18 designates the president commander 
in chief of the armed forces. The president is authorized by Arti- 
cle 19 to take "such exceptional measures as are required" to deal 
with serious and immediate threats to national independence, ter- 
ritorial integrity, or the execution of international commitments. 
The National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale) is empowered to 
pass laws regarding martial law, states of emergency, and the prin- 
ciples of national defense organization (Article 41) and to declare 
war (Article 42). The Council of Ministers, over which the presi- 
dent presides, is authorized by Article 43 to declare martial law, 
which may be extended beyond two weeks only by the National 
Assembly. 

In 1988 three main interministerial councils and advisory bod- 
ies were concerned with coordinating the various departments and 
soliciting technical advice in matters of defense. Chaired by the 
president, the Defense Committee consisted of the ministers con- 
cerned with defense policy and the chief of staff; it met to make 
government decisions in defense matters. The High Defense Coun- 
cil, which included the inspector general and chief of staff of the 
armed forces and the commandant of the National Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmerie Nationale), provided technical military advice, justifi- 
cations, and recommendations to the Defense Committee. The 
High Committee on Intelligence, which was under the authority 
of the president, guided and coordinated record keeping, documen- 
tation, and intelligence services. 

Defense organization had both central and regional components. 
At the national level, the president was the supreme authority. As 
commander in chief of the armed forces, the president directed and 



186 



National Security 



coordinated defense policy. The president was assisted in this by 
the minister of defense and by other ministers as required. 

The minister of defense had two distinct but related functions: 
assisting the president in all defense matters and executing mili- 
tary policy. In the exercise of these functions, the minister of defense 
had direct authority over the chief of staff of the armed forces, who 
also served as commander of all the armed forces, and the inspec- 
tor general of the armed forces, who was responsible for central 
administration (see fig. 14). 

There has been remarkable continuity in the senior civilian and 
military defense posts. Jean Konan Banny served as minister of 
defense in the early 1960s, until he was implicated in a 1963 coup 
plot. His successor, Kouadio M'Bahia Ble, served as minister of 
defense for more than seventeen years, from September 1963 to 
February 1981, before the pardoned and politically rehabilitated 
Banny returned to the post. The first chief of staff, Brigadier General 
Thomas D'Anquin Wattara (who in August 1966 became the first 
Ivoirian general), held that post between 1961 and 1974. Wattara's 
successors, however, have had shorter tenures. In November 1987, 
President Houphouet-Boigny replaced the most senior army officers 
with new men; Brigadier General Felix Ory succeeded Major 
General Bertin Zeze Baroan as chief of staff, and Brigadier Joseph 
Ballou replaced retiring Major General Ibrahim Coulibaly as in- 
spector general. In December 1987, the Ministry of Defense ab- 
sorbed the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, and Banny became 
minister of defense and maritime affairs. 

By decree in November 1963, the minister of defense was em- 
powered to carry out government policy in military matters; to es- 
tablish and oversee the National Service (Service Civique), an 
organization in which young men and women participated in the 
economic development of the country, especially in the rural areas; 
to review the organization of the armed forces, the National Gen- 
darmerie, and the National Service and to present plans to the presi- 
dent as required; to administer and evaluate the mobilization and 
use of the armed forces and military requirements; to oversee vet- 
erans affairs; to prepare and execute budgets and programs for the 
ministry; and to present to the president or the Defense Commit- 
tee all proposals for international negotiation concerning defense 
matters. 

In 1984 the ministry's headquarters staff was budgeted for 529 
billets (including 31 French technical assistance personnel). Most 
of the billets were allocated as follows: the cabinet received 46; the 
Central Administrative Services, 244; the Armed Forces of Cote 
d'lvoire (Force Armee Nationale de Cote d'lvoire — FANCI), 116; 



187 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 





MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
AND MARITIME AFFAIRS 










1 










1 




[ 


ARMED 
FORCES 
CHIEF 
OF STAFF 




COUNCIL 
OF 

MINISTERS 


NAVY 




AIR 
FORCE 




GENDARMERIE 
NATIONALE 



1ST MILITARY 
REGION 
(ABIDJAN) 



2D MILITARY 
REGION 
(DALOA) 



3D MILITARY 
REGION 
(BOUAKE) 



4TH MILITARY 
REGION 
(KORHOGO) 



INSPECTOR 
GENERAL 



DIRECTORATE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND LEGISLATIVE 
AFFAIRS 



DIRECTORATE OF 
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 



DIRECTORATE 




OF DEFENSE 





DIRECTORATE 
OF STUDIES 
AND PROGRAMS 



MEDICAL 
SERVICES 



MILITARY 
JUSTICE SERVICE 



MIITARY SECURITY 
SERVICES 



1ST LEGION 
(ABIDJAN) 



2D LEGION 
(DALOA) 



3D LEGION 
(BOUAKE) 



4TH LEGION 
(KORHOGO) 



Source: Based on information from Cote Ivoire, Ministere de l'lnformation, Annuaire 
Administratif, 1985; and United States, Department of the Army, Abidjan Report, 
No. 6 851 5020 85, November 21, 1985. 



Figure 14. Organization of Ivoirian Defense Forces, 1988 



the Ivoirian Air Force (Force Aerienne de Cote d'lvoire — FACI), 
81; and the Presidential Guard and Militia (Garde Presidentielle 
et Milice— GPM), 7. 

Since May 1972, local defense organization has been based on 
a territorial division of responsibility between the civilian prefec- 
tures (prefectures) under the minister of interior and the military 
regions under the minister of defense. This arrangement superseded 
a system of departmental commands. The minister of interior, 



188 



National Security 



supported as required by the minister of defense, was responsible 
for civil defense. Initially, three military regions were established 
with headquarters, at Abidjan, Daloa, and Bouake. In July 1984, 
the country was reorganized into four military regions. The fourth 
region was centered at Korhogo in order to provide better defense 
coverage in the sparsely populated but politically sensitive north- 
ern territories. In each prefecture, the prefect (prefet) was respon- 
sible for all nonmilitary matters having a bearing on defense (see 
Local Government, ch. 4). On the regional level, the military com- 
mandant was specifically charged with defense responsibilities. This 
system required close cooperation and coordination between the 
regional military commanders and the civilian prefects. Each mili- 
tary garrison was under a commanding officer, who represented 
the regional commandant and whose functions were prescribed by 
decree in December 1971. 

The military regions provided active-duty forces and an adminis- 
trative structure for civilian and military defense planning. Each 
region comprised between six and twelve prefectures under a ter- 
ritorial commander who reported to the minister of defense through 
the chief of staff of the armed forces. The regions provided liaison 
service for the local political and administrative authorities, pre- 
pared plans for the protection of sensitive military and civilian assets 
in the region, coordinated regional and local military and civilian 
defense measures, maintained operational readiness, and conducted 
military exercises as required. The regional military commands 
did not have any organic logistical resources but rather drew on 
central support services. 

Defense Mission and National Policy 

In 1987 the armed forces consisted of about 14,920 regular and 
paramilitary personnel, organized into FANCI, the navy, FACI, 
the National Gendarmerie, the Presidential Guard and Militia, and 
the Military Fire Brigade. Although the National Gendarmerie was 
an integral part of the Ministry of Defense and Maritime Affairs, 
its mission related more to internal security than to external defense 
(see Internal Security, this ch.). 

The effective strength of the army was about 3,000 troops dur- 
ing the early 1970s. It increased to 4,000 during the mid-1970s, 
and to more than 8,000 by the early 1980s, before declining stead- 
ily to about 5,500 by 1987. FANCI was equipped lightly and almost 
exclusively with French materiel, much of which was delivered dur- 
ing 1980 and 1981 , when the army experienced its greatest expan- 
sion (see table 9, Appendix). 



189 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Headquarters elements included a general staff, headquarters and 
logistics companies, commissariat service, and materiel service. The 
main combat elements were the four infantry battalions of three com- 
panies each, stationed in the four military regions. The First Bat- 
talion at Port Bouet near Abidjan included two infantry companies, 
a paratroop company, and an air defense unit. An armored battal- 
ion with two squadrons also was stationed in the Abidjan region, 
along with the Military Preparatory Technical Academy (Ecole 
Militaire Preparatoire Technique — EMPT) at Bingerville. The Sec- 
ond Battalion at Daloa consisted of three infantry companies. In 
the Third Military Region at Bouake was the Third Battalion, con- 
sisting of three infantry companies, a heavy weapons/artillery bat- 
tery, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, an engineering battalion with 
a combat engineer company, two construction companies, and a 
training company. The Fourth Military Region at Korhogo was still 
being established, and in 1986 a new command battalion and a dog- 
handling center were reported to have been formed. 

Until December 1987, the Ivoirian navy (Marine Nationale) was 
part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, which was also responsi- 
ble for the merchant marine. In July 1974, Captain Lamine Fadika 
became the first Ivoirian minister of maritime affairs, replacing 
an expatriate. In December 1987, Fadika was removed from office, 
and the ministry was incorporated into the Ministry of Defense 
and Maritime Affairs under Banny. 

The navy's mission was limited to coastal and river patrols and 
harbor defense, and its primary emphasis was on protecting the 
environment and fighting fires. The ministry planned to restruc- 
ture the navy into two coastal patrol squadrons as additional fast 
attack craft were acquired. Naval headquarters were at the main 
naval base at Locodjo, near Abidjan; smaller bases were at 
Sassandra, San-Pedro, and Tabou, all on the southwestern coast. 
The navy expanded from about 200 personnel in 1970, to 400 in 
1980, to about 700 in the late 1980s, maintaining a ratio of officers 
to enlisted men of 1 to 10. It had a small but versatile force of war- 
ships, auxiliaries, and service craft. Most of these were French craft, 
commissioned in the late 1970s (see table 10, Appendix). The navy 
was also reported to have a commando group and one light trans- 
port aircraft. The independent merchant marine fleet consisted of 
more than sixty vessels, including three tankers. 

FACI was basically a military transportation and liaison ser- 
vice rather than a combat force. This mission was reflected in 
FACFs official name, Ivoirian Air Transport and Liaison (Groupe- 
ment Aerien de Transport et de Liaison — GATL). Like FANCI, 
FACI was an independent service arm of the Ministry of Defense 
and Maritime Affairs. In 1988 Colonel Abdoulaye Coulibaly was 



190 



President Houphouet-Boigny inspecting the troops 
Courtesy Embassy of Cote d'lvoire, Washington 

the FACI commander, having assumed that post from a French 
officer in 1974. FACI had only about 200 personnel through the 
1970s. It then entered a period of expansion, reaching an estimated 
strength of 930 in the mid-1980s. Organizationally, FACI consisted 
of a headquarters staff with operational, technical, and general ser- 
vices sections and also various field activities and air bases. 

FACFs one small combat aircraft squadron consisted of six French 
Dassault-Breguet light attack/trainer Alpha Jets, obtained during 
1980 and 1981. The squadron was stationed at the Bouake air base, 
which opened in December 1980. Some of FACFs original light 
transport planes, including three Fokker F-27s and four F-28s, were 
transferred in 1979 to the national airline, Air I voire, and several 
old transports (three C-47s, five MH-1521 Broussard light trans- 
ports, and one Mystere 20) have been retired from service. In 1987, 
in addition to the Alpha Jets, FACFs aircraft consisted of twenty 
fixed- wing aircraft and eleven helicopters used for training, light 
transport, ferrying of dignitaries, and communications and utility 
missions. Pilots received training on French Aerospatiale Rallye 160 
and Rallye 235 aircraft, two Reims Aviation/ Cessna 150Hs, and 
six Beech F33C Bonanzas (see table 10, Appendix). 

FACI operated from a number of strategically situated air 
bases. Port Bouet near Abidjan was the main base for FACI, along 
with the First Military Region/FANCI Battalion, the paratroop 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



company, and the air defense forces. Other major bases were in the 
southwest at Daloa (the headquarters of the Second Military Region/ 
FANCI Battalion) and in the populous central savanna at Bouake 
(site of the Third Military Region/FANCI Battalion), which included 
a heavy weapons battery, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and 
the engineering battalion. Yamoussoukro, Sassandra, San-Pedro, 
Tabou, Man, Seguela, Odienne, and Korhogo also had airfields. 

The remaining component of the armed forces having a combat 
mission was the GPM. President Houphouet-Boigny formed the 
GPM to serve as a paramilitary counterweight to FANCI after the 
1963 military coup plot and to provide personal protection to the 
president. In 1986 the militia was estimated to have had 1,500 per- 
sonnel; the Presidential Guard, 1,100. GPM members were recruited 
largely from the National Gendarmerie and were organized into two 
units, one based in Abidjan and the other at Yamoussoukro. 

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 

According to the Constitution, the burden of national defense 
is shared by all citizens of Cote d'lvoire. As of June 1961 , military 
service for all male citizens was required by law. Although nomi- 
nally compulsory, military service in fact was not universal. The 
small size of the armed forces and the large number of volunteers 
made conscription virtually unnecessary. In general, conscription 
seemed to have been reserved for a handful of troublesome stu- 
dents and striking workers. 

In the late 1980s, Cote d'lvoire 's population included at least 
2.5 million males aged fifteen to forty-nine, of whom about 1.3 
million were believed to be fit for military service. Active service 
varied from one to two years and normally included both military 
and civic training. Active service also could be spent in National 
Service work or working for state enterprises. The period for reserve 
service was twenty-three years. In general, all Ivoirian citizens could 
be required to perform certain duties in the national interest under 
the rubric of military service. The National Service was designed 
particularly with this purpose in mind, and it was primarily to this 
organization that young women were called to serve. 

The pay, living conditions, and benefits available in the armed 
forces were relatively attractive and compared favorably with alter- 
native employment opportunities; however, they were not lavish. 
The government attempted to strike a prudent balance by pro- 
viding institutional support and emoluments sufficient to sustain 
satisfaction and loyalty without transforming the military into an 
unduly privileged elite. Nonetheless, some senior officers unethi- 
cally profited from their temporary assignments to state enterprises, 
although corruption was not as widespread as in many other African 



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countries. To some extent, military and security personnel were 
exempt from "salary alignments" and the impact of austerity mea- 
sures introduced in the early 1980s. 

Officers were recruited through the Military Academy (Ecole 
des Forces Armees — EFA) at Bouake or by promotion from the 
ranks of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Career NCOs were 
recruited from among those who had at least five years' active ser- 
vice. Promotions for officers were almost exclusively by merit selec- 
tion. Officers were generally retired when they attained the age 
limit for their grade. The highest rank in the navy was admiral; 
in FANCI and FACI, it was general (see fig. 15; fig. 16). All mili- 
tary personnel were subject to obligations, regulations, and dis- 
ciplinary rules prescribed by government decree. Career military 
personnel were prohibited from striking or joining trade unions; 
were obliged to serve both day and night; and were required to 
obtain authorization to marry, travel outside their garrisons, ex- 
press their opinions publicly, or join outside associations. 

Military justice was enforced by both administrative and judi- 
cial means, depending on the severity of the offense. The military 
courts had jurisdiction over members of the armed forces who were 
accused of crimes unrelated to any other offenses within the juris- 
diction of any other court, crimes committed while carrying out 
military duties or while conducting operations to maintain peace 
and public order, or crimes committed inside the military estab- 
lishment or against the security of the state. Unlike the civil and 
criminal court system, the military justice system had no court of 
appeals. The Supreme Court occasionally has been asked to review 
and set aside a military tribunal's verdict and to order a retrial 
(see Judical System, ch. 4). 

Training 

Before independence, military training was conducted almost 
exclusively by French personnel either on the job or at institutions 
in France, Senegal, and Cote dTvoire. Most training was based 
on informal arrangements. Only a few officers and NCOs were 
sent to France for advanced professional and technical training. 
Since independence, as it has acquired the necessary expertise, Cote 
dTvoire has assumed responsibility for training its own armed 
forces. In November 1961, France transferred the EMPT located 
at Bingerville to the new Ivoirian government. At that time, the 
school taught only specialized technical subjects, such as commu- 
nications and automotive mechanics. Because the new government 
intended to use the military as a means to promote the ethos of 
national service and to teach skills relevant to national development, 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 




National Security 




Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

the programs were immediately expanded to include agricultural 
and construction skills. 

Since assuming control of the EMPT at Bingerville, FANCI 
gradually expanded the curriculum. Students entered the academy 
after their first year of secondary education and remained there 
throughout secondary school (see Education, ch. 2). Students took 
military training and academic courses simultaneously through- 
out the program. Initially, the curriculum stressed technical and 
vocational subjects, but by 1988 it was expanding to include courses 
in the humanities and social sciences so that graduates would qualify 
for entrance into universities in Cote d'lvoire and Europe. Stu- 
dents were admitted to the school following a competitive exami- 
nation, and graduates could either enter FANCI with a commission 
or proceed to college. About 86 percent of those admitted com- 
pleted the program and graduated. In addition to training Ivoir- 
ian students, the Bingerville academy also accepted pupils from 
other francophone African countries, such as Niger, Burkina Faso, 
Gabon, Senegal, and Central African Republic. The school had 
a French commandant and employed both military and civilian 
faculty, including a sizable number of French instructors. In 1982 
the school was reported to have almost 500 students, more than 
40 French civilian professors, and several French military in- 
structors. 

In July 1963, FANCI established its own school, the EFA, at 
Bouake. The EFA subsequently became a regional military train- 
ing center serving francophone West Africa. It also was headed 
by a French commandant. The EFA selected officer and NCO can- 
didates between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five by competi- 
tive written and oral examinations administered annually; officer 
candidates had to hold a baccalaureate degree. By 1983, the twen- 
tieth anniversary of the EFA, 251 Ivoirian officers and 48 officers 
from Gabon, 38 from Togo, 32 from Senegal, 20 from Central Afri- 
can Republic, 15 from Niger, 7 from Burkina Faso, and 6 from 
Chad had received commissions from the school. 

Until 1983 all training for FACI pilots was provided in France 
in a four-year program of instruction. Following a 1982 Franco- 
Ivoirian agreement, however, a basic pilots' training school was 
opened at the Bouake air base in April 1983. France provided the 
aircraft, operating budget, and materiel for the one-year program. 
By 1986 enrollees also included non-Ivoirians. Ivoirian students 
were selected by FACI, and the training was conducted by the 
French aircraft manufacturer Aerospatiale. The program included 
140 hours of training. Graduates were awarded a pilot's license 
and went to France for further flight training in transports or jets, 



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depending on their aptitude. Officer candidates had to meet ad- 
vanced mathematics qualifications, and NCOs were required to 
have completed the equivalent of one year of postsecondary edu- 
cation. On the basis of the selection examination, candidates were 
divided into three groups for specialized duties. Candidates who 
scored the highest could become pilots; those who scored in the 
middle group could become mechanics or communications tech- 
nicians; and those who scored in the lowest category could be trained 
for other occupations. Mechanics, communications technicians, and 
most other specialists were trained in Cote d'lvoire. Because of 
its small size and the specialized technical expertise required, FACI 
recruited for officers and NCO candidates through selective ex- 
aminations given only once a year. 

The Ministry of Maritime Affairs had also operated a number 
of training institutions for Ivoirian and West African naval and 
merchant marine personnel. These schools were transferred to 
the Ministry of Defense and Maritime Affairs in December 1987. 
In 1975 plans were unveiled for a regional 1 ,500-student naval/ 
merchant marine academy in Abidjan to serve the needs of the Eco- 
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other 
inter- African organizations to which Cote d'lvoire belonged. By 
1983 several training facilities were in operation, including the Mer- 
chant Marine Training Academy, the Academy of Oceanographic 
Sciences and Technology, the Regional Maritime Instruction 
Center, and the Center for Antipollution Control. These regional 
training institutions and others were supported by the United 
Nations, the European Development Fund, and other international 
organizations. Several countries, particularly France and Japan, 
also provided aid. France supplied most of Cote dTvoire's naval 
craft as well as maritime training; Japan furnished the Navy's only 
training ship, trained Ivoirian naval officers, contributed more than 
US$500,000 toward the construction of the Abidjan Naval Acad- 
emy, and participated in the phased expansion of the Naval Acad- 
emy and the Abidjan port facilities. 

Foreign Influences 

France has been the dominant foreign influence on Ivoirian secu- 
rity concerns. France maintained its position through several in- 
stitutional and informal arrangements. The most important was 
the mutual defense pact of the Entente Agreement of 1959. By this 
agreement, French forces guaranteed internal and external secu- 
rity of the Council of the Entente members. This relationship was 
strengthened by the supplementary quadripartite military ac- 
cords of April 24, 1961, among France, Cote d'lvoire, Niger, and 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

Dahomey (present-day Benin). In addition, the Franco-Ivoirian 
Technical Military Assistance Accord of 1961 reaffirmed France's 
position as the chief supplier of military aid, training, and equip- 
ment. These agreements secured for France a virtual monopoly 
of external military assistance to Council of the Entente countries, 
legitimized the continued presence of French armed forces on their 
soil, and served as justification for occasional direct military inter- 
ventions. Thus, the national military forces of francophone Africa, 
together with the French forces stationed among them and France's 
rapid deployment forces (forces d' intervention), formed a transcon- 
tinental defense network that served both local security needs and 
French global interests. Although the level of French military as- 
sistance to Africa (and to Cote d'lvoire in particular) declined in 
the 1980s, France's paramount position was not challenged by other 
foreign powers or by Ivoirian demands for autonomy. Indeed, since 
the 1970s France had consolidated its position as the leading 
Western arms supplier to Africa, where it was second only to the 
Soviet Union. 

The Franco-Ivoirian Technical Military Assistance Accord of 
1961 encompassed four categories of assistance. Three categories 
involved French contributions to Ivoirian defense, and the fourth 
dealt with joint military operations. First, France provided tech- 
nical assistance personnel (cooperants — see Glossary) to headquarters 
and field commands. The agreement for the continued provision 
of these cooperants (who served as administrators, advisers, and in 
operational capacities) was reviewed and renewed every two years. 
In 1985 about 1,000 French military officers and NCOs provided 
technical military assistance to twenty African countries; 78 were 
assigned to Cote d'lvoire, a decrease from a peak of 110 in 1981. 

Second, France provided military equipment and training for 
the Ivoirian armed forces under renewable three-year agreements. 
Equipment and materiel were either donated or sold on favorable 
terms, and military training was furnished as grant aid. In 1985 
France provided about US$2. 1 million in direct military aid to Cote 
d'lvoire. French military detachments sometimes undertook spe- 
cial projects in the country; for example, for eight months in 1984 
and 1985 a vehicle and equipment repair team serviced Ivoirian 
equipment in Bouake. In the early 1980s, France also subsidized 
approximately 200 Ivoirian officers and NCOs annually attend- 
ing French military academies. 

Third, a joint agreement allowed France to station troops in the 
country. These forces, represented in 1988 by the 400-man Forty- 
third Marine Infantry Battalion situated near Abidjan, served as 
tangible evidence of France's security commitment to respond to 



198 



Armed Forces color guard 
Courtesy Ellen Perna Smith 



any major crisis occurring in Cote d'lvoire or in France's mutual 
security partners. This battalion could intervene upon request or 
direction, either alone or in conjunction with similar units stationed 
in Senegal, Niger, and Gabon, with rapid reinforcements by French 
rapid deployment forces. 

Finally, the two countries participated in joint military exercises 
held each year and large-scale maneuvers held every two or three 
years. In the 1980s, these exercises became increasingly sophisti- 
cated and politically significant. At the operational level, they 
strengthened cooperation and coordination between French and 
Ivoirian forces. At the political level, they were a cogent symbol 
of the special relationship the two countries shared. 

Apart from these formal accords, France also sought to bolster 
its influence with its former African colonies through visits, ex- 
changes, conferences, and other meetings that promoted a continu- 
ing "defense dialogue." For example, the French Ministry of 
Defense conducted the biennial meetings of the Institute of Higher 
Studies for National Defense (Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense 
Nationale — IHEDN) in Paris for key military and civilian leaders 
from francophone African countries. The conferences emphasized 
defense ties and military cooperation, the strategic significance of 
Africa in the global defense environment, and the importance of 
Franco- African solidarity. Participants also visited major French 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

military and National Gendarmerie installations for briefings and 
demonstrations of French rapid deployment forces and the latest 
equipment. 

Other industrialized countries also have furnished military as- 
sistance and equipment to Cote d'lvoire. Japan provided a train- 
ing ship, training, and naval technical assistance. The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Britain, and the United States furnished support aircraft, 
small naval craft, military utility trucks, jeeps, and mortars. In ad- 
dition, FANCI procured assault rifles from Switzerland, and the 
police bought pistols from the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany). 

In the late 1980s, the military relationship between the United 
States and Cote d'lvoire was becoming more important. Between 
1967 and 1986, eighty-five Ivoirian trainees received military in- 
struction under the United States International Military Educa- 
tion and Training (IMET) program. The program, which expanded 
sharply with the signing of a new IMET agreement in 1983, pro- 
vided training in such areas as infantry and airborne skills, intelli- 
gence, and marine environmental science, thereby promoting 
professional relationships among military personnel. The value of 
training services increased to US$41 1 ,000 during fiscal years (FY — 
see Glossary) 1984 to 1986, covering six to ten Ivoirian military 
students per year. 

Government- to- government sales of defense equipment and ser- 
vices, though relatively small, have also expanded. In FY 1986, 
the United States signed military sales agreements valued at 
US$500,000, of which US$25,000 was classified as foreign mili- 
tary sales and US$475,000 as foreign military construction sales. 
In 1985 the United States initiated the African Civic Action Pro- 
gram, which included a Coastal Security Program to help West 
African littoral states patrol and defend their Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs) against treaty violations, illegal fishing, and smug- 
gling. The African Civic Action Program also strengthened regional 
cooperation in search and rescue, pollution control, and training 
operations, all of which coincided with the Ivoirian navy's primary 
missions. By 1987 the United States had furnished some commu- 
nications and navigation equipment to Cote d'lvoire under the 
terms of the program. 

Role of the Armed Forces in Society 

Unlike the military in many other African and Third World 
states, the Ivoirian armed forces maintained a relatively low pro- 
file. According to a 1984 United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency (ACDA) survey of 144 countries, Cote d'lvoire 



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National Security 



ranked one hundred and second in military expenditure, ninety- 
first in the size of its armed forces, ninety- sixth in arms imports, 
one hundred and twenty-fourth in military expenditure as a per- 
centage of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), one 
hundred and twenty-eighth in military expenditure as a percen- 
tage of the government budget, one hundred and eighteenth in mili- 
tary expenditure per capita, one hundred and sixth in military 
expenditure relative to the size of the armed forces, one hundred 
and thirteenth in the ratio of armed forces to total population, and 
seventy-ninth in the ratio of arms imports to total imports. 

The Military in National Perspective 

From 1976 to 1985, Ivoirian military expenditures averaged less 
than 2 percent of GNP and ranged between 4 and 6 percent of 
the government's budget. As measured in constant 1983 United 
States dollars, the country's arms imports multiplied sevenfold from 
about US$15 million a year during 1976 and 1977 to between 
US$90 and US$130 million per year from 1978 to 1981, when Cote 
d'lvoire acquired several costly ships and aircraft. Expenditures 
then declined abruptly to an annual average of only US$22 mil- 
lion from 1982 to 1985, a period of austerity for the country (see 
Growth and Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). At least a portion 
of Cote d'lvoire' s arms imports from France was furnished on a 
grant basis during this period. 

The government's operating budget for FY 1986 amounted to 
CFA F433.62 billion (for value of CFA F— see Glossary), of which 
CFA F31.3 billion (7.2 percent) was allocated to the Ministry of 
Defense. Although this represented almost an 11 percent increase 
from the ministry's 1985 budget, defense allocations were still a 
distant second to the budget of the Ministry of National Educa- 
tion and Scientific Research. Personnel costs absorbed about two- 
thirds of the defense budget, while materials and operating expenses 
each absorbed about one-fifth of the budget. In addition, for FY 
1986 the Ministry of Maritime Affairs received CFA Fl.l billion 
(a substantial reduction from CFA F3.8 billion in 1985), bringing 
the total defense operating budget for 1986 to CFA F3 2. 4 billion. 

National Service and Veterans Groups 

Given the top priority it has assigned to socioeconomic develop- 
ment, the government has regarded the armed forces as an instru- 
ment of nation building as well as national defense. In fact, in the 
1960s it entertained the somewhat naive hope that the armed forces 
would become self-sufficient rather than a drain on the economy, 
and for that reason the National Service enjoyed strong presidential 



201 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



backing. Until 1983 the Ministry of Defense was known as the 
Ministry of Defense and National Service, signifying its dual role 
of protector and nation builder. Initially, the National Service draft- 
ed its recruits, but recruitment soon became voluntary to make 
it more attractive. 

The National Service program sought to train soldiers as farmers, 
halt migration to cities, teach useful skills, and provide a general 
education along with military training. (Within a short time, 
however, the military training was abandoned, although the Na- 
tional Service remained under the Ministry of Defense, was funded 
within the army's budget, and practiced military discipline.) Na- 
tional Service trainees, under the supervision of Israeli military and 
agricultural technicians, established the National Service Center 
at Bouake in 1964. The National Service Center, which coordi- 
nated programs in the Bouake area, also processed agricultural 
produce and provided materials, seeds, and machinery to regional 
centers. Various regional centers experimented with mechanized 
agriculture and poultry, egg, and livestock production. Plans called 
for transplanting National Service volunteers to villages where they 
were to serve as agents of change. The government, through the 
National Service program, created "Progressive Villages" as 
demonstration projects, which, upon attaining economic indepen- 
dence, were to be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
government also transformed some existing villages into "Villages 
under Supervision," which cultivated certain experimental crops 
like tobacco, rice, and cotton. 

By the mid-1960s, the National Service had expanded into other 
areas. The Company of Pioneers, also supported by Israeli tech- 
nical assistance and led by officers and NCOs detailed from the 
army, undertook national construction and other projects. A 
Women's Corps was set up, with Israeli women officers as advisers. 

In 1964 the National Service Center at Bouake opened with 330 
fifteen- to eighteen-year-old women trainees. Regular recruits at- 
tended a one-year course of instruction, and instructors attended 
for two years. The curriculum included French-language training, 
home economics, hygiene and nutrition, child care, animal hus- 
bandry, and poultry raising. After completing their service, the 
trainees, with government help, were expected to settle in villages 
and assist local women; however, only about two-thirds of the 
trainees completed the program, and the impact they had in vil- 
lages was probably negligible. 

The National Service program was as misconceived as it was 
ambitious. Two years were insufficient to turn raw recruits into 
proficient soldiers and farmers, and the government made no 



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provisions to keep trainees on the farm once they had finished their 
course. Consequently, in 1983 the government transferred the Na- 
tional Service from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Rural 
Development. This transfer recognized that the primary mission 
of the National Service was development rather than defense and 
permitted the Ministry of Defense to concentrate on its more con- 
ventional military responsibilities. 

Veterans were not prominent in Cote dTvoire's independence 
movement and have not been a major force in the country's social 
and political life. The relatively small size of the armed forces and 
the correspondingly small career service corps, coupled with the 
limited role of the military in public affairs, has contributed to their 
quiescence. Veterans of the colonial armed forces have received 
generous pensions, as have military personnel who have retired 
from the national armed forces. The National Veterans Adminis- 
tration Office has been subsidized by the Ministry of Defense and 
Maritime Affairs. 

Internal Security 

According to many observers, Cote dTvoire has had one of the 
most stable political systems in Africa. As of 1988, President 
Houphouet-Boigny had been the dominant national figure for more 
than forty years. He was the country's founding father and its first 
and only president. In 1988 political violence was relatively rare 
in Cote dTvoire. Since independence, there have been few politi- 
cal prisoners, no executions of political opponents, and no officially 
sanctioned disappearances or abductions. At the same time, there 
were numerous indications of political instability. Since the 1970s, 
the Ivoirian polity has experienced several crises (see Economic 
and Political Issues of the Late 1970s and 1980s, ch.l). 

Domestic Security 

After the alleged coup attempts in 1962 and 1963, Houphouet- 
Boigny disarmed, disbanded, and reorganized the army; took over 
the defense and interior portfolios; formed a party militia composed 
predominantly of ethnic Baoule kinsmen to maintain order in Abi- 
djan; overhauled the State Security Court; and, for his personal 
protection, established a Presidential Guard separate from the army. 
Nevertheless, Houphouet-Boigny considered the army to be the 
cornerstone of Ivoirian internal security. 

Following the 1973 alleged coup attempt in Cote dTvoire and 
the April 1974 military coup in Niger that ousted President Hamani 
Diori, a lifelong friend and regional political ally, Houphouet- 
Boigny ceded a larger political role to the armed forces to give them 



203 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

a formal stake in the regime. In June 1974, he removed the French 
commander of the FACI and the French commandant of the mili- 
tary academy at Bingerville, replacing them with Ivoirian officers. 
A month later, he brought military officers into the cabinet for the 
first time. Houphouet-Boigny also promoted several senior army 
officers and appointed ten officers as prefects. 

At same time, the new minister of interior, Mathieu Ekra, under- 
took organizational reforms and made new appointments in the 
territorial administration and police forces. By the end of 1974, 
a new ethnic balance had emerged among the security forces. North- 
erners controlled higher positions in the army; the demographi- 
cally preponderant Baoule dominated the National Security Police; 
and southerners were a plurality in the police and National Gen- 
darmerie. 

In the 1980s, as political upheavals became more frequent, 
Houphouet-Boigny repeatedly changed his government. In Febru- 
ary 1981 , in the wake of the 1980 coup and assassination attempts, 
he enlarged the cabinet from twenty-five to thirty-six ministers, 
bringing in Banny as minister of defense and Leon Konan Koffi, 
who had a reputation for being tough, as minister of interior. (Iron- 
ically, Banny had been the minister of defense who was arrested 
and sentenced to death for his role in the 1 963 coup plot but later 
given presidential amnesty. Kouadio M'Bahia Ble, who replaced 
Banny after the 1963 incident, kept that post until Banny took it 
back from him in 1981 .) In late 1985, several senior military officers 
were appointed to leadership posts in the Democratic Party of Cote 
d'lvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote d'lvoire — PDCI), further- 
ing the process of political co-optation that began in the mid-1970s. 

Several other groups, including political exiles, labor unions, 
teachers, and university students, at times posed a threat to civil 
order; however, none of these groups was likely to topple the govern- 
ment (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). Secondary-school teachers in 
particular became especially outspoken during the mid-1980s. In 
April 1983, the National Union of Secondary School Teachers of 
Cote d'lvoire (Syndicat National des Enseignants du Secondaire 
de Cote d'lvoire — SYNESCI) staged a two-week strike to protest 
an 80 percent reduction in the teachers' housing allowance. The 
government responded by threatening to conscript union leaders, 
dissolve the union, expel teachers from their houses, and close all 
secondary schools. In July 1987, SYNESCI' s leaders (who had also 
called the 1983 strike) were ousted by a progovernment faction dur- 
ing irregular rump proceedings of the union's congress, while 
uniformed police and plainclothes officers surrounded the union 
headquarters. The new union officials immediately pledged their 



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loyalty to the government and charged their predecessors with mis- 
appropriation of union property and funds. Thirteen of the oust- 
ed unionists were arrested, and in late October the eleven males 
were sent to the army base in Seguela. According to Minister of 
Education Balla Keita (who had taken over the newly consolidated 
ministry in the midst of the 1983 SYNESCI strike with instruc- 
tions to break it), the detainees were "well-known agents of inter- 
national subversion" who had been "sent to the army for national 
service and civic and moral education in the supreme interest of 
the country." Significantly, SYNESCI — which was one of the last 
unions independent of the government — appeared finally to have 
fallen under government influence. 

University students have also been a continuing source of anti- 
government protest, much to the chagrin of a government that 
has invested up to 40 percent of the national budget in educa- 
tion. In 1969 police and soldiers occupied and closed the Univer- 
sity of Abidjan (present-day National University of Cote dTvoire), 
arrested dozens of students, and detained them at Akouedo 
after they protested the government's attempt to place their newly 
formed Movement of Ivoirian Primary and Secondary School Stu- 
dents (Mouvement des Etudiants et des Eleves de Cote dTvoire — 
MEECI) under the PDCI. In February 1982, the government again 
closed the university after both students and faculty protested the 
government's banning of Professor Laurent Gbagbo's speech on 
political freedom. In 1985 police broke up a violent demonstra- 
tion by students protesting wholesale reduction in scholarship 
aid. 

Alien migrant labor also represented a potential security threat. 
Cote d T voire 's relatively robust economy made the country a mag- 
net for migrant labor. In 1988 at least 2 million foreign Africans 
in the country — about half of them Burkinabe — (residents of Bur- 
kina Faso) comprised about one-fifth, and perhaps much more, 
of the population of Cote dTvoire. Most aliens were agricultural 
laborers or unemployed urban squatters, politically helpless and 
economically deprived migrants who turned to crime. 

Foreigners who were more industrious often became scapegoats 
for the wrath of hard-strapped Ivoirians, who saw these outsiders 
taking jobs that they themselves had allegedly been denied. In April 
1980, for example, hundreds of Mauritanians were taken under 
protective custody, and some 1,500 others took refuge in the 
Mauritanian embassy in Abidjan after days of rioting and fight- 
ing with Ivoirians. More serious incidents directed against Bur- 
kinabe occurred during xenophobic riots in 1985, leading Burkina 
Faso to recall its ambassador from Abidjan. 



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Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 
Human Rights 

Cote d'lvoire has a mixed record of human rights observance. 
The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators ranked the country 
ninety-sixth on political rights and ninety-second on civil rights out 
of 144 nations. Freedom House has consistently rated Cote d'lvoire 
low on its scale of political rights and civil liberties; nonetheless, 
in 1980 it elevated the country from the status of "not free" to 
"partly free." This rating put Cote d'lvoire in the same category 
as Transkei (part of South Africa) and ranked it freer than Guinea 
but less free than Senegal. The World Human Rights Guide rated the 
country as "poor," while the United States Department of State's 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987 officially charac- 
terized human rights conditions in Cote d'lvoire as "generally satis- 
factory." 

Cote d'lvoire was a signatory to a number of international human 
rights conventions, including the Slavery Convention of 1926, the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956, 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War and Civilians in Time of War, and the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. It had not yet signed 
the 1953 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Con- 
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno- 
cide of 1948, or the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. 

Internal Security Organization and Forces 

Responsibility for internal security in Cote d'lvoire was shared 
by three ministries in a coordinated, multilayered pattern adapted 
from the French colonial system. The Ministry of Interior was 
responsible primarily for territorial and local administration and 
included local police forces; the Ministry of Internal Security was 
charged with state security and national police functions; and the 
Ministry of Defense and Maritime Affairs (primarily through the 
National Gendarmerie) provided paramilitary forces throughout 
the country in coordination with the respective regional and local 
authorities. 

The Ministry of Interior, as chartered by decrees of January 1961 
and May 1962, had broad regulatory functions. As part of its 
security-related responsibilities, it regulated public associations, gun 
control, access to public buildings, emigration and immigration, 
foreign propaganda, foreign visitors, and passport controls. It also 
directed the National Security Police, supervised traditional chief- 
taincies, and administered territorial subdivisions. 



206 



National Security 



Although the National Security Police was transferred to the 
Ministry of Internal Security in 1976, the other functions of Minis- 
try of Interior have remained essentially intact. In February 1981, 
Leon Konan Koffi replaced Alexis Thierry-Lebbe as minister of 
interior. As of 1985, its constituent elements included the minister's 
cabinet and six directorates covering territorial administration, local 
communities, financial affairs, personnel and manpower programs, 
the National Printing Office, and the National Archives. It had 
a staff of about 4,900 and an operating budget of C FA F 13. 3 bil- 
lion, or 3.2 percent of the government's budget. 

Territorial administration remained the ministry's most im- 
portant function pertaining to public order and internal security. 
The prefects and subprefects executed government policies and 
represented the interests of the local population (see Local Govern- 
ment, ch. 4). Each prefecture and municipality also was responsi- 
ble for maintaining order; executing government laws, regulations, 
and policies; and administrating the police. Moreover, the prefects 
and subprefects were empowered to call upon the armed forces if 
needed and to requisition persons and property in matters of pub- 
lic safety. Prefects were authorized to detain for forty-eight hours 
anyone apprehended for crimes and offenses involving state security. 

The Ministry of Internal Security was established as part of a 
governmental reorganization in March 1976 to consolidate the na- 
tional police and state security functions that had formerly been 
assigned to the Ministry of Interior. In November 1983, Brigadier 
General Oumar N'Daw, who had been the high commander of 
the National Gendarmerie for nine years, succeeded Colonel Gaston 
Ouassenan Kone, who served as minister of internal security from 
1976 to 1983. In 1985 the ministry was reorganized into the fol- 
lowing groups: the minister's cabinet; eight directorates (National 
Security Police, Regional Security, Inspector General of Police Ser- 
vices, Materials, Financial Affairs, Personnel, Police Economics 
and Finances, and Judicial Affairs); the National Police Academy, 
and an intelligence service. In 1985 the ministry had a staff of about 
5,600, and its operating budget of CFA F11.7 billion (or 2.8 per- 
cent of the government's budget) represented a 5.8 percent increase 
over its 1984 operating budget. 

The National Security Police was an investigative bureau and 
national police force with a strength of about 5,300 in 1987. It en- 
forced law and order and provided special police services. The var- 
ious directorates of the National Security Police were responsible 
for public security, internal and cross-frontier traffic, counter- 
espionage, intelligence, criminal investigation, narcotics and drug 
control, and the administration of sixteen national police districts. 



207 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

In larger towns and cities, the National Security Police cooperated 
with the municipal police forces; in the smaller communities and 
rural areas, it worked with the local police and the National Gen- 
darmerie. The ministry's Regional Security Directorate included 
three separate divisions grouping the commissariats for subprefects 
and major urban centers and the Frontier Police. The Special Police, 
Frontier Police, and the Abidjan Port Police were grouped under 
the Central Commissariat. 

The National Security Police Public Security Directorate con- 
sisted of the uniformed national police and the Companies for the 
Security of the Republic (Compagnies Republicaines de Securite — 
CRS), which were at the immediate disposal of the minister of in- 
ternal security for deployment throughout the country. In emer- 
gencies, prefects could call upon the minister to use any CRS in 
his or her jurisdiction. The CRS were most frequently used to han- 
dle certain kinds of local emergencies and rescue operations. They 
also cooperated with the local National Gendarmerie forces and 
the Frontier Police. The Intelligence Directorate was responsible 
for collecting intelligence on security-related political, economic, 
and social events (such as industrial strikes and antigovernment 
demonstrations). The Counterespionage Directorate was respon- 
sible for protecting the state against treason and espionage. The 
Criminal Investigation Directorate coordinated and directed crime- 
fighting efforts, maintained the central files, and served as liaison 
with international police through the International Criminal Police 
Organization (Interpol). 

Before independence and until the National Police Academy 
(Ecole Nationale de Police) was opened in 1967, police training 
consisted of a six-month course given at the Federal School in 
Dakar, Senegal. By 1988 about 6,000 police officers had been 
trained at the National Police Academy; in the 1980s, the acad- 
emy annually graduated about 450 officers, who were then assigned 
to the Police Forces of the Ministry of Internal Security. Like its 
military counterparts, the National Police Academy also served 
as a regional training center for francophone Africa and has 
graduated officers from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Afri- 
can Republic, Chad, Congo, Niger, and Senegal. 

The academy's basic course of study varied from six months to 
two years (depending on the student's rank) and included forensic 
medicine, judicial procedure, criminal investigation, criminology 
and criminal psychology, police administration, computer technol- 
ogy, and communications. Admission was by direct recruitment 
or entrance examinations. Candidates for commissioner were re- 
quired to have credits toward a law degree to gain entrance and 



208 



National Security 



to complete their law degree in order to graduate. Candidates who 
failed to obtain the law degree within two years were admitted to 
the police officer corps. Commissioners also were recruited from 
among police officers who fulfilled length-of-service requirements 
set by police ordinance. Police officer candidates, who also under- 
went a two-year training program, could be admitted directly to 
the academy with a bachelor's degree or were recruited by exami- 
nation from among police officers with three years' service. Finally, 
police officers were recruited from among qualified Ivoirian na- 
tionals who had completed elementary school. 

The third pillar of internal security, the National Gendarmerie, 
consisted of a headquarters staff, four legions (corresponding to 
the four military regions) and a professional training academy, the 
Gendarmerie School (Ecole de Gendarmerie). This national con- 
stabulary force was formed in October 1960, replacing the Guard 
of the Republic that had been established in 1958. In 1988 Colonel 
Koffi Botty was the high commander of the National Gendarmerie, 
having replaced Brigadier General N'daw in 1983. The National 
Gendarmerie was responsible for defending rural areas and main- 
taining domestic order, thereby complementing the conventional 
tactical capabilities of the regional military commands. Its effec- 
tive strength of 1,500 in the late 1960s doubled to 3,000 in the early 
1970s, and in 1987 it was estimated at 4,500. The headquarters 
included an intelligence bureau; administrative and training center; 
bureaus of logistics, personnel, and budget planning; and a secu- 
rity and foreign liaison division. 

The four National Gendarmerie legions each had a general staff, 
detached companies that were deployed in and around the major 
towns and population centers in their respective prefectures, and 
a small number of mobile squads for rapid reaction and general 
support. 

Before 1960 auxiliaries and auxiliary students trained in Dakar. 
In 1960 an officer instruction center was created in Abidjan. In 
1961 the National Gendarmerie set up its own academy, the Gen- 
darmerie School, in Abidjan. The school trained NCOs (recruit- 
ed from among the police and other qualified persons) and 
constables (recruited from among qualified students). The train- 
ing period lasted about eleven months, at the end of which gradu- 
ating constables received a police aptitude certificate. NCOs 
received an equivalent diploma. Students received instruction in 
both police techniques and military training. The academy also 
offered eight-week in-service training courses for NCOs and motor- 
cycle police. The academy has graduated a large number of NCOs 
but only a few officers. The 1983 graduating class included about 



209 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

250 NCOs and 8 officers, bringing the academy's total number 
of graduates to 77 officers and 6,062 NCOs, which included 113 
Burkinabe NCOs who underwent training between 1967 and 1969. 

Crime and Punishment 

The Constitution of Cote d'lvoire establishes a legal basis for 
the Ivoirian criminal justice system. The right to a fair public trial 
is guaranteed by law, and that right generally was respected in 
urban areas. In rural areas, traditional justice often substituted for 
formal criminal law. By law, defendants are entitled to legal coun- 
sel, and the court is supposed to appoint lawyers for the indigent; 
however, attorneys were often not available. 

Criminal Justice System 

The Ivoirian penal code prohibited official violence without legiti- 
mate justification; nevertheless, suspects (particularly foreign Afri- 
cans) were routinely subjected to rough treatment when detained 
or arrested by the National Gendarmerie or National Security 
Police. The penal code also allowed the police or investigative magis- 
trates to conduct home searches without warrants if they had rea- 
son to believe that evidence of a crime would be found. Although 
the Constitution and statutes prohibited arbitrary arrest and im- 
prisonment, the penal code did permit public prosecutors to de- 
tain suspects for up to forty-eight hours without charges. Magistrates 
could order longer detention of up to four months, provided that 
monthly reports were filed with the Ministry of Justice justifying 
continued detention. In the 1980s, periodic but short-lived anti- 
crime campaigns resulted in massive detentions. The Ivoirian 
government abolished capital punishment for political crimes and 
had not employed it for criminal offenses since independence. 

Prison System 

As in most Third World countries, prison conditions in Cote 
d'lvoire were harsh. Prisons often were crowded, dietary condi- 
tions were poor, and medical and sanitation facilities were minimal. 
Family members were encouraged to bring food to prisoners to 
supplement the meager prison diets. Prisons served as punitive and 
custodial facilities rather than as rehabilitative institutions. Visits 
by prisoners' attorneys were permitted, but the vast majority of 
inmates could not afford legal assistance. The few court-appointed 
lawyers could not effectively represent the large numbers of per- 
sons assigned to them. There was virtually no vocational training, 
and although prisoners routinely performed labor, like cleaning 
public markets or maintaining roads, they did little or no gainful 



210 



National Security 



work. Prison staffs and guard forces were small relative to the in- 
mate population, had minimum education and professional train- 
ing, and could scarcely maintain control of the inmates and prison 
facilities. In July 1983, for example, a group of armed Burkinabe 
made a night raid on the large prison in Bouake and freed forty- 
five of their countrymen. 

The prison population in 1966 was 3,754 inmates, of whom 2,953 
had been sentenced and 801 were accused but not yet convicted 
or sentenced. By the early 1970s, the prison population had in- 
creased sharply to between 5,000 and 7,000 inmates. The two larg- 
est prisons, at Yopougon near Abidjan and at Bouake, accounted 
for about one-half the total prison population. The former facility 
had about 1,100 inmates, and the latter had between 1,600 and 
2,000. Ten years later, the number of inmates in the Bouake pri- 
son was estimated at 1,400, and by 1985 the total number of con- 
victed prisoners in the country had doubled to some 13,000. A large 
proportion (perhaps even a substantial majority) of the inmates in 
Ivoirian penal institutions were expatriate Africans from neighbor- 
ing countries. If the 1966 prison population figures are represen- 
tative of a fairly stable ratio of inmates awaiting sentence to those 
actually serving sentences, then Cote d'lvoire compared very 
favorably with the Third World norm in which the majority of 
prisoners were awaiting trial because of the judicial backlog. 

Periodically, Houphouet-Boigny granted wholesale amnesties to 
prisoners. For example, in October 1975 he pardoned about 5,000 
common law prisoners serving prison terms for embezzlement and 
theft. At the same time, he pardoned many political prisoners, in- 
cluding 145 who had been implicated in the Gagnoa uprising of 
1970 and 12 soldiers who had been held since the 1973 coup plot. 
Ten years later, on December 7, 1985, in commemoration of the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Cote d'lvoire's independence, the presi- 
dent ordered the release of nearly 10,000 of the country's prisoners 
who were not incarcerated for violent crimes or armed robbery. 

Incidence and Trends in Crime 

Crime in Cote d'lvoire has been linked to abrupt socioeconomic 
and cultural change related to uncontrolled and rapid urbaniza- 
tion, industrialization and associated labor migration, unemploy- 
ment and underemployment, the proliferation of urban slums, the 
absence or collapse of urban and human services, and the inabil- 
ity of government authorities to enforce law and order. In the 1980s, 
serious crime increased markedly, particularly in Abidjan and other 
urban areas. Like other modernizing countries, Cote d'lvoire ex- 
perienced increases in theft, armed robbery, myriad petty crimes, 



211 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

prostitution, and drug and alcohol abuse. The most frequent of- 
fenders were young men and juveniles, although women also in- 
creasingly resorted to crime. 

Police Response to Increased Crime 

In July 1987, the minister of internal security estimated that the 
Ivoirian police required about 800 recruits a year — nearly three 
times the recruitment level at that time — to cope with increasing 
crime. In the 1980s, law enforcement officials conducted periodic 
large-scale crime sweeps and law-enforcement crackdowns to deter 
and disrupt illegal activities. In July 1983, for instance, police de- 
tained more than 3,500 people during a ten-day sweep of Abidjan 
that involved both directed and random searches of people, vehi- 
cles, and homes. Special police units were formed to counter the 
increasingly sophisticated and brazen tactics used by criminals. In 
July 1984, the minister of internal security formed a new "antigang 
brigade" with special training, equipment, and weapons. In early 
1987, in response to the proliferation of bank robberies in Abidjan, 
the ministry established a bank surveillance brigade with fifteen 
vehicles donated by the Professional Association of Banks. 

In the 1980s, the government stepped up drug enforcement ef- 
forts to prevent the production, smuggling, sale, and use of illegal 
drugs, such as marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, heroin, and 
cocaine. In 1986 the police narcotics squad handled 718 drug cases. 
Nevertheless, the government failed to make a serious dent in an 
alarming problem that continued to outstrip enforcement resources. 
In May 1987, Cote d'lvoire hosted a two-week international sym- 
posium on the prevention and treatment of drug abuse and alco- 
holism. At the insistence of the United States Federal Aeronautics 
Administration (FAA), the police instituted strict new security meas- 
ures in October 1987 at the Abidjan-Port Bouet International Air- 
port to meet international standards. The measures included 
personal searches, metal detectors, baggage x-rays, access cards 
for airport service personnel, and strict access controls for persons 
and vehicles seeking to enter the airport. 

Public Response: fr Psy chose Securitaire" 

Crime and security have become major public concerns in Cote 
d'lvoire. The alarming increase in crime rates, particularly in Abi- 
djan, has induced dipsy chose securitaire (obsession with security) among 
Ivoirians. Frequently thefts and armed robberies, often accom- 
panied by violence, have led some neighborhoods and businesses 
to form defense committees to protect their lives and property. Pri- 
vate security firms also have prospered in the cities, especially in 



212 



National Security 



Abidjan, filling the growing gap between levels of crime and police 
protection. Various communal and business interest groups have 
provided equipment and resources to the overtaxed and under- 
equipped public security forces. The most notable recent example 
was the Abidjan bankers' contribution of motor vehicles to the new 
bank surveillance unit. The Union of Burkinabe in Cote dT voire 
also donated ten vehicles to the police during 1983 and 1984. The 
Lebanese community, whose estimated 100,000 to 300,000 mem- 
bers control much of the retail trade, contributed twenty vehicles 
and 200,000 liters of fuel to security forces, and the Italian busi- 
ness community donated fifty-five Fiat vehicles to the police. France 
also has furnished substantial assistance to the paramilitary forces. 
After Houphouet-Boigny made an obviously undeliverable promise 
in November 1983 to rid the country of banditry within five months, 
the French government promptly donated about 100 Peugeot-504 
diesel vehicles to the National Gendarmerie. In 1984 France also 
dispatched a special police brigade to reinforce Ivoirian counter- 
parts. Despite such self-help and French support, in early 1988 there 
was no indication that the magnitude of Cote d T voire 's crime 
problem would diminish or that the capacity of the security forces 
to control it would improve. 

* * * 

Given the specialized nature of the material and the protective- 
ness of Ivoirian security services, there is no comprehensive study 
covering Ivoirian national security. Much of the material in this 
chapter came from periodicals like Afrique defense, its English- 
language counterpart Africa Defence, Africa Research Bulletin, Marches 
tropicaux et mediterraneens, and Freres d'armes. Other sources were an- 
nual publications, such as The Military Balance published by the In- 
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers produced by the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, and Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices produced by the United States Department of State. Material 
on the administrative structure of security forces came from 
L 'Administration ivoirienne, by Hugues Tay and Guide des institutions 
politiques et administratives by Albert Aggrey. The main sources for 
information on crime and the criminal justice system included the 
Ivoirian daily Fraternite matin and the Abidjan Institute of Crimi- 
nology's published conference proceedings titled First West African 
Conference in Comparative Criminology. Also useful was Crime and 
Modernization by Louise Shelley. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



213 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1965-84 

3 Major Economic Aggregates, Selected Years, 1970-87 

4 Agricultural Production, Selected Years, 1979-87 

5 Exports, Imports, and Balance of Trade, Selected Years, 

1965-84 

6 Principal Trading Partners, 1985 

7 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-84 

8 Total Debt and Debt Service, Selected Years, 1970-87 

9 Army Equipment Inventory, 1987 

10 Naval Equipment Inventory, 1987 

11 Air Force Equipment Inventory, 1987 



215 



Appendix 



Tnhlo 1 

1 OLDie 1 . 


Adetric Convevsion Coefficients cine 


I FdCtOTS 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 




0.39 


inches 






feet 


Kilometers , 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares (1U,UUU nrj 




acres 






square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 







pounds 






long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1965-84 
(in billions of CFA francs at constant prices; base year 1984) * 



Sector 


1965 


1970 


1975 


1980 


1983 


1984 


Agriculture 


485.6 


605.0 


680.1 


856.3 


767.1 


767.9 




104.8 


204.9 


287.5 


511.5 


493.0 


374.1 


Services 


257.3 


409.1 


844.2 


105.0 


1,062.1 


1,013.9 



* For value of the CFA franc — Communaute Financiere Africaine franc — see Glossary. 



Table 3. Major Economic Aggregates, Selected Years, 1970-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1970 


1975 


1980 


1982 


1984 


1986 


1987 


Gross national product 


1,369 


3,580 


9,951 


7,059 


6,092 


8,657 


9,439 


Exports of goods and services . 


. 566 


1,503 


3,640 


2,844 


3,042 


3,705 


3,624 


Imports of goods and services 


. 584 


1,741 


4,761 


3,498 


2,833 


3,482 


3,881 


Current account balance .... 


-38 


-379 


-1,826 


-1,016 


-54 


-135 


-624 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, "Country Tables" in World Debt Tables, 
2, Washington, 1988, 98. 



217 



Cote dTvoire: A Country Study 



Table 4. Agricultural Production, Selected Years, 1979-87 
(in thousands of tons) 



Commodity 


1979-81 1 


1985 


1986 


1987 




1,090 


1,048 


1,084 


1,000 


Rice 


438 


541 


561 


595 




352 


480 


420 


415 




3,429 


4,671 


4,799 


4,704 




1 Ofsl 


1 son 




1 , JUVJ 


Yams 


2,079 


2,900 


3,000 


2,900 






390 


400 


400 




157 


160 


187 


215 


Sugar cane 


1,373 


1,270 


1,500 


1,750 




163 


163 


140 2 


136 2 


Coffee 


298 


277 


265 


260 


Cocoa 


427 


580 


575 


570 




54 


88 


75 


91 




74 


117 


115 


122 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Annual average. 

2 Estimate. 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
FAO Production Yearbook, 1987, Rome, 1988, 113-244. 



Table 5. Exports, Imports, and Balance of Trade, Selected Years, 1965-84 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 



Exports 



Coffee 


104.9 


186.2 


301.6 


644.2 


410.6 


450.2 


Cocoa 


39.4 


89.0 


240.6 


793.3 


427.0 


964.0 


Other agricultural products . . 


. . 22.7 


18.6 


70.3 


105.0 


77.9 


127.0 


Forestry products 


, , 60.7 


84.7 


162.6 


474.3 


198.1 


217.0 


Petroleum products 


7.2 


5.2 


67.9 


212.0 


239.3 


308.0 




24.2 


42.5 


218.4 


362.1 


356.1 


296.6 




4.7 


17.7 


59.2 


131.0 


103.9 


136.9 


Wood products 


21.4 


17.7 


50.2 


98.5 


119.0 


117.6 


Other manufactures 


. . 40.8 


20.7 


113.0 


192.2 


151.6 


169.4 




326.0 


482.3 


1,283.8 


3,012.6 


2,083.5 


2,786.7 


Imports 














Agricultural products 


42.2 


41.8 


113.7 


249.4 


251.3 


231.4 


Petroleum products 


13.0 


15.3 


133.8 


557.1 


343.3 


432.8 


Manufactures 


. . 204.0 


326.3 


967.7 


1,807.1 


911.7 


1,115.7 




. , 259.2 


383.4 


1,215.2 


2,613.6 


1,506.3 


1,779.9 




66.9 


93.0 


68.9 


399.0 


585.2 


1,007.6 



218 



Appendix 



Table 6. Principal Trading Partners, 1985 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Country Exports Imports 





527.7 


511.0 




507.0 


76.7 




300.7 


69.3 




287.5 


59.7 




192.1 


87.3 




135.6 


41.5 



Source: Based on information from Africa Research Bulletin [Exeter, United Kingdom], 24, 
No. 6, July 31, 1987, 8769. 



Table 7. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-84 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 



Goods and services balance 61.2 96.5 5.6 -570.3 60.4 755.9 

Interest, transfers, and 

remittances -52.3 -88.2 -324.1 -1,262.3 -986.7 -891.8 

Current account balance * 8.9 8.3 -318.4 -1,832.6 -926.4 -135.9 

Capital account balance 

(private and public) 3J) 29.5 191.6 1,020.9 392.6 269.1 

Overall balance * 12.6 37.8 -126.8 -811.7 -533.8 133.2 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Table 8. Total Debt and Debt Service, Selected Years, 1970-87 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1970 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Long-term debt 


266 


1,008 


4,742 


8,490 


9,733 


11,714 


Short-term debt 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1,059 


725 


787 


1,265 


IMF credit used 1 





13 





622 


623 


576 


Total debt 2 


266 


1,021 


5,801 


9,837 


11,142 


13,555 


Debt service 


43 


143 


943 


1,235 


1,540 


1,477 



n.a. — not available. 

1 International Monetary Fund — see Glossary. 

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from World Bank, "Country Tables" in World Debt Tables, 
2, Washington, 1988, 98-99. 



219 



Cote d'hoire: A Country Study 

Table 9. Army Equipment Inventory, 1987 

Country of In 
Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Tanks 

AMX-13 light France 5 

Armored vehicles 

AML-60 -do- 10 

AML-90 -do- 6 

ERC-90 Panhard reconnaissance -do- 7 

M-4 armored personnel carrier United States 16 

VAB4x4 France 13 

Air defense 

20mm M693 towed and self-propelled 

(air defense gun) France and 

United States 14 

40mm towed antiaircraft gun France 5 

Towed artillery 

M-1950 105mm howitzer United States 4 

Mortars 

120mm AM-50 France 16 

Antitank weapons 

89mm STRIM France n.a. 

Recoilless rifles 

106mm M-40 United States n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987, 129; 

Barbara Pope, ed., World Defense Forces, Santa Barbara, California, 1987, 62; and 
Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1986, Washington, 1986, 379. 



220 



Appendix 



Table 10. Naval Equipment Inventory, 1987 



Country of In 
Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Fast attack craft 

(equipped with missiles) 

PR-48 Patra class France 2 

Patrol craft 

PR-48 Patra class France and 

Belgium 2 

Karlskrona CG.27 Sweden 3 

Amphibious landing ships 

Batral class France 1 

LCVPs 1 * 

Fast assault boats 

Rotork-type Britain 10 

Service craft 

Barracuda-class launch United States 1 

Arcor France 8 * 

River patrol craft 

Comoe class -do- 1 

Training vessels 

Shimazu training ship Japan 1 

* Estimate. 

Source: Based on information from Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., Combat Fleets of the World, 
1986-1987, Annapolis, 1986, 282-83; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1978-1988, London, 
1987, 300. 



221 



Cote d' I voire: A Country Study 

Table 11. Air Force Equipment Inventory, 1987 

Country of In 
Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Ground attack 

Dassault-Breguet light attack/trainer France 6 

Trainer 

Aerospatiale Rallye 160 basic -do- 1 

Aerospatiale Rallye 235 basic -do- 1 

Riems Aviation/Cessna 150H basic -do- 2 

Beech F33C Bonanza basic United States 6 

Transport 

Grumman Gulfstream II and III -do- 2 

Rockwell Aero Commander 500B -do- 2 

Liaison and transport 

F-28 Mk 4000 Fellowship VIP Netherlands 1 

Helicopters and transport 
SA-313B Alouette lis, 
SA-316B Alouette Ills, 
SA-365C Dauphin 3s, 

SA-330 Pumas France 1 1 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987, 129; 
"Republic of the Ivory Coast," Air Forces of the World, 1986, Geneva, 1986, 285-86, 
and "Ivory Coast," Flight International, November 29, 1986, 47. 



222 



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Chipman, John. French Military Policy and African Security. London: 
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Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa. Chicago: Univer- 
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"Urban Strategy and Development Strategy." Pages 

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Ministere de 1' economie et des finances. Projet de loi de 

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1986. 



233 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



. Ministere du plan et de l'industrie. Plan quinquennal de de- 

veloppement economique, social et cultur el, 1981-1985. (Unpublished 

document, 3 vols.) Abidjan: 1983. 
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1 18-135 in Olajide Aluko (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States. 

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Delury, George E. (ed.). World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and 

Parties. (Facts on File Series, 1 .) New York: Facts on File, 1987. 
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Diallo, Thierno. "Les societes et la civilisation des Peul." Pages 

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249-250, October-November 1986, 97-104. 
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J.-F. Medard (eds.), Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote dTvoire. Paris: 

Karthala, 1982. 

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234 



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235 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



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Toungara, Jeanne Maddox. "Political Reform and Economic 
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Chapter 5 

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"Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast 

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237 



Cote dTvoire: A Country Study 



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Campbell, Bonnie. "The Ivory Coast." Pages 66-116 in John 
Dunn (ed.), West African States: Failures and Promise. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 

Clinard, Marshall B., and Daniel J. Abbott. Crime in Developing 
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Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1986, Washington: Perth, 1986. 
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118-35 in Oaljide Aluko (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States. 

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Faure, Y.-A., and J.-F. Medard. Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote dTvoire. 
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France. Ministere des affaires etrangeres. Cote dTvoire: Mission 
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Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. Personal Rule in Black 
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Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-1988. London: Jane's, 1987. 

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Kurian, George Thomas. "Ivory Coast." Pages 982-99 in George 
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239 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



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Woronoff, Jon. West African Wager: Houphouet Versus Nkrumah. 
Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1972. 

Zartman, I. William. International Relations in the New Africa. Engle- 
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Zartman, I. William, and Christopher Delgado (eds.). The Politi- 
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241 



Glossary 



barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day, often ab- 
breviated 4 'bpd" or "bd." A barrel is a volume measure of 
forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons 
depends on the density of the specific product. About 7.3 bar- 
rels of average crude oil weigh one ton; gasoline and kerosene 
average closer to 8 barrels per ton. 

canton — During the colonial era, referred to a group of neighbor- 
ing villages linked either by ethnicity or by direct family ties. 

CFA franc — The African Financial Community (Communaute 
Financiere Africaine — CFA) franc, the currency of Cote d'lvoire. 
In 1988 CFA F315 equaled US$1. The CFA, an organization 
that includes France and most former French colonies in Africa, 
administers currency policy in the franc zone. As of 1988, the 
CFA maintained a currency parity between French francs (FF) 
and the CFA francs of West Africa at the rate of FF1 = CFA 
F50. Issuing the CFA francs is the Central Bank of West Afri- 
can States (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest — BCEAO), which is based in Paris. 

cooperants — French technical assistants and teachers under contract 
to the Ivoirian government for a fixed period. Cooperants gener- 
ally received higher salaries than local counterparts and were 
exempted from many customs regulations. Until 1986 the 
Ivoirian government assumed responsibility for paying cooper- 
ants; after 1986 their salaries were included in the foreign aid 
provided by France. 

coutumes — Literally, "customs, mores, or practices." Fixed, annual 
fees paid by colonial authorities to local rulers to secure trad- 
ing rights or permission to establish permanent settlements. 
Payment of coutumes constituted a de facto recognition of lower 
status and ceased when the colonial administration felt it could 
impose its will on local chiefs. 

fiscal year (FY) — the calendar year. 

French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise — AOF) — The 
collection of territories under French colonial rule until 1960. 
French West Africa comprised what in 1988 was Mauritania, 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Cote d'lvoire, Niger, Togo, and 
Benin. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the value of domestic 
goods and services produced by an economy over a period of 



243 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 

time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final con- 
sumption and investment are included because the values of 
primary and intermediate production are assumed to be in- 
cluded in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown 
at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are 
included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP 
at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for 
depreciation of physical assets have not been made. 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product (q. v. ) 
plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- 
eign countries. GNP is the broadest measure of the output of 
goods and services by an economy. 

indigenat — Refers to denizenship and rights of natives. In colonial 
French West Africa (q.v.), the colonial system of discipline 
characterized by arbitrary and summary judgments accorded 
Africans living in rural areas. The indigenat was abolished in 1946. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affi- 
liated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange rates and payments. The main business 
of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including 
industrialized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments 
by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

London Club — A noninstitutional framework within which bank 
advisory committees conduct negotiations between debtor coun- 
tries and the private banks holding the loans. The advisory com- 
mittees form in response to requests for debt restructuring and 
consist of individuals representing major loan holders in the 
key creditor countries. The London Club typically reschedules 
principal falling due and principal in arrears; interest is not 
covered by any agreement and must be paid along with any 
outstanding arrearages before any agreement can take effect. 

Paris Club — A noninstitutional framework whereby developed na- 
tions that have made loans or guaranteed official or private ex- 
port credits to developing nations meet to discuss borrowers' 
ability to repay debts. The organization, which met for the first 
time in 1956, has no formal or institutional existence and no 
fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French trea- 
sury, and it has a close relationship with the World Bank (q. v.), 
the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), and the United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 



244 



Glossary 



Western Sudan — That part of French West Africa (q. v.) compris- 
ing in 1988 the state of Mali. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less- 
developed countries. The president and certain senior officers 
of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three 
institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that 
subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



245 



Index 



Abbe people, 56 

Abidjan: concentration of population in, 
26; courts in, 151-2; crime in, 211; Ebrie 
population in, 56; land concessions in, 
77; life expectancy in, 86; as military 
region, 189- 90, 192; petroleum fields 
near, 125; as port, 131; as principal city, 
16; as railroad terminal, 129; roads in, 
130; social unrest in, xxx; telecommu- 
nications in, 133; university in, 81, 84 

Abidjan-Niger Railroad (Regie du Chemin 
de Fer Abidjan-Niger: RAN), 129-30 

Abidjan-Port Bouet International Air- 
port, 132-33 

Abidjan Stock Exchange (Bourse de Valeurs 
d' Abidjan), 104 

Abidjan University (see also National Uni- 
versity of Cote d'lvoire), 27 

Abidji people, 56 

Abolition of Slavery, Supplementary Con- 
vention (1956), 206 
Aboure people, 56 

Abron (Brong) people, xxiv, xxvi, 7, 56 

Academy of Oceanographic Sciences and 
Technology, 197 

accords, military (1961), 197-98 

Adioukrou people, 56 

administration, government (see also mili- 
tary organization; specific ministries), 
24, 146, 207; autonomous communi- 
ties as, 155-56; cercles (French colonial), 
13-14; divisions of, 25-26, 207; prefec- 
ture administration of, 24-25, 153-54, 
189, 207; Subprefectural Council of, 155; 
subprefectures (sous-prefetures) of, 24-25, 
154-55, 207 

Administrative Section (Supreme Court), 
152 

Advisory Labor Committee, 108 
African Agricultural Union (Syndicat 
Agricole Africain: SAA), 4, 17; opposi- 
tion of, 73-74; pressure for colonial re- 
form of, xxv, 20 
African Civic Action Program, 200 
African Democratic Rally (Rassemble- 
ment Democratique Africain: RDA), 
19, 20 



African Development Bank, 138 
African Financial Community (Com- 

munaute Financiere Africaine), 102 
Agip, 126 

Agni (Anyi) people, xxiv, xxvi, 7, 28, 49; 
Christianity among, 72, 73; culture of, 
54-56; rebellion of, 7, 28, 55 

agricultural sector (see also cocoa industry; 
coffee industry; exports; food process- 
ing industry; planter class): expansion 
of, 93; exports of, xxvii, 4, 26, 30, 
94-95, 109-10, 112-17, 121-22, 134; 
food crops of, 117-20; foreign workers 
in, xxvi, 106-7, 205; forest and savanna 
regions of, 110-11; labor force employ- 
ment in, 105; livestock and poultry in, 
120; performance of, 109-10; planta- 
tion elite in, 19, 73; under Vichy 
government, 16 

Ahmadiya brotherhood, 70 

Aid and Cooperation Fund (Fond d'Aide 
et de Cooperation: FAC), 138 

AIDS, 87-88 

Air Afrique, 133 

air bases, 191-92 

air fields, 129, 133, 192 

air force (see also Ivoirian Air Force), 183 

Air France, 133 

Air Ivoire, 133, 191 

airports, 129, 132-33 

Air Transport Union (Union des Trans- 
ports Aeriens: UTA), 133 

Akan people (see also Agni (Anyi)), xxvi, 
7, 47, 48; influence of, 61; religions of, 
66, 68; society of, 53-56 

Albania, 173 

Alepe, 45 

Algeria, 177, 185 

Alladian people, 56 

Alliali, Camille, 158 

Angoulvant, Gabriel, xxiv, 11 

AOF. See French West Africa (Afrique 
Occidentale Francaise: AOF) 

armed forces (see also Armed Forces of Cote 
d'lvoire; conscription; military train- 
ing; veterans), 169-70; chain of com- 
mand in, 187; expansion of, 186; of 
French in Cote d'lvoire, 170, 198-99; 



247 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



under Houphouet-Boigny, 25, 27-28; 

increased political role for, 203-4; 

recruitment for, 192; role and strength 

of, 183-84, 200-201 
Armed Forces of Cote d'lvoire (Force 

Armee Nationale de Cote d'lvoire: 

FANCI), 187, 189-92, 203 
army. See Armed Forces of Cote d'lvoire 

(Force Armee Nationale de Cote d'lvoire: 

FANCI) 

Asante kingdom (see also Ghana), 49, 53 
Asante people, 7 

assimilation: Africans under policy of, 12; 

Agni and Baoule policy for, 55; French 

colonial policy for, 12 
Assini, 3, 8 

Association of Ivoirian Women (Associ- 
ation des Femmes Ivoiriennes: AFI), 
79 

association policy, French colonial, 12 
Attie people, 56 

Audit and Control Section (Supreme 

Court), 152 
Avikam people, 56 
Ayame I dam, 124 
Ayame II dam, 124 
Ayame (reservoir/lake), 45 

Bafing River, 45 
Bagbe River, 45 

balance of payments, 94, 96, 97, 134- 

35 

Ballou, Joseph, 187 

Bambara people, 50, 59-60 

banana industry, 116 

Bandama Blanc River, 43, 44, 45, 49 

Bandama Rouge River, 43, 44, 45 

Bandama Valley Authority (Autorite de 
la Vallee de la Bandama: AVB), 99 

banking system, 102-3 

Banny, Jean Konan, 187, 190, 204 

Baoule people, xxiv, 3, 7, 17, 49; culture 
of, 55-56; as ethnic group, xxvi; repre- 
sentation in government of, 166; syn- 
cretic religions among, 73 

Baptists, 72 

Baroan, Bertin Zeze, 187 
barrier islands (cordon littoral), 40 
BCEAO. See Central Bank of West Afri- 
can States (Banque Centrale des Etats 
de L'Afrique de l'Ouest: BCEAO) 
Bechio, Jean Jacques, 158 



Bedie, Henri Konan, xxix, 32, 158; and 
National Assembly, 149; and succes- 
sion, 165 

Belier oil field, 125-26, 127 

Benin, 13, 23, 173-74 

Berlin Conference (1885), 9 

Bete people, xxvi, 28, 49, 57-58 

Bia River, 45 

Binger, Louis, xxiv, 10 

Bobo Dioulasso region, 17 

Bobo people, 64 

Bondoukou, 7, 43, 44 

Botty, Koffi, 209 

Bouake, 118, 151-2, 183, 202; as military 
region, 189, 191, 193, 196; prison, 211 

Brazzaville Conference (1944), 16-18 

Britain, 9, 10, 200 

brotherhoods of Islam, 70 

BSIE. See Special Investment and Capi- 
tal Equipment Budget (Budget Spe- 
cial d'Investissement et d'Equipement: 
BSIE) 

budget deficit, 30 

budgets, domestic (see also spending, pub- 
lic), 100-102 
Burkinabe people, xxvi, 10, 64, 175, 205 
Burkina Faso, 10, 23, 45; border with, 40; 
immigrants from, 106, 171, 175, 205; 
relations with, 173-75; Voltaic cultures 
in, 60-61 

Buyo hydroelectric facility and dam, 95, 
124 

Buyo reservoir/lake, 45 



Canada, 138 

cantons, 154, 155 

Cape Palmas, 45 

capital flows, xxviii, 96, 102-3 

cassava cultivation, 118-20 

Cavally River, 43, 44-45 

CCCE. See Central Fund for Economic 
Cooperation (Caisse Centrale pour la 
Cooperation Economique: CCCE) 

CEAO. See Economic Community of West 
Africa (Communaute Economique de 
l'Afrique Occidental : CEAO) 

Center for Antipollution Control, 197 

Central Bank of West African States 
(Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique 
de l'Ouest: BCEAO), 102, 104 

Central Fund for Economic Cooperation 



248 



Index 



(Caisse Centrale pour la Cooperation 
Economique: CCCE), 125, 138 
cercles, 13-14 

Cesareo, Antoine, 166-67 
Chad, 177 

Charles, Donwahi, 158 
Chevron Oil Company, 127 
China: relations with, 177, 178 
Christianity (see also Baptists; Methodists; 

Roman Catholicism), 64 
civil defense, 189 
civil rights, 146-47 
civil servants, 73, 77, 105 
climate, 45-46 

Coastal Security Program, 200 

cocoa industry, xxiii, xxvii, 26, 30, 94, 

95, 96-97, 109-10, 112, 138 
coffee industry, xxiii, xxvii, 26, 30, 94, 

95, 96-97, 109-10, 112-13, 138 
Coffie, Joseph, 168 

Commodity Marketing and Price Control 
Board (Caisse de Stabilisation et de Sou- 
tien des Prix de Production Agricole: 
CSSPPA), 98, 99, 101, 110, 137 
Communist Party, France, xxv, 20-21 
Communist Study Groups, 16, 19 
communities, autonomous, 155-56 
Comoenou kingdom, 55 
Comoe River, 44, 45 
Companies for the Security of the Republic 
(Compagnies Republicaines de Securite: 
CRS), 208 
Company of Pioneers, 202 
Compaore, Blaise, 175 
conscription, 147, 184-85, 192 
Constituent Assembly (France), 17-18 
constitution: of French Fourth Republic 
(1946), 18, 19; reforms of 1946 (1956): 
lot cadre, 22; of French Fifth Republic 

(1958) , xxv, 22-23, 145; of Cote d'lvoire 

(1959) , 23 

Constitution (1960): of Cote d'lvoire, 
xxv-xxvi, 24, 145-56; criminal justice 
system, 210; provisions related to mili- 
tary of, 186; provisions related to suc- 
cession, 165 

Constitutional Section (Supreme Court), 
152, 153 

Convention on the Political Rights of 

Women (1953), 206 
Convention on the Prevention and 

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 

(1948), 206 



cooperants, 106, 170, 198 

corruption, xxviii, 34, 163, 172, 192 

Cote d'lvoire Credit Bank (Credit de la 
Cote d'lvoire: CCI), 103 

cotton industry, 96, 115 

Coulibaly, Addoulaye, 190-91 

Coulibaly, Ibrahim, 187 

Coulibaly, Mamadou, 31 

Council of Government, 22 

Council of Ministers, 148, 152, 186 

Council of the Entente (Conseil de l'En- 
tente), 23, 173; economic aid from, 
138; formation and function of, 173-74; 
French military guarantees to, 197-98 

coups d'etat: attempts in Cote d'lvoire, 
30, 203, 204; in Burkina Faso (1983), 
147, 174-75; in Ghana (1966), 174; in 
Liberia (1990), 175; in Niger (1974), 
30, 203 

courts of appeal, 152 

courts of assize, 151 

courts of first instance, 151-52 

court system, 146, 151-53, 210 

court system, military, 193 

coutume, 8, 11 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), 206 

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul- 
tural Rights (1966), 206 

crime, xxviii, 138-39, 163; causes of, 
211-12; controls for, 212-13; increase 
in, xxiii, 34, 89, 138, 163 

CSSPPA. See Commodity Marketing and 
Price Control Board (Caisse de Stabili- 
sation et de Soutien des Prix de Produc- 
tion Agricole: CSSPPA) 

cultural groups: of East Atlantic region, 
53-56; identification with, 349; in la- 
goon region, 49, 56, 72; of Mande re- 
gion, 58-60; regions designated for, 
48-50; Voltaic people as, 60-61; of West 
Adantic region, 56-59 

currency: of African Financial Commu- 
nity, 102; of Cote d'lvoire, 94 

Czechoslovakia, 173 



Dahomey (see also Benin): as colony of 
French West Africa, 13; in Entente, 23; 
in Mali Federation, 23; military accord 
(1961), 197-98 

Daloa, 192. 

dams, 45, 111, 121, 123-24 



249 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



Dan Mountains, 43 
Dan people, xxvi, 58-59 
Davo River, 45 

debt, external, xxiii, xxviii, 33, 94, 96, 
97, 100, 135-38 

defense: local organization of, 188-89; 
network in francophone Africa for, 19; 
organization for, 186-87; policy for, 
183-84, 185, 186-87, 188-89, 192; 
purchase of equipment for, 200 

Defense Committee (see also High Defense 
Council), 186 

defense spending. See spending, public 

deforestation, 113-4, 138 

de Gaulle, Charles, xxv, 16, 22 

Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire (Parti 
Democratique de Cote d'lvoire: PDCI), 
4; Committee Directorate of, 158, 160; 
control of student dissent by, 172; de- 
centralization of, 32; formation of, xxv, 
19; Houphouet-Boigny as leader of, 
xxv, 19, 73-74; ideology of, 21; as mass 
organization, 21; opposition to, 20, 34; 
organization and political monopoly of, 
21, 24-26, 156-60; Political Bureau of, 
147, 158; purge and reorganization in, 
25-26; relations with government of, 
179; role of military in, 204 

Denise, Auguste, 31, 158 

diamond mining, 128 

Dida people, 57-58 

Diori, Hamani, 30, 174, 203 

Dioulo, Emmanuel, 34 

discrimination, French colonial adminis- 
tration (see also France, colonial ad- 
ministration and colonial policy of), 
3-4, 12 

disease (see also AIDS), 87 

Djedje Mady, Alphonse, 158 

Djenne, 5 

Djerma people, 64 

Dogon people, 64 

Dona Fologo, Laurent, 147, 158 

drought, 29, 96, 117, 124, 136 

drug abuse, xxviii, 89, 138-39, 163, 212 

East Atlantic Region, 48-49, 53-56 
Ebrie Lagoon, 45, 131 
Ebrie people, 56 

Economic and Social Council (Conseil 
Economique et Social), 146, 149, 151 
economic assistance: from commercial 



creditors, 136; from France, 93, 138, 
170, 177; from Israel, 178; from Paris 
Club donors, 136; from Western coun- 
tries and multilateral agencies, 136-38 

Economic Community of West Africa 
(Communaute Economique de l'Af- 
rique Occidentale: CEAO), 176 

Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), 176, 197 

economic development: diversification, 
115; by France, 4; infrastructure de- 
velopment as, 48, 95-96, 121; National 
Service role for, 187, 202 

economic growth, 4, 26, 29, 93-94, 144, 
160, 162 

economic performance: based on agricul- 
tural exports, 4, 26, 30, 94-96, 109-10, 
121, 136-37; changing levels of, xxiii, 
34, 94-98; effect of political split with 
communism of, 20-21; phases of, 94 

economic policy: of Houphouet-Boigny, 
94-98, 144; long-term planning for, 99 

ECOWAS. Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) 

educational system (see also literacy; 
schools; teachers; university): established 
by Catholic missionaries, 14; improve- 
ment of, 40, 80-81, 85-86; limited ac- 
cess to, 77, 80; primary, secondary, and 
higher, 81-84 

EECI. See Electrical Energy of Ivory Coast 
(Energie Electrique de Cote d'lvoire: 
EECI) 

EFA. See Military Academy (Ecole des 
Forces Armees: EFA) 

Ehotile people, 56 

Ekra, Mathieu, 31, 158, 204 

Elections, 158, 161, 167 

Electrical Energy of Ivory Coast (Ener- 
gie Electrique de Cote d'lvoire: EECI), 
124, 125 

electricity production, 123-25 

elite class. See political system; social 
structure 

Employment Office of Cote d'lvoire, 109 
EMPT. See Military Preparatory Tech- 
nical Academy (Ecole Militaire Prepa- 
ratoire Technique: EMPT) 
energy, 123-25 

Energy Management Agency (France), 
125 

Entente Agreement (1959). 197 
Entente Council, 138 



250 



Index 



enterprises, state-owned, xxiii, 97-98 
Espoir oil and gas fields, 125, 127 
Establishment of Cote d'lvoire, 9 
ethnic associations, 74, 76 
ethnic groups (see also cultural groups), 

xvi, 48-49 
ethnicity: in armed forces, 204; importance 

of, 50; in politics, xxvii, 17,21, 27, 32, 

76, 160, 163, 164, 165-66; problems of, 

xxvi, 61, 64, 163 
European Development Fund, 138, 197 
European Economic Community (EEC), 

134 

European explorers, 7 
European Investment Bank, 125 
Ewe people, 64 

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), 200 

executive branch of government (see also 
Council of Ministers; president; specific 
ministries), 146, 147-48 

exports: of agricultural products, xxvii, 
4, 30, 94, 95, 109-10, 112-17, 121, 
122, 134; to France, 93, 134, 170; in- 
centives for, xxvii, 122-23; markets for, 
134; of non-agricultural products, 122, 
134; revenues from, 26, 30, 94-96, 
109-10, 121, 136-37 

Exxon, 125-27 



FACI. See Ivoirian Air Force (Force Aer- 
ienne de Cote d'lvoire: FACI) 

Fadika, Lamine, 190 

family relationships, 51-53 

FANCI. See Armed Forces of Cote d'lvoire 
(Forces Armees Nationales de Cote 
d'lvoire: FANCI) 

Fanti people, 64 

feculents (starches), 117 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, West 

Feredougouba River, 45 

financial system, 102-4 

fiscal policy, 97 

fishing industry, 120-21 

flooding, 440 

food crops, 117-20 

Food Marketing Bureau (Office pour la 
Commercialisation des Produits Viv- 
iers: OCPV), 120 

food processing industry, 95 

forced labor system, xxiv, 3-4, 14, 18, 19 

foreign borrowing. See debt, external 



foreign policy (see also security, interna- 
tional), 144, 172-79 

Forest Development Company (Societe 
pour le Developpement des Forets: 
SODEFOR), 113-14 

forest region (see also deforestation), 5-6, 
40, 43, 110-11, 113, 120 

Foxtrot gas reserves, 127 

France (see also discrimination, French 
colonial administration; Free French 
government; French West Africa; 
Vichy government): as arms supplier, 
198; assistance with internal security 
by, 213; autonomy for overseas terri- 
tories of, xxv, 22; campaigns against 
Samori Toure, 10; changing colonial 
ambitions of, xxiii-xxiv, 8-9; colonial 
administration and policy of, xxiv, 3-4, 
10, 12-14, 16-22, 47; economic and 
trade relations with, 21, 93, 134, 144, 
170, 176-77; exploration and expan- 
sion in Africa of, xxiv, 8-10, 11-13; in- 
fluence of, 4, 14, 29, 145-46, 170, 183, 
186, 197, 199-200; military recruit- 
ment of Ivoirians by, 185; military rela- 
tions with, 144, 169, 170, 176-77, 
183-84, 197-99; Ministry of Cooper- 
ation of, 106; political relations with, 
134, 176-77; treaties with, 8, 170; 
Vichy government in, xxv, 16, 185 

Franco-Ivoirian Technical Military As- 
sistance Accord (1961), 176-77, 185- 
86, 198 

Franco-Prussian War (1871), xxiii, 8 

Free French government, 16 

French Community, xxv, 22; Cote d'lvoire 
withdraws from (1960), 23-24; Mali 
Federation of, 23 

French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equa- 
toriale Francaise: AEF), 185 

French nationals in Cote d'lvoire, xxvi- 
xxvii, 28-29, 93, 105-6, 166-67, 170 

French Sudan (see also Mali), 10 

French Textile Development Company 
(Compagnie Francaise de Developpe- 
ment des Textiles: CFDT), 115 

French Union, xxv, 18 

French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale 
Francaise: AOF): colonial consolidation 
in, 13-14; designation in French Union 
of, 18; under Grand Council of Dakar 
(1947), 20; impact of World War II on, 
xxiv-xxv, 16-21; military command 
structure for, 184-85; RDA in, 20 



251 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



Fulani people, 59, 64 



Gabon, 176 

Gagnoa uprising (1970), 211 
Gambia, 8 
Gao, 5 

Gbagbo, Laurent, 33, 172 

Gendarmerie School (Ecole de Gendar- 
merie), 209-10 

General Federation of Ivoirian Workers 
(Union Generale des Travailleurs de 
Cote d'lvoire: UGTCI), 85, 109, 168 

Geneva Conventions (1949), 206 

geographic regions, 40 

German Democratic Republic. See Ger- 
many, East 

Germany, 9 

Germany, East, 173 

Germany, West, 138, 200 

Gervais, Jeanne, 79 

Ghana, 53; Akan people in, 49; Asante 
people in, 49; border with, 40; relations 
with, 173-75; Soninke Empire of, 59; 
Voltaic cultures in, 60-61 

Ghana Empire, 5, 59 

gold mining, 128 

Gomonaba River, 45 

Gouro people, 58-59 

Gourounsi people, 64 

government intervention: in economic ac- 
tivity, xxvii, 98-100, 137; in informa- 
tion activities, xxviii, 147, 164; in labor 
force activities, 108, 168-69 

GPM. See Presidential Guard and Militia 
(Garde Presidentielle et Milice: GPM) 

Grand-Bassam, 8 

Guaranteed Minimum Agricultural Wage 
(Salaire Minimum Agricole Garanti: 
SMAG), 108 

Guaranteed Minimum Interprofessional 
Wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofes- 
sionel Garanti: SMIG), 108 

Guere people, 57-58 

Guinea, 10, 45, 59; border with, 40; as 
French West African colony, 13; rela- 
tions with, 173-74, 175 

Guinea-Bissau, 8 

Gulf of Guinea, 8, 40, 43, 44, 74, 131 

hadith. See Islam 
Hamallah, 71 



Hamallism. See Islam 

Harris, William Wade, 72 

Harrism, 72-73 

Hausa people, 64 

health care system, 40, 87-88 

High Committee on Intelligence, 186 

High Court of Justice. See superior courts 

High Defense Council, 186 

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 3; administra- 
tion of, xxv, 4, 23-25, 27-30, 143-44; 
appeal and influence of, 4-5, 27-32, 39, 
74, 143, 163, 203; armed forces and 
government reorganization by, 203-4; 
Baoule heritage of, 55-56, 73; consoli- 
dation of power by, xxvi, 4-5, 24-25, 
27-31, 76, 143; as delegate to French 
Constituent and National Assemblies, 
17, 18, 19-20; foreign policy of, 144, 
172-79; forms and leads RDA, 20; as 
leader of PDCI, xxv, 19; as leader of 
SAA, xxv, 73-74; succession debate 
over, xxviii-xxix, 31-32, 164-66 

housing: private, 88; public, 88 

human rights, 147, 206; limitations of, 
164 

Hungary, 173 

hydroelectric plants {see also dams), 95, 
123-24 



He de Goree, 8 

IMET program. See United States 
immigrants: Burkinabe as, xxvi, 64, 175, 
205; effect of influx of, 26, 29, 61, 64, 
76, 163; effect on population growth of, 
46, 48; French as, 64; French policy to 
encourage, 14; from Mali, 106, 171; 
Mauritanians as, 205; from Middle East, 
51, 64; as migrant laborers, 26-27, 205 
imports: of food, 96, 110, 117, 120; of 
French products, 93, 170; of technology, 
93 

import substitution, xxvii, 93, 95, 121- 

22; industries of, 122-23 
income distribution, xxiii, 4, 29, 74, 76-77, 

79-80, 86, 107-9; policy to equalize, 93 
Indenie people, 7, 55 
independence (1960), 4, 23-24, 93 
indigenat, 14, 17, 157; elimination of, 18 
Indochina, 20 

industrial sector {see also import substitu- 
tion; manufacturing sector): develop- 
ment of, 48; growth of, 95-96, 121; 



252 



Index 



import substitution industries in, 93, 
95; labor force employment in, 105 
inflation, 30 

infrastructure (see also airfields; airports; 
ports; railroads; roads; waterways): de- 
velopment of, xxiii, 93, 94-95, 99; for 
transport, 128-29, 130 

Institute of Higher Studies for National 
Defense (Institut des Hautes Etudes de 
Defense Nationale: IHEDN), 199 

intelligence (see also High Committee on 
Intelligence; National Security Police): 
domestic, 186; foreign, 174 

interest groups: ethnic associations as, 74, 
76; French population as, 170-71; labor 
and labor unions as, 105-7, 168-69; 
military as, 169-70; students and in- 
tellectuals as, 27, 31-32, 74, 171-72; 
Syrians and Lebanese as, 74, 171 

International Cocoa Organization, 112 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 208 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
austerity measures of, 106; standby 
agreement loan of, 136; structural ad- 
justment program of, xxviii, 94, 136, 
137 

investment: direct foreign, 26, 32, 93, 95, 
121; domestic, xxiii, 99-100, 103-4 

Iringou River, 45 

iron ore deposits, 128, 130 

irrigation systems, 111 

Islam (see also brotherhoods of Islam): 
adaptations of, 73; among Juula and 
Malinke people, 60, 70, 72; in Bondou- 
kou, 7; forms of, 64; hadith, 70; Hamal- 
lism of, 71; in Mali Empire, 6; in 
Mande culture, 60; Shia sect in, 70; 
spread of and resistance to, 61, 65, 70-1; 
in Sudan, 5; Sufism in, 70; Sunni sect 
of, 70; Wahabist puritanism of, 70-71 

Israel, 144; relations with, 177, 178-79, 
202 

Italians in Cote d'lvoire, 213 

Ity Mining Company (Societe Miniere 

d'lty: SMI), 128 
Ivoirian Air Force (Force Aerienne de 

Cote d'lvoire: FACI) (see also air force), 

188, 189, 190-91, 196-97 
Ivoirian Air Transport and Liaison 

(Groupement Aerien de Transport et 

de Liaison: GATL), 133, 190 
Ivoirian Bank for Construction and Public 



Works (Banque Ivoirienne de Construc- 
tion et de Travaux Publics: BICT), 103 

Ivoirianization (see also French in Cote 
d'lvoire; immigrants; labor force; 
population), 26, 105-6, 166-67, 168 

Ivoirian Maritime Navigation Company 
(Societe Ivoirienne de Navigation Mar- 
itime: SIVOMAR), 131-32 

Ivoirian Maritime Transport Company 
(Societe Ivoirienne de Transport Mari- 
time: SITRAM), 98, 131 

Ivoirian Mining Company (Societe pour 
le Developpement Minier de Cote 
d'lvoire: SODEMI), 98, 128 

Ivoirian Navy (Marine Nationale), 
183-84, 189, 190, 200 

Ivoirian People's Front (Front Populaire 
Ivoirien: FPI), 172 

Ivoirian Refining Company (Societe 
Ivoirienne de Raffinage: SIR), 127 

Ivoirian Textile Development Company 
(Compagnie Ivoirienne de Developpe- 
ment des Textiles: CIDT), 115 



Jacquinot Decree (1951), 78 
Jaman kingdom, 7 
Japan, 197, 200 

judicial branch of government (see also 
court system; Supreme Court), 146, 
151-53 

Judicial Section (Supreme Court) (see also 

courts of appeal), 152 
justices of the peace, 151 
justice system: criminal, 210-13; military, 

193 

Juula people, xxvi, 6, 7, 50, 59-61; Islam 
among, 70 



Kan River, 45 
Keita, Balla, 158 
kinship, 51 

Koffi, Leon Konan, 204, 207 

Komonos Hills, 43 

Kone, Gaston Ouassenan, 207 

Kong (city), 59, 60 

Kong Empire, 6, 7 

Kongo River, 45 

Korhogo, 151, 190 

Korea, North, 173 

Kossou Dam, 121, 124 



253 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



Kossou reservoir/lake, 45, 124 
Koulango people, 61 
Krou language, 56 

Krou people (see also Bete people), 48, 49, 
64; culture and society of, 56-58; 
religions of, 68 

Kwa language, 49, 50-51, 56-57 



Labor Code (1952), 108 

labor force (see also forced labor; wages): 
educational level of, 94-95; effect of im- 
migrant influx on, 26, 29, 48, 163; 
French workers in, 93, 105-6, 166-67, 
170; Ivoirianization of, 105-6, 166-67, 
168; mobility in, 107; proportion of 
population in, 105; social status of em- 
ployment in, 77; unemployment and 
underemployment in, 26, 29, 108-9; 
wages and earnings of, 107-9; women 
in, 105; work regulations for, 108 

labor unions: government control of, 108, 
168-69; membership in and activities 
of, 168-69; for teachers, 33, 85, 168 

Lagoon cultures, 49, 56, 72 

lagoon region (zone lagunaire), 40, 56 

lakes, 45 

land tenure and use, 110-11 

languages: Agni, 51; Arabic, 51; Atlan- 
tic, 50; Baoule, 51; English, 51; Ewe, 
51; Fanti, 51; Fon, 51; French as offi- 
cial, 50-51, 145; Gourounsi, 51; Krou, 
56; Kwa, 49, 50-51, 56-57; Mande, 
50-51; Mande-kan, 59; Mossi, 51; 
Niger-Congo, 49, 50; Senoufo, 51; 
Voltaic (Gur), 50; Wolof, 51 

Lebanese in Cote d'lvoire, xxvi, 28, 74, 
163, 171, 213 

Lebanon, 51, 64 

legislative branch of government (see also 
National Assembly), 146, 148-49 

Leraba River, 45 

Liberia, 10, 40, 45, 173, 175 

Libya, 70, 174-75, 177 

lineage organization in East Atiantic cul- 
tures, 53-55; importance in Ivoirian 
religions of, 65-66; in Lagoon cultures, 
56; in Mande society, 59; patrilineage 
and matrilineage, 51-53; in religion, 
65-66; in Voltaic cultures, 61; in West 
Atlantic culture, 57-58 

literacy, 81, 160 

livestock, 120 



Loan Guaranty Fund (Council of the En- 
tente), 173 
Lobi people, 60, 61, 69 
Lobo River, 45 
loi cadre, 22 
Loi-Programme, 99 
London Club, xxviii, 97, 136, 137 

Madagascar, 20, 185 

maize production, 118 

Mali, 10, 13, 50; border with, 40; im- 
migrants from, 106, 171; independence 
of, 23; Malinke Empire of, 59; relations 
with, 173, 175 

Mali Empire, 5, 6 

Mali Federation, 23, 174 

Malinke Empire, 59 

Malinke people, xxvi, 50, 59-60; Islam 
among, 70 

Man, 43 

Mandel Decree (1939), 78 

Mande people (see also Bambara people; 
Juula people; Malinke people), 47, 50; 
religions of, 68-69 

Mande Region, 48-49, 58-60 

manganese mining, 128 

manioc cultivation. See cassava 

manufacturing sector (see also import sub- 
stitution), 121-23 

marabout, 70-71 

Marahoue River. See Bandama Rouge 

River 
marriage, 78 
Marxism, 16 

Maternal Health Care (MHC) centers, 87 
Mauritania, 13 

M'Bahia Ble, Kouadio, 187, 204 
Mbato people, 56 
media, 160 
Mekyibo people, 56 
merchant marine fleet, 131-32, 190 
Merchant Marine Training Academy, 
197 

Methodists, 72 

middle class. See social structure 

migration (see also immigration): to Abi- 
djan and the south, 26, 74; role of eth- 
nic associations in, 74, 76; from savanna 
to forest region, 47-48 

Military Academy (Ecole des Forces Ar- 
mees: EFA), 193, 196 

military assistance, 176, 183, 197-200 



254 



Index 



military base (France), 170 

military exercises, 199 

Military Fire Brigade, 189 

military organization, 25, 186-89 

Military Preparatory Technical Academy 
(Ecole Militaire Preparatoire Tech- 
nique: EMPT), 190, 193, 196 

military ranks, 193 

military regions, 189-90 

military service, 192 

military training, 193, 196-97; supplied 
by France, 198; in United States, 200 

minerals, 127-28 

mining industry, 127-28 

Ministry of Agriculture, 202 

Ministry of Cooperation (France), 106 

Ministry of Defense, 187, 201, 203 

Ministry of Defense and Maritime Af- 
fairs, 187-88, 189, 190, 197, 203, 206 

Ministry of Defense (France), 199 

Ministry of Finance, 98-99 

Ministry of Industry, 98 

Ministry of Interior, 206-7 

Ministry of Internal Security, 185, 206-7, 
208 

Ministry of Justice, 153, 210 

Ministry of Maritime Affairs, 187, 190, 
197, 201 

Ministry of Mining, 98 

Ministry of National Education and 
Scientific Research, 85, 201 

Ministry of Overseas Departments and 
Territories (France), 18 

Ministry of Planning, 98-99 

Ministry of Public Health and Popula- 
tion, 88 

Ministry of Rural Development, 203 

Ministry of Trade, 98 

Ministry of Women's Affairs (Ministere 

de la Condition Feminine), 79 
missionaries: Catholic, 14, 72; Christian, 

64; from France, 3 
Morocco, 185 
Moronou kingdom, 55 
mortality rates, 46-47, 86-87 
Mossi people {see also Burkinabe people), 

xxvi, 17, 19; culture of, 60; as workers 

in Cote dTvoire, 26-27 
Mt. Bowe de Kiendi, 44 
Mt. Nimba, 43 
Mt. Yeleve, 44 
mountains, 40, 43 

Movement of Ivoirian Primary and 



Secondary School Students (Mouve- 
ment des Etudiants et Eleves de Cote 
dTvoire: MEECI), 27, 172 
Muhammad (prophet), 69-70 
municipalities, autonomous. See commu- 
nities, autonomous 

Nangui (Nengue), 60 

National Agricultural Development Bank 
(Banque Nationale pour le Developpe- 
ment Agricole: BNEC), 34, 103, 104 

National Amortization Fund (Caisse Au- 
tonome d'Amortissement: CAA), 100 
National Archives, 207 

National Assembly (Assemblee Nation- 
ale), 146, 147-49; Committee for Eco- 
nomic and Financial Affairs, 149; 
Committee for General and Institu- 
tional Affairs, 149; Committee for So- 
cial and Cultural Affairs, 149; open 
election for, 167; powers related to mili- 
tary of, 186 

National Commission on Ivoirianization, 
105 

National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Na- 
tionale), 166, 186, 187, 189, 200; for 
internal security, 209 

nationalism: of Cote dTvoire, 16, 49, 166; 
of French West Africa, 22 

National Police Academy (Ecole Nation- 
ale de Police), 208-9 

National Printing Office, 207 

National Savings and Loan Bank (Ban- 
que Nationale d'Epargne et de Credit: 
BNDA), 103, 104 

National Security Police (Surete Nation- 
ale), 185, 206-8; Counterespionage 
Directorate, 208; Criminal Investigation 
Directorate, 208; Intelligence Direc- 
torate, 208; Public Security Directorate, 
208 

National Service Center, 202 

National Service (Service Civique), 187, 
192, 201-3 

National Telecommunications Bureau 
(Office National de Telecommunica- 
tions: ONT), 133-34 

National Union of Secondary School 
Teachers of Cote d'lvoire (Syndicat Na- 
tional des Enseignants du Secondaire de 
Cote dTvorie: SYNESCI): as critics of 
education policy, 85; organizational 



255 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



independence of, 168; strikes and 

demonstrations by, 33, 204 
National University of Cote d'lvoire, 27, 

33, 51, 79, 84, 86, 172, 178 
National Veterans Administration Office, 

203 

natural gas, 127 

natural resources. See electricity produc- 
tion; forest region; minerals; natural 
gas; oil industry; timber industry 

Naval Academy at Abidjan, 197 

navy. See Ivoirian Navy (Marine Na- 
tionale) 

N'Daw, Oumar, 207, 209 

Netherlands, 200 

news media, 147 

Neyo people, 58 

Niabe, Gnagbe, 28-29 

Niaboua people, 58 

Niamkey, Hyacinthe Adiko, 168 

Niger: aid to and relations with, 173, 176; 
in Entente, 23; as French West African 
colony, 13; military accord (1961), 197 

Niger-Congo language family {see also 
Krou language; Kwa language; lan- 
guages), 49, 50, 57 

Nigeria, 176 

Nigerian Civil War (1966-70), 176 
Niger River, 8 
Nimba Mountains, 45 
Nkrumah, Kwame, 174, 175 
Nzima people, 56 
Nzi River, 45 
Nzo River, 45 

OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) 

Office for the Promotion of Ivoirian Enter- 
prise (Office de Promotion de 1' Enter- 
prise Ivoirienne: OPEI), 105 

officer corps, 169, 192-93 

oil industry {see also natural gas), xxvii, 
94, 125-27 

oil price shock, 95, 96, 125-27 

ONT. See National Telecommunications 
Bureau (Office National de Telecom- 
munications: ONT) 

Opadjele, Gnabe. See Niabe, Gnagbe 

Ordinary Budget (Budget Ordinaire), 
100-102 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

174, 178 
Ory, Felix, 187 



palm oil industry, 115 

pan-Africanism, 175, 184 

parastatals: agricultural development bank 

as, 104; increase in number of, 99-100; 

proposed privatization of, 97-98 
Paris Club, xxviii, 97, 136-38 
PDCI. See Democratic Party of Cote 

d'lvoire (Parti Democratique de Cote 

d'lvoire: PDCI) 
penal code, 210 

People's Democratic Republic of Korea. 

See Korea, North 
People's Republic of China. See China 
PETROCI. See Petroleum Operations 

Company of Cote d'lvoire (Petrole de 

Cote d'lvoire: PETROCI) 
petroleum industry. See oil industry 
Petroleum Operations Company of Cote 

d'lvoire (Petrole de Cote d'lvoire: 

PETROCI), 98, 125 
Phillips Petroleum Company, 125, 127 
pineapple industry, 117 
pipeline, gas, 127 
plantain production, 118, 120 
planter class, 3-4, 19, 73, 161 
plateau, 40, 43 
Poland, 173 

police forces {see also International Crimi- 
nal Police Organization (Interpol)), 
207-8 

Police Forces (Ministry of Internal Secu- 
rity), 208 

political parties (pre-independence), 19 

political system: constitutional multiparty 
fiat for, 146; de facto single-party, 4, 
163-64; elite in, xxvi, 4, 73, 157, 
160-62, 164, 167; influence of France 
on, 4; instability in, 34-35; opposition 
to, 31-32, 160, 162-64, 166-68; orien- 
tation toward, 160; patronage in, 76- 
77, 78; role of military in, 30, 203-4; 
stability of, 27, 203 

population {see also immigrants; migra- 
tion; mortality rates; resettlements): 
concentrations of, 47-48; French peo- 
ple in, 93, 105-6, 166-67, 170; growth 
of, 46; volume of foreign, 61 

poro societies, 61 

Port Bouet, 132, 170, 191 

ports, 129, 130, 131 

Portugese explorers, 7 

postal service, 134 

poverty, 89 



256 



Index 



precipitation, 45-46, 111, 124 
prefect (prefet), 25, 153-54 
prefectures. See administrative divisions 
president, 147-48, 149, 151-52; powers 

related to military of, 186 
Presidential Guard and Militia (Garde 

Presidentielle et Milice: GPM), 188, 

189, 192 

price mechanism: in domestic economy, 
xxvii, 99, 137, 138, 161; of Interna- 
tional Cocoa Organization, 112 

prison system, 210-11 

privatization (see also parastatals, proposed 
privitization of), 97-98 

Progressive Villages, 202 

property ownership. See land tenure 

Protestant religions, 72 

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu- 
gees (1967), 206 

Public Works Authority (Direction et Con- 
trole des Grands Travaux: DCGTX), 
166 

purges, political, 25 

Qadhafi, Muammar al, 174, 177 
Qadiriya brotherhood, 70 
Quran (Islam), 70 

radar network, 183 
railroads, 129 

RAN. See Abidjan-Niger Railroad (Regie 
du Chemin de Fer Abidjan-Niger: 
RAN) 

Rawlings, Jerry, 174-75 
rebellion in French colonies, 20 
recession, 136 

Regional Maritime Instruction Center, 
197 

religions (see also Harrism; Protestant 
religions; Roman Catholicism): local 
and African, 64-69; of the North, 68- 
69; of the South, 66, 68; syncretic, 73 

religious tolerance, 65 

reservoirs, 45 

resettlements, 47 

rice production, 118 

river systems, 40, 43, 44-45 

roads, 129, 130-31 

Roman Catholicism: educational system 
established by, 14; prevalence of, 72 
Romania, 173 



rubber industry, 115 
rural areas, 29 

SAA. See African Agricultural Union 

(Syndicat Agricole Africain: SAA) 
Sahara, Western, 1177 
Sahara Desert, 43 
Saint Louis, 8 
Sankara, Thomas, 174-75 
San-Pedro (port), 130, 131, 192 
Sanwi people, 7, 28, 55 
Sassandra, 192 

Sassandra River, 40, 43, 44-45, 111 

savanna region, xxiii, 40, 43-44, 110, 
120; crops of, 115, 120; sugar indus- 
try in, 116 

schools: Quranic, 51, 81; Roman Catho- 
lic, 72, 81 

security: internal, 185, 206-10, 212-13; 
international, 183-84 

Sekou Toure, Ahmed, 174, 175 

Senegal, 8; as French West African col- 
ony, 13; governor general of, 13; in- 
dependence of, 23; in Mali Federation, 
23; relations with, 173-74 

Senegalese Irregulars (Tirailleurs Sene- 
galais), 184-85 

Senegal River, 8 

Seniambele people. See Senoufo people 
Senoufo people, xxvi, 6, 50; culture of, 

60-61; representation in army of, 166 
Senoussiya brotherhood, 70 
service sector, 95; labor force employment 

in, 105 
Shia sect. See Islam 
Shultz, George, 177 
Siena people. See Senoufo people 
Sikasso Plateau, 45 

SIR. See Ivoirian Refining Company (So- 
ciete Ivoirienne de Raffinage: SIR) 

SITRAM. See Ivoirian Maritime Trans- 
port Company (Societe Ivoirienne de 
Transport Maritime: SITRAM) 

Slavery Convention (1926), 206 

slave trade, 7-8 

social services, 77, 88 

social structure, 4-5; assimilation and as- 
sociation policies for, 12, 55; civil ser- 
vants in, 73, 77; development of, 39-40; 
effect of change in, 160-63; elite in, 12, 
16, 23, 39, 73, 76-78; lack of develop- 
ment of, 79-80; lineage organization in, 



257 



Cote d'lvoire: A Country Study 



51-55, 57-59, 61, 65-66; middle class 
in, 77-78; women in, 78-79 
social unrest, xxviii, xxx, 25-27, 31-35, 
162, 163 

SODEMI. See Ivoirian Mining Company 
(Societe pour le Developpement Minier 
de Cote d'lvoire: SODEMI) 

solar power, 125 

Solidarity Fund (Council of the Entente). 

See Loan Guaranty Fund (Council of 

the Entente) 
Solomougou River, 45 
Songhai (vassal state), 5 
Soninke Empire, 59 
South Africa, 144, 176 
South African Airways, 176 
Soviet Union, 144; relations with 172-73, 

177, 178, 198 
Special Investment and Capital Equip- 
ment Budget (Budget Special d'lnves- 

tissement et d'Equipement: BSIE), 

100-2, 131 
spending, public, xxiii, 99-100, 137; 

budgets for, 100-102; for defense, 201; 

for education, 81, 85-86; for public 

health care, 87 
standard of living, 40 
State Security Court as superior court, 

152, 153 

stock exchange. See Abidjan Stock Ex- 
change (Bourse de Valeurs d' Abidjan) 

strikes: by PDCI, 20; by public em- 
ployees, 34; by school teachers' union, 
33; by students, 27, 32-33, 166; wild- 
cat, 169 

student opposition, 27, 32-33, 171-2 
succession (see also Houphouet-Boigny, 

succession debate over), 31-32, 164-66, 

169 
Sudan, 5 

Sudan, French (see also Mali): as French 
West African colony, 13; in Mali Fed- 
eration, 23 

Sudanic empires, 5 

Sufism. See Islam 

Sugar Development Company (Societe 
de Developpement Sucrier: SODE- 
SUCRE), 99, 116 

sugar industry, 115-16 

sunna (Islam), 70 

Sunni sect. See Islam 

Superior Council of Magistrates, 151 

Superior Council of the Judiciary, 153 



superior courts, 152; High Court of 

Justice as, 152, 153 
Supreme Court (see also court system), 

146, 193; Judicial Section of, 152; as 

superior court, 152 
Sweden, 200 
Switzerland, 200 
Syria, 51 

Syrians in Cote d'lvoire, 171 

Taabo (reservoir/lake), 45 
Tagba Lagoon, 45 
teachers, 84-85 

technical assistance (see also cooperants), 198 
technology imports, 93 
telecommunications, 133-34 
telephone circuits, lines, and cable, 133 
Tenneco, 126 
Territorial Assembly, 19 
thermal energy facilities, 123-25 
Thierry-Lebbe, Alexis, 207 
Tidjaniya brotherhood, 70 
Tiemba River, 45 

timber industry (see also deforestation; 

forest region), xxvii, 94, 109-10, 113- 

15, 138, 
Timbuctu, 5 
Togo, 49, 173, 174, 175 
Toura Mountains, 43 
Toure, Samori, xxiv, 10, 47, 59, 60, 70 
trade policy: of import substitution, 93, 

121-23; protection levels of, 97, 122-23 
trade unions. See labor unions 
trading partners, 134, 173, 176-78 
treaties with France, 170, 176-77 
Treich-Laplene, Maurice, xxiv, 10 
Tsetse fly, 120 

UGTCI. See General Federation of Ivoir- 
ian Workers (Union Generale des 
Travailleurs de Cote d'lvoire: UGTCI) 

UMOA. See West African Monetary 
Union (Union Monetaire Ouest Afri- 
caine: UMOA) 

underemployment. See labor force 

unemployment. See labor force 

Union of Burkinabe, 213 

United Nations: Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 87; diplomacy in, 177-79; 
Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), 122; support for training 
facilities by, 197 



258 



Index 



United States, 177-78, 200; Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA), 200-201; Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), 212; Interna- 
tional Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) program, 200; relations 
with, 144, 177-8 

university (National University of Cote 
d'lvoire), 27, 32-33, 51, 79, 84, 86, 
172, 178 

University of Abidjan, 84 

Upper Volta {see also Burkina Faso), 10, 
17, 26; in Entente, 23; as French West 
African colony, 13-14, 17, 19; in Mali 
Federation, 23 

urban areas: development of, 48, 160; ef- 
fect of migration to, 26, 48; society of, 
74, 76; unrest in, 163 

Verdier, Arthur, 9 
veterans, 203 

Vichy government, xxv, 16, 185 
villages, xxiii, 154, 155 
"Villages under Supervision," 202 
violence (1949), 20 

Voltaic people {see also Mossi people; 

Senoufo people), 50; cultures of, 60-61 
Voltaic Region, 48-49 
Volta River Basin, 43 
von Bismarck, Otto, 9 
Vridi Canal, 74, 131 
Vridi thermal station, 123, 125 

wages, 107-9, 168-69 
Wahabist puritanism, See Islam 
waterways, 74, 129 



Wattara, Thomas D'Anquin, 187 
Wattara clan, 60 

West African Economic Community 
(Communaute Economique de l'Af- 
rique Occidentale: CEAO), 121 

West African Monetary Union (Union 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine: UMOA), 
102 

West Atlantic Region, 48-49, 56-59 
WHO. See World Health Organization 

(WHO) 
wind-powered pumps, 125 
Wobe people, 57-58 
women: in labor force, 105; in National 

Service, 192, 202; in social structure, 

78-79 
Women's Corps, 202 
World Bank: loans for road construction 

and improvement, 131; pressure from, 

122; structural adjustment programs of, 

88, 98, 136-38 
World Health Organization (WHO), 87, 

88; Special Program on AIDS (SPA) of, 

88 

World War I, 184-85 
World War II, xxiv-xxv, 4, 30, 185; im- 
pact of 16-21 



Yace, Philippe, xxix, 24, 31-32, 34, 151, 

157, 158, 165 
Yamoussoukro, 25, 65, 183, 192 
yams: festival of, 68; production of, 

117-18, 120 
Yopougon prison, 211 

Zaire, 176 



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